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1 Introduction
The objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the literature on the economic effects
of ^nancia/ reporting regMiaftW. It adds to the existing studies in this area by focusing
on jma// anrf m^flMm-s/zed/jriva/e con^MzniW in an economy. More specifically, it (1)
studies compliance by small private companies in the Netherlands with financial
reporting regulation, (2) looks at the way in which financial reporting regulation is
perceived by Dutch small company managers as well as credit analysts dealing with
smaller firms, and (3) attempts to measure the costs of compliance imposed on small
private companies as a result of financial reporting regulation. These three aspects are
the subjects of empirical investigations.
1.1 The regulation of financial reporting
Businesses constitute the supply side of the market for accounting information, through
their financial reporting activities. Various groups of users of financial reporting
information make up the demand side. In most market economies, the market for
financial accounting information is increasingly influenced by compulsory standards and
' As used in this dissertation, the term^na/icia/ repomng regKfarion is intended to include all
regulations (e.g. laws, rules and standards) that affect the characteristics (i.e. timing, content,
form and verification) of financial reporting practice (see also Lev [1988, p. 1]). Financial
reporting regulation takes the form of either ./znanria/ reporftng fegülario/i through company
law or^/ianda/ reporting .rta/Kiarcis issued by governmental bodies or by private organisations.
In the Netherlands, company law is the primary source of financial accounting regulations.
^ In this dissertation, a />uMc compa/ry is defined as a company whose shares are officially
listed. In the same way, a /jnva/e company is defined as a company whose shares are not
publicly listed. In the Dutch context, a /iaam/oze ven/jootecfojp (NV) refers to a public limited
liability company that may have its shares traded on a stock exchange, but which is allowed
to block the transfer of its shares. A oe.r/ore/i vennooKc/zap (BV) is a private limited liability
company the shares of which cannot be freely transferred. Although the Dutch term 'besloten
vennootschap' is not fully equivalent to the US term 'private company', both definitions share
the basic characteristics of a limited number of shareholders and a less distinct separation of
management and ownership.
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government legislation. This increase in the intensity of financial reporting regulation
has not gone unchallenged, and has resulted in an elaborate debate on the desirability
of financial reporting regulation. The prime focus in this debate has been on the position
of large, publicly listed firms, as pointed out by Taylor and Turley [1986, p. 19].
However, recent developments within European economies (e.g. the introduction of the
Fourth EC Directive) have led to the regulation of financial reporting by companies that
are neither public nor large. Hence, the debate on financial reporting regulation deserves
to be extended to include arguments for and against the regulation of financial reporting
activities by smaller or private companies. Essentially, such a debate should concentrate
on two issues:
2. How does the firm size or ownership structure affect the ^^p/j/y of financial
accounting information? This area involves such questions as: what incentives do small
company managers have to voluntarily disclose accounting information and what are
their views on mandated financial reporting? How do small company managers react to
financial reporting regulation in terms of compliance with these regulations? And, does
regulation have a disproportionate economic effect on small or private companies? Can
it be shown, for example, that small private companies bear disproportionately higher
direct costs (e.g. information production and information disclosure costs) as a result of
accounting regulation? Indirect costs (e.g. competitive disadvantages) may also be
relatively higher for these firms.
2. How does the firm size or ownership structure affect the de/na/ui for financial
accounting information? Among the topics which need to be discussed in this respect
are: who are the primary users of accounting information on small private companies
and are these any different from the primary users of the financial statements produced
by large public firms? Are there differences in the information needs of users depending
on the size or ownership structure of the firm they are interested in? Will regulatory
requirements that are designed for large public firms ensure the provision of information
that meets the needs of users of small company accounting infonnation?
It is these questions which this dissertation addresses. Given the fact that the bulk of the
financial accounting literature has concentrated on the accounting environment of large
public firms, the study presented in this dissertation deviates from most existing studies
on financial reporting regulation by focusing on small and medium-sized private
companies. Essentially, it explores an application of the arguments used in the debate
on financial reporting regulation to the case of small and medium-sized firms. It
examines in detail the typical characteristics of the accounting environment of small and
medium-sized private companies, the main differences with the accounting environment
of large public firms, and the implications of these differences for the debate on the
necessity of financial reporting regulation. Given the domination within the empirical
literature of studies on the demand for financial reporting information, this study also
differs by focusing to a large extent on the supply side of the accounting information
market. The effect of financial reporting regulation on small and medium-sized private
companies is investigated empirically by studying (1) compliance with current legal
requirements, (2) the way in which small company managers perceive financial reporting
12regulation, (3) the cost effects of financial reporting regulation on small private
companies, and (4) the views of loan officers on the financial information issued by
medium-sized companies.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first part (section 1.2) introduces
the primary topics which this dissertation addresses. It describes the context in which
the debate on accounting regulation for small and medium- sized privately owned firms
has evolved and introduces the key issues in this debate. Section 1.3 discusses the
importance of the issue of financial reporting regulation for small and medium-sized
companies in a European context. The latter part of this chapter (section 1.4) gives an
outline of the dissertation and introduces the remaining chapters.
1.2 Differential financial reporting regulation . •
In the accounting literature, attention has been given to the impact of financial reporting
regulation on small and medium-sized private firms only since the late seventies,
especially after initial research showed that compliance costs per monetary unit of sales
were considerably higher for smaller firms [SEC, 1977]. These findings raised questions
about the desirability of uniform disclosure across all firms [Horwitz and Kolodny,
1982, p. 31]. Given the continuous growth in the regulation of financial reporting in
most western countries, the suggestion was raised that extensive regulations place an
undue burden on the reporting firms. Although this standards over/oad argument was
also directed at the experience of large public firms [see Hammill, 1979, Tweedie,
1981], the main concern was whether existing or proposed regulations would have a
disparate impact on small or privately owned firms. Hence, a case was made for the
introduction of d#fi?rCTtfi<2/ reporrmg regw/arion where the implementation of financial
reporting regulation depended on the characteristics of the firms involved, the
information needs of the primary external parties and the application of a cost/benefit
analysis of such regulations [Gutberlet, 1983].
The determination of a starting point for the implementation of differential financial
reporting regulations depends greatly on the implied purpose of disclosing the financial
statements in question. The role of the annual report in stewardship would seem to call
for differential regulations based on legal status. The use of accounting information as
a monitoring device will be more prominent in relation to public firms, where there are
a large number of shareholders and an autonomous board of directors. In private firms,
however, the distinction between owners and managers is less clearcut and shareholders
are often active as managers. If, on the other hand, the need of external users is
advocated as the primary objective of financial accounting, firm size would seem to be
a more important factor. In the case of a smaller firm, the number of potential user
groups is smaller, the number of users within each group is smaller and users may be
in a better position to get the information they desire without legal interference. In this
context, Traas [1976] distinguishes three firm models: ........ . „-, .
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• the proprietary model, where the firm is essentially an extension of the owner. The
firm is closely related to the individual owner and there is no separation of ownership
and control. Given the close relation between business information and personal
information on the owner, there is little demand for the disclosure of financial
accounting information and the accounting information produced is relevant chiefly for
the owner himself;
• the c/as«/ (or classical) model, where there is a formal separation between ownership
and control, but where the owners of the firm are still very active as managers;
• the opew model, where the firm is described as a coalition of participants, in which
the role of financial accounting information is to provide participants with information
which they can use to decide on the continuation of their relationship with the firm.
The open model would typically fit a large public company, whereas the closed model
could be typified by a medium-sized private company. The classification presented does
not, however, provide a rigorous and easy means of categorising any individual firm.
In principle, a small private firm may well fit the prescription of the open model. Also,
there is no unambiguous relation between the models specified in respect of the amount
and content of the accounting information which is to be disclosed. The classification
presented does, however, draw attention to the fact that financial reporting requirements
should not necessarily be uniform for all firms. As a result, different financial reporting
requirements may be called for in relation to different types of firms. Hence, the
relevance of the arguments used in the discussion of the desirability of financial
reporting regulation, which usually apply to large companies that are listed on a stock
market and in whose economic well-being a large number of societal groups are
interested, may well change when applied to non-large, non-public firms.
This dissertation is concerned with the financial reporting regulation debate, focusing
on non-large (i.e. small and medium-sized) private companies. A primary topic in this
context is the discussion of differential financial reporting regulations for small or
privately owned firms. Although the arguments used in the differential reporting debate
are not always clearly distinguished when applied to small firms versus privately owned
firms, a closer look indicates that both characteristics may result in different approaches
to the issue of exempting firms from accounting regulation. Obviously, most of the
differential financial reporting arguments have been put forward in the context of firms
that are both small and privately owned'. For this reason, the focus in this dissertation
is on .wia// a/w/ m£d/u/n-5Jzed private /irmj''. It thereby circumvents the application of
The term j/na// c/ose/y AeW./ir7n is sometimes used in this context. This may be defined as
rm wir/i a /imjfaf /uwnter o/ OHTieri w/io are genera/fy dasefy invo/ved in rA«
* The term 'small and medium-sized private firms' is not necessarily the equivalent of the more
general term 'small and medium-sized enterprises' (SME) or its Dutch synonym 'Midden- en
kleinbedrijf. The latter term (or its abbreviation, MKB) is widely used in Dutch, and appears
in the names of numerous committees and institutes. Nevertheless, it is very hard to find a
14differential reporting arguments to small public companies and large private companies,
and focuses on those firms for which differential financial reporting requirements may
be most called for.
In Europe, the differential reporting issue has gained increasing importance as a result
of the Fourth EC Directive on corporate financial reporting. This Directive contains
exemptions for small and medium-sized firms, apparently following the standards
overload argument. Thus, the Directive depicts a convenient example of many of the
difficulties addressed in this debate, such as:
1. How should the firms that are to be exempted from (part of) the regulations be
defined? Should such a definition be based on firm size or on some other characteristic
such as legal status? Can one conclude, for example, that full disclosure would impose
disparate costs on small firms and can it be shown to what extent the exemptions
provided shield the firms exempted from disproportionate cost effects? Also, any
definition based on firm size (as is used in the Directive) raises the problem of which
variables to use as a proxy for firm size and what boundaries to set to define small or
medium-sized firms.
2. What regulations should these firms be exempted from? Should exemptions only
include disclosure requirements (i.e. the volume of the information disclosed) or should
differential measurement rules be included (i.e. relating to the content of the information
disclosed)?
Economic arguments have played a dominant role in the differential reporting debate.
First, there is a belief that compliance costs are disproportionately higher for small and
privately owned firms. Second, the benefits of disclosing general purpose financial
statements seem relatively small for small private firms because of the limited number
of potential users of such information. Moreover, these users could have different
information needs when dealing with small or closely held firms. However, although
these beliefs are frequently expressed, they are rarely empirically investigated. It is the
aim of this dissertation to contribute to the empirical literature on the economic effects
of financial reporting regulation for small and medium-sized private firms, within the
framework of the Dutch financial reporting regulatory context.
precise definition of this term. Even one the most prestigious Dutch dictionaries ('Van Dalen
Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal') provides only the following meaningless definition:
"firms that are not very large". Many statistical reports also tend to define the term by a
similar process of negative contrast:
"Firms performing government or semi-government tasks, or active in the
agricultural, fishing or mining industry, or having more than a hundred
employees, are not defined as small or medium-sized firms" [Thurik, 1990],
In this dissertation, the term 'small and medium-sized private firms* is used in the context of
company law definitions, that are typically based on a combination of three measures: total
assets, total annual sales and the number of employees.
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The economic effects of financial reporting regulation have received only limited
attention in Dutch accounting literature [Van de Poel, 1988, p. 20]. Studies by Mertens
[1991] and Maijoor [1991] have contributed to this field of research, in line with the
observations made by Bouma [1988, p. 285] and Van der Grinten [1981] that an
evaluation of the costs and benefits of financial reporting regulation deserves more
attention in the Netherlands. Studies on the effects of financial reporting regulation on
small and medium-sized firms are almost non-existent in the current Dutch accounting
literature*. Apart from a limited number of studies of the contents of small companies'
financial statements [e.g. NOvAA, 1986] and the use of medium-sized companies'
financial statements by bankers [NOvAA, 1991b], small and medium-sized company
financial reporting and the regulation thereof have not received much attention from
Dutch accounting scholars. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap.
1.3 Financial reporting regulations for small and medium-sized firms
The following observation is fundamental to this dissertation. Prior to 1984, Dutch
company law exempted virtually all private companies from mandated financial
accounting disclosures, leaving the supply of accounting information by these firms to
market forces*. With the adaptation of Dutch company law to the Fourth Directive in
1983, all public and private companies, irrespective of their size, had to prepare annual
accounts in some fomf. This situation is in sharp contrast with that in the US, where
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is concerned solely with publicly listed
companies subject to the Federal securities legislation that it administers [Zeff, 1994,
p. 23]. These companies constitute only a small fraction of the total number of
businesses in the US (see table 1.1). ' . ; •••. ^ zijsasss»?
Most other US companies, although they may be subject to State company law
requirements, are not required to disclose any financial statements periodically or to
have their financial statements audited [Zeff et al., 1992, p 357, ftn 47]. In contrast with
the harmonisation efforts of the EC, little has been done in the US to harmonise state
company laws and there has never been a general Federal corporation law, nor is there
at present a strong movement in favour of such legislation [Landau, 1988, p. 56].
* A small number of studies have attempted to measure the cost for small and medium-sized
firms of complying with all the various administrative obligations (e.g. ACE-Resultants [1984]
and Leerstoel Marktbeleid [1991]), while other studies have focused on the compliance costs
relating to taxation regulations (e.g. Snijder [1981] and Allers [1994]).
' Private companies were subject to the provisions of the Corporate Financial Statements Act
only if their share capital was in excess of/500,000 or if their total assets were in excess of
/8 million and they employed at least 100 staff. >
' Dutch company law requirements also apply to cooperatives and mutual insurance companies.
Such firms are not, however, discussed in this dissertation. * -• .ws*™*
16Instead, state corporate laws develop in an environment of competition between states
which should ensure the enactment of corporate laws that meet the needs of the business
community [Landau, 1988, p. 62]. Others, however, feel that the competition between
state regulations is more of a "race to the bottom", leaving few states with effective
requirements on the disclosure and auditing of financial statements [Zeff et al., 1992,
pp. 356-357].
Table 1.1. The scope of financial reporting regulations in the US and the Netherlands.
Estimated total number Estimated number of companies
of businesses affected by financial reporting
regulations
United States' ., .,.,,. 13,300,000 . 10,000 (0.08%)
Netherlands* 471,000 175,000* (37.2 %)
1. The data on the US data have been supplied by Evans [1987, pp. 657-674].
2. The data on the Netherlands have been supplied by the Central Office of Statistics,
"Statistiek van het ondememingen en vestigingenbestand 1987", Voorburg.
3. The figures presented are based on the total number of public companies, private companies
and cooperatives. The number of annual accounts disclosed may be lower due to non-
compliance or exemptions. The total number of companies affected by financial reporting
regulations in the European Community is estimated at 2,500,000 [OECD Working Group
on Accounting Standards, 1987, "Availability of Financial Statements", Working Document
No. 2, OECD, Paris].
As a result of the limited scope of the US federal financial reporting regulations, both
the SEC and the FASB may have relatively little need to be concerned about the costs
that accounting and disclosure standards might impose on small and medium-sized
companies which have not entered the securities market. However, given the broad
scope of the European company law requirements, interest in the economic effects of
financial reporting regulations on small and medium-sized companies ought to be much
greater in Europe. Although the Fourth Directive does provide exemptions for small and
medium-sized firms, these are mainly concerned with disclosure requirements relating
to the vo/wme of the financial statements, while relatively little attention has been
directed to harmonising measurement requirements pertaining to the con/en/ of the
financial statements [van der Tas, 1992, p. 250]. Very little empirical evidence has been
presented on the effect of such exemptions on the cost imposed on small and medium-
sized companies.
The task of enforcing financial reporting rules also seems comparatively easy in the US,
as opposed to the job of the numerous enforcement agencies in Western European
countries, which have to deal with perhaps tens or even hundreds of thousands of
companies affected by regulatory accounting rules [Zeff, 1994, p. 23]. Nevertheless,
although the problems of enforcing compliance can be expected to be substantial in most
EC countries, it seems that, within most EC countries, little attention has been given to
the need for securing actual compliance with the standards [Zeff, 1994, p. 4]. Again,
17empirical evidence on compliance with European financial reporting regulations is rather
scarce. .
1.4 Purpose and outline of the dissertation
This dissertation originated from a research project that was aimed at a cost-benefit
analysis of Dutch financial reporting regulation. Part of the research project focused on
the effects of financial reporting regulation on small and medium-sized private firms*.
The results of this study are presented in this dissertation.
Consequently, the main objective of this thesis is to determine the effects of the change
in the regulatory requirements on financial reporting which was introduced in the
Netherlands in 1983 on small Dutch companies. Building on the existing literature on
the effect of accounting regulation, the empirical chapters in this dissertation investigate
the impact of financial reporting regulation on small companies in terms of (1)
compliance with current legal financial reporting requirements, (2) the way in which the
managers of small firms perceive current financial reporting regulations, (3) the
accounting costs imposed on small companies as a result of current financial reporting
requirements, and (4) the views of a primary user group of small and medium-sized firm
financial reports, i.e. bankers, on the usefulness of the financial reporting information
supplied by these firms.
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the
theoretical debate on financial disclosure regulation with respect to its implications for
small and medium-sized privately owned firms. The arguments raised in the debate on
the desirability of financial accounting regulation are evaluated in the context of small
and medium-sized private firms, focusing finally on the standards overload debate and
the desirability of differential financial reporting regulations. The existing empirical
literature on the economic effects of financial reporting regulation and its implications
for small and medium-sized private firms are also discussed in this chapter.
Chapters 3 and 4 report on an empirical investigation into compliance with, perceptions
of and the costs of financial reporting regulation by and for small Dutch private
companies. The quality, quantity and timeliness of the information disclosed by small
firms as a result of company law requirements is investigated in chapter 3. Financial
reports disclosed by small firms are examined in relation to the years 1984 (immediately
ensuing the introduction of the financial reporting regulations for small companies) and
1990, so as to reveal any changes in the disclosures made by small firms over time.
Chapter 4 presents the results of a questionnaire survey of small firm owner/managers.
* A second study originating from the initial cost-benefit project is Maijoor [1991]. It includes
empirical studies on the effect of Dutch financial reporting regulation on (1) the choice of legal
status by Dutch firms and (2) the Dutch audit industry.
18This survey focuses on the way in which the respondents perceive prevailing financial
reporting regulations and the costs imposed on small firms by these regulatory
requirements. . . -, . • «
Chapter 5 reports on an empirical study of the views of credit analysts dealing with
small and medium-sized private firms, as to the usefulness and importance of financial
reports supplied by these firms.
The final chapter (chapter 6) summarizes the results of the empirical studies and
evaluates the effects of the regulatory change in the financial reporting environment on
small and medium-sized private companies. Some suggestions for further research into
the question of the regulation of financial reporting by small and medium-sized private
companies are also given here.
1920chapter Differential Financial :
Reporting Regulation:
Theory and Evidence I
2.1 Introduction • ^ • < • • -'•'•
The existence of various exemptions for small and/or private firms in current
financial reporting regulations, such as the Fourth EC-Directive, seems to indicate
regulators do appreciate the reality of disparate economic effects of regulation for
these firms (see Appendix I for descriptions of current differential financial reporting
regulations in the Netherlands and three other countries). But the financial accounting
literature provides no explicit theoretical framework for explaining the existence of
such exemptions. Although there are economic theories explaining the existence of
financial reporting regulations using either public interest or private interest
argumentations, these have been almost exclusively developed in the context of large
publicly listed firms. The issue of providing exemptions for firms with specific
characteristics (e.g. small or private) is hardly dealt with in these theories. Also, the
empirical evidence provided in this area is largely oriented towards large public
firms. Despite increasing interest in small firms, little research can be found on
whether financial reporting regulations have a disparate effect on smaller businesses
or on whether there are economic reasons for allowing differential financial reporting
regulation' for small and medium-sized privately held businesses. Consequently, the
rationalisation of the existence of exemptions based on public interest or private
interest arguments is largely an empirical issue that has yet to be resolved. Policy
makers who look for economic guidance on how to differentiate between financial
reporting requirements for different business sizes will find that there is much talk
but few facts. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce an outline theory on
financial accounting disclosure regulation for small and medium-sized private firms.
As such, this chapter provides a fundamental frame of reference for the empirical
chapters in the remainder of this dissertation (chapters 3, 4 and 5).
' For our purposes rftj^erenria/ re/wri/ig regufarion can be defined as "the practices which
reflect an adoptive form of financial accounting and reporting in which the implementation
of measurement and disclosure standards [...] depends upon either the characteristics and
relevant information needs (based upon purpose) of the primary external parties at interest
in financial reports issued by smaller privately owned businesses or application of
cost/benefit ratio analysis" [Gutberlet, 1983, p. 17]. . >i .<
21In applying the regulatory debate to small and medium-sized private companies, three
basic issues need to be addressed:
1. SnowW r/ze yznanria/ reporting activities o/ 5/na// and meÄum-5/zg<i ^zrms £e
regMiör«d? This discussion is an extension of the more general regulatory debate on
whether regulation of financial reporting activities by firms is desirable. The public
interest and private interest theories of financial reporting regulation and their
application to the small private firm setting will be the subject of section 2.2 of this
chapter.
2. Given the existence of financial reporting regulation, the next issue is whether
reporri/zg reg«/a//on S/IOMW fee dzj^eren/ /or s/na// and mio'iu/n-.rizea' /?rzvate
as opposed to large public companies. The differential reporting debate
provides arguments for and against differences in regulations based mostly on
differences in firm size (discussed in section 2.3.2) or ownership structure (discussed
in section 2.3.3). Also, the existing empirical research on the economic consequences
of financial reporting regulations for the small private firm context will be discussed
in order to reveal areas requiring further empirical evidence on the economic effects
of financial reporting regulation for small and medium-sized private firms.
3. If it can be argued that financial reporting regulation should be different for small
and medium-sized private firms, the third issue is /zow oTjfferentia/ reporting
regM/arion /or .y/na// and merf/jtfw-«zed przva/e ^zrray .s/zoK/d be z/np/Vmented. Various
implementations of differential financial reporting regulation have been suggested, all
emphasising their potential effect on relieving the suggested disproportionate
economic consequences for small and medium-sized private companies. The question
of how differential reporting regulations should be introduced and the various ways
regulators have dealt with this problem are discussed in Appendices I and II at the
end of this dissertation.
2.2 Theories of financial reporting regulation
Excellent and elaborate discussions of the theoretical financial reporting regulation
debate are available [e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, chapter. 7, Beaver, 1989,
chapter 5, Wölk et al., 1992, chapter 4, Easterbrook and Fishel, 1984, pp. 680-696,
Bromwich, 1985, chapter 4, Benston, 1976, chapter 4, and Maijoor, 1991,
chapter 3]. The aim of this section is to review the arguments advanced in the
regulatory debate and to review these arguments in the context of a the small and
medium-sized private company. Also the section will provide an overview of the
empirical evidence on the existence of economic effects for these firms.
2.2.1 Early theories
Theories of financial reporting regulation attempt to explain the existence of financial
reporting regulation. Early theoretical rationales for the regulation of financial
accounting originated from the concern of accounting researchers with prescribing
22how firms should report in order to provide a 'fair' presentation of the firm's
financial situation. Regulation would direct the financial accounting policies of
reporting firms thus ensuring the provision of 'good' financial accounting and
preventing the abuse resulting from inadequate financial reporting. These early
approaches to the theory of financial reporting regulation proved to be unsatisfactory
because they ignored the economic effects of regulation on the parties concerned. For
example, the various groups of users of financial accounting information and their
specific information needs were in fact disregarded as it was conceded that 'good'
financial accounting information was in the interest of all possible users. -•;
2.2.2 Public interest theories ••-.-.- •.•'••-> :
An alternative theoretical approach to accounting regulation stresses the role of the
information receiver and focuses on the utility of accounting disclosures in decision
making processes. Based on the alleged inadequacy of markets to ensure the
provision of adequate financial accounting information, theories were developed
explaining why financial reporting regulation had evolved, using the />«Mc tn/erert
as an overriding argument. The central issue in the public interest arguments is
whether or not there are some flaws in a private sector accounting information
market (i.e. some 'market failures') that would lead to the conclusion that
governmental regulation is a desirable solution to avoid such flaws and secure an
optimal level of production of accounting information [Beaver, 1989, p. 178]. These
market failures or externalities include (1) the public good problem, (2) information
asymmetry, (3) the speculation problem [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 162-169]*.
To correct these imperfections, government regulation is called for. Elaborate
discussions of the market failures mentioned can be found in Easterbrook and Fishel
[1984, pp. 680-696], Bromwich [1985, chapter 4], Watts and Zimmerman [1986,
chapter 7], Benston [1980, chapter 4], and Maijoor [1991, chapter 3]. The arguments
in favour of a regulated accounting information market' imply that, given the
existence of certain market failures, regulation can improve the information market's
efficiency in a Pareto sense.
* Early rationales for government intervention in the market for accounting information are
discussed by Leftwich [1980] and Watts and Zimmerman [1986, pp. 138-162]. These
include management monopoly control of information, naive investors and functional
fixation, and the uselessness of accounting information due to divers and subjective
accounting procedures. Assuming efficient capital markets, most of these rationales seem to
have limited scope [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 162].
' In this context, an unregulated accounting information market does not necessarily imply
that all government involvement is absent. The government still has to penalize fraud and
enforce contracts between individuals. In a free accounting information market, however,
the government should not be involved in specifying contracts through prescriptions on the
contents or volume of accounting information to be produced and disclosed.
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Critics of the public interest theories subsequently contested the existence or
materiality of the market failures suggested, or the ability of regulatory activities to
eliminate such failures. It has been argued that the market failure analysis overlooks
strong incentives in the competitive capital market for the demand and supply of
information [Horwitz and Kolodny, 1982, p. 6]. In order to attract capital suppliers,
firms can benefit from the disclosure of adequate information, while investors can
reveal their preferences for information by offering higher prices for shares of firms
that do provide information conform their needs. Ultimately, both suppliers and users
of accounting information would benefit from information production conform the
preferences of investors*. Also, by introducing the concept of non-zero contracting
costs, the desirability of regulation becomes subject to its ability to reduce
contracting costs more efficiently than private arrangements [Watts and Zimmerman,
1986, p. 169]. A further important criticism against financial reporting regulation is
that, whereas a free market may lead to w/uferproduction of information, regulation
may result in an overproduction of information. In a regulated environment, public
goods are costless (or at least subsidised). As a result, users tend to overstate their
real demand because there is no charge for it [Wölk et al., 1992, p. 90]. Since
accounting information has public good characteristics, a regulated market may lead
to an overproduction of accounting information.
The public interest debate on the desirability of financial reporting regulation is
almost exclusively directed towards large publicly quoted firms, that have ready
access to external capital markets for equity and debt finance [Keasey and Watson,
1993, p. 39]. Public interest arguments in favour of financial reporting regulation
mainly are based on the role of accounting information in capital markets. It is
normally assumed that firm shares are frequently traded, that there are strong
incentives to obtain and process information about firms and that the capital market
is efficient in processing this information and pricing the firms' stock [Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986, p. 162]. Moreover, shareholders are assumed to own diversified
portfolios and to enjoy the full benefits of limited liability [Keasey and Watson,
1993, p. 39]. This setting, however, seldom fits the situation of the small company
sector. Small public company equity is less likely to be frequently traded, which
makes exiting from such a firm more difficult and costly. Also, small public
company investors normally have tied up a large part of their wealth in the
enterprise, which makes them less likely to achieve well-diversified portfolios. Small
* Other incentives for voluntary disclosure by managers are provided by agency theory
based on the suggestion that managers are motivated to provide accounting information in
order to minimize agency costs, which is in their self-interest [Watts and Zimmerman,
1986, p. 196]. Agency theory, however, builds on the role of accounting information as a
monitoring device in contracts between agents (e.g. management) and principals (e.g.
shareholders), while public interest theories build on the hypothesis that accounting numbers
are a source of information for investment and valuation decisions. To link both premises,
it should be clear that accounting information used in contracts is valuable to investors, and
vice versa [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 198].
24public companies typically have few outside investors and major shareholders of
these firms often are directly involved in decisions on firm-activities.
The emphasis on capital markets also makes the arguments used to advocate or
oppose financial reporting regulation difficult to apply to private companies, since
these firms do not have their shares quoted on a securities market. Consequently, the
arguments used to advocate or oppose financial reporting regulation may have
considerably different implications in the small and medium-sized private firm
context [Keasey and Watson p. 39]. Also, agency theory provides a number of
reasons why the role of accounting would be different in private versus public firms.
Firstly, in private firms there is less separation of ownership and control which
would make the use of explicit contracts between owners and managers of the firm
less imperative. In a private firm the owner-managers are more likely to own a large
portion of the firm's shares since the firm owners are more likely to be active as
managers. As a result, firm managers are more likely to act in the interest of outside
shareholders and also shareholders are better able to directly monitor the actions of
management and rely less on incentive contracts using accounting numbers.
Secondly, in private firms, the lack of separation of ownership and control gives the
owner-manager both the scope and the incentives to engage in opportunistic
behaviour at the expense of outside factor suppliers. The extensive information
asymmetry between the owner manager and outside parties makes the use of
accounting numbers in contracts with outside parties more difficult. As a result more
emphasis may be placed on alternative bonding and signalling devices in private
firms and less emphasis may be placed on accounting numbers. If there is less use
for accounting information in private firms then, as a result, financial reporting
regulations may have different economic effects on private firms than on public
firms. •;••;
In case of the Fourth EC Directive, and the impact it has on the financial reporting
regulations of small and medium-sized private firms, the 'public interest' that
presumably is served by the Directive is to further enhance the freedom of
establishment for companies, to facilitate the trade within the EC as well as cross
border transactions. As an important means to achieve this objective, it was felt that
harmonisation of company law was necessary to provide an equal level of protection
for members (shareholders and employees) and other persons (mainly creditors) in all
Member States. It was found important that companies that are in competition with
one another should publish financial information that can be regarded as equivalent,
particularly in the case of limited liability companies. In the context of small and
medium-sized private firms it is important to mention that in the first proposal for the
Fourth Directive, issued in 1968, the proposed regulations applied only to public
limited liability companies. Furthermore, this proposal entailed an option to include
exemptions for small public liability companies and public limited liability companies
that were familiy businesses. However, in the final version the scope of the Fourth
Directive was extended to all public as well as private limited liability companies,
although some partial exemptions for small and medium-sized firms were included.
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The discrepancy between the original proposal for the Fourth Directive and the final
Directive as it was issued in 1973, particularly with respect to the regualtions for
small and medium size private firms, casts some doubts on whether pursuing the
public interest can explain the accounting regulations as laid down in the Fourth
Directive. It seems that in order to understand the existence of the Fourth Directive,
the proces by which the Directive was created has to be taken into account.
Therefore, a historical overview of the advancement of the regulations for small and
medium-sized private firms within the Fourth Directive, is provided in appendix I at
the end of this dissertation. . ,.. . . . .
2.2.3 Private interest theories •:.*" - > -
From the economics literature, empirical inconsistencies between the regulators'
actions and the public interest hypothesis led to a questioning of the assumption that
politicians are motivated by social welfare considerations [Watts and Zimmerman,
1986, p. 175-176]. As a result, an alternative theory of financial reporting regulation
was built on the assumption that politicians, similar to all other parties in the
financial accounting arena, act in their own interest. Private m/erar theories build on
the premise that (1) regulation has wealth-distributing effects and (2) all parties
involved (including regulators) act from self-interest. Under these assumptions, the
political process is delineated as a competition for wealth transfers [Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986, p. 222]. The outcome of the political process in terms of
regulations, depends on the lobbying activities of various parties (receiving and
providing benefits resulting from the regulation), whose involvement (and success)
depends on information and organisation costs. Regulators play their own role in this
setting, also acting from self-interest, seeking wealth transfers via the political
process [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 226]'. The actions of politicians, and the
extent to which they can pursue their private interest, are dependent on the strength
and number of other interest groups, favouring or opposing these actions.
According to the private interest theory of accounting regulation, the outcome of the
political process depends on the lobbying activities of various parties (receiving and
providing benefits resulting from the regulation), whose involvement (and success)
depends on information and organisation costs, //t/orma/ton cows arise from the
necessity to keep track with all (proposed) regulation and to estimate of the wealth
transfers to be expected from them. Since expected wealth transfers would be trivial
for individuals, information costs would generally exceed expected benefits at the
individual level. Therefore interest groups exist, emanating from economies of scale
in gathering relevant information. The size of these interest groups is limited by their
' Private interest behaviour of politicians includes actions indirectly increasing politicians'
wealth, such as transferring control of resources to government, and granting favours to
interest groups to ensure sufficient votes in future elections.
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effectiveness, which depends on their ability to influence the political process, i.e.
their orgo/wsarion castt. First, they have to be able to present views representing,
ideally, a consensus view of all its members, which depends on the homogeneity of
interests of group members. Second, large interest groups are more likely to attract
stronger opposition from those providing the wealth transfers and will encounter
more incentives for group members to free ride.
Based on the work of Downs [Downs, 1957] and Olson [Olson, 1965], Sutton [1984]
and Lindahl [1987] have tried to expand the lobbying literature to the case of
financial reporting, putting emphasis on the cost and benefits of lobbying behaviour.
Both articles try to describe which parties are expected to gain the highest net
benefits from lobbying and therefore will most actively lobby on accounting
standards. Sutton [1984, p. 82] argues that any party will only engage in lobbying
activities if the benefits expected from lobbying exceed the costs, subject to the
probability that lobbying will influence the rule-making decision. Lindahl [1987, p.
61] extended the analysis of Sutton by incorporating a free rider problem which will
restrain parties from lobbying (even if they expect net benefits) if they are assured
that another party will engage in the same lobbying activity. The implication of the
analysis on the level of individual lobbying are that
1. firms are more likely to engage in lobbying then users because firms generally are
more wealthy then users. Also users generally are holding diversified portfolios
which can be rearranged to counter any economic effects from an accounting
standard, instead of engaging in lobbying. Firms are generally less diversified and
can only at great expense avoid economic effects of accounting standard by changing
its line of business [Sutton, 1984, p. 86];
2. large firms are more likely to engage in lobbying then small firms because
benefits from lobbying are positively related to firm size. Large firms are more
likely to receive large enough benefits from the lobbying activity to overcome the
free rider problem, restraining smaller firms from lobbying and costless benefiting
from others [Lindahl, 1987, p. 62]. Also, since successful influence through
lobbying is generally preceded by resource expenditures, it is often suggested that
larger firms, with larger resources, have an edge over smaller firms in the amount of
pressure they can exert on regulators [Brown and Feroz, 1992, p. 720].
On the group level, where individuals create organisations for lobbying purposes as a
cost sharing mechanism, smaller groups are more likely to be more successful
because (1) they have relatively lower organisation costs, and (2) they are better able
to monitor compliance with group goals and overcome free riding [Lindahl, 1987,
p. 63]. Since producers of accounting information (accountants and firms) are
smaller and more homogeneous groups and are better represented in existing
organisations, they are more likely to engage in collective lobbying than users
[Sutton, 1986, p. 86]. .'',;..-./'- i.; ' , . ,- : ,;. . r, ; ,... ,.
Both Sutton and Lindahil recognise that their theories are difficult to test empirically,
given the fact that it is hard to find evidence of the magnitude, nature and timing of
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lobbying activities [Maijoor, 1991, p. 72]. In fact, very few empirical studies have
assessed the costs and benefits of lobbying activities and no studies have provided
evidence that smaller firms are less successful in the political process*. Therefore it
remains unclear whether the existence of regulations for small and medium firms or
the existence of exemptions for these firms can be explained by the disability c.q.
ability of smaller firms to influence the regulatory process
With respect to the Fourt EC Directive, as has been mentioned before, the
discrepancy between the original proposal for the Fourth Directive and the final
Directive as it was issued in 1973, particularly with respect to the regulations for
small and medium-sized private firms, may be an illustration of how private interest
arguments and lobbying activities may affect the outcome of the financial reporting
regulation process. The historical overview of the advancement of the regulations for
small and medium-sized private firms within the Fourth Directive, provided in
Appendix I at the end of this dissertation, provides some evidence that the European
accounting regulation may be a result of a political proces, in which economic
reasoning and lobbying activities from interested parties play an important role.
Especially the opposition of small and medium-sized firms in Germany has been a
strong force to limit the effects of the EC financial reporting regulations for such
firms. However, these efforts that have for example resulted in several propositions
to completely exempt a number of small closely held companies from the Fourth
Directive, have not always been very succesfull.
2.3 Financial reporting regulation, firm size and ownership structure
2.3.1 Introduction
In the remainder of this chapter, the arguments used to defend and oppose the
introduction in financial reporting regulations of exemptions based on firm size or
ownership structure will be presented and discussed. Also, existing empirical
evidence relating to the arguments advanced will be reviewed. Most arguments used
to defend differential financial reporting regulations emerge from the presumed
' In empirical tests of private interest regulation theory, firm size is a frequently used
explanatory variable for explaining and predicting accounting policies of management and
lobbying behaviour of interested parties. The interpretation of the observed effects of firm
size, however, is hard to substantiate. The use of firm size as a proxy for the political
sensitivity of a firm is often criticised as other factors beside the firm's size affect its
political visibility (e.g. industry, recent price increases, the influence of unions). Also, the
correlation between firm size and political visibility may be ambiguous as large firms may
not only bear higher political costs but also may receive more substantial political benefits
(e.g. loans or subsidies). These restrictions demand great caution in the interpretation of the
effect of firm size in empirical tests [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 239]. •• • -
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existence of differential economic effects for firms that are either small or private.
Empirical research on the economic effects of financial reporting regulation tries to
estimate the benefits or costs related to financial reporting regulation, by using
methods to either directly or indirectly measure those costs and benefits or to identify
the perceptions of respondents on cost-benefit issues. In the discussion of these
studies that will be presented in this chapter, evidently, the focus will be on the
direct and indirect implications of the results of the studies discussed for the financial
reporting environment of small and medium-sized privately held firms.
In the financial accounting literature there is no systematic line of research dealing
with financial reporting in the context of small private firms. The bulk of the
empirical literature on the economic effects of financial reporting regulation has been
directed towards large publicly held firms. Nevertheless, the results of some of these
studies may have implications for the small private firm context. Regarding the effect
of firm size on financial reporting, evidence from studies on (1) capital market
reactions to financial disclosures, (2) the timeliness of disclosure, (3) compliance
with disclosure regulations, (4) the use of financial reports by outside parties, (5)
compliance costs and (6) competitive disadvantages may provide evidence for
differential economic effects for smaller firms. Many of the studies in these areas
deal with small private firms and therefore may provide evidence for the impact of
firm size as well as the impact of ownership structure on the economic effects of
financial reporting and its regulation. Distinctive research on financial reporting in
private versus public firms includes studies on (1) accounting method choice in
private firms, (2) the usefulness of private firms' financial statements to outside
stakeholders.
As mentioned before, most empirical studies in this area have focused on companies
that are both small as well as private. However, the arguments in the differential
reporting debate should be separated between the impact of firm size and the impact
of ownership structure on the financial reporting environment of firms, since these
characteristics may result in different approaches to the issue of exempting firms
from financial reporting regulation. Therefore, the first part of this section will focus
on the arguments and accompanying empirical evidence based on firms size (2.3.2),
followed by the a discussion of the impact of ownership structure on financial
reporting issues (2.3.3). At the end of this section both approaches will be evaluated
and connected (2.3.4).
2.3.2 Financial reporting regulation and firm size
The arguments presented in favour of different financial reporting regulation for
small firms have evolved around a large number of issues, including the role of
accounting information of small firms in capital markets, the reduced usefulness of
small companies' financial statements as a result of a lack of timeliness and extensive
non-compliance with disclosure regulations, the presumption that the primary user
29groups of small firms' financial statements are different compared to large firms and
the assumption that user groups may have different information needs when dealing
with small firms. As a result, the benefits from mandatory financial disclosure for
small firms may be much lower than in the context of large public firms. Also, the
costs of complying with financial reporting regulation as well as the competitive
disadvantages resulting from financial disclosures may be relatively higher for
smaller firms. These issues will be dealt with consecutively in the following sections.
2.3.2.1 Firm size and security prices ...-• '
Empirical research into the role of financial reports of small versus large companies
in capital markets has indicated that security price reactions are stronger for smaller
firms because there are fewer alternative sources of information available to the
market [Zeghal, 1984, p. 300]. A potential explanation for this finding is that
investors can potentially earn greater trading profits by developing information to
complement financial statements of large firms than by doing so for small firms. This
results in less privately developed information on small companies being available
which increases the importance of publicly disclosed accounting information by small
firms [Atiase, 1980, p. 25]. Consequently, publicly disclosed accounting information
should generate a more extensive market reaction for small companies than for large
companies. Studies by Grant [1980], Atiase [1985], Kross and Schroeder [1988]
Lobo and Mahmoud [1989] and Zeghal [1984], all show that price reactions to
earnings announcements are invertedly related to firm size^ while Bamber [1986,
1987] finds that trading volume reactions follow the same pattern of correlation with
firm size. It has also been shown that the capital market is able to anticipate large
companies' future earnings at an earlier point in time than small companies' earnings
[Freeman, 1987]. Also, in the case of a small firm the market reaction persists for a
longer period of time indicating that small companies' earnings announcements are
more surprising and take more time for investors to interpret and act upon [Bamber,
1987]. Apparently, less information is available about small firms, resulting in less
accurate and more diffuse investors' earnings expectations and greater reliance on the
companies' earnings announcements for security pricing [Atiase et al. 1988, p. 23].
Capital market research hence shows that security price and trading volume reactions
are larger for earnings announcements of smaller firms, indicating that publicly
' The study by Grant [1980] did not actually consider a size effect but showed that security
price reactions to interim reports were smaller for firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) compared to firms whose equity securities are traded over the counter
(OTC). Since the latter group is generally relatively small, it could be argued that the
results also support the size effect. Further research by Atiase [1987] suggests that the firm
size effect can be found for NYSE as well as OTC firms and that an exchange-effect can be
found after controlling for firm size.
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disclosed information may be more valuable to investors dealing with small firms.
However, the evidence of strong investor reactions to small firms' earnings
announcements is not necessarily inconsistent with the assumption that small
companies provide information that users do not need or do not understand. While
the earnings disclosures may be informative, other disclosures could still be
unnecessary or confusing [Atiase et al., 1988, p. 21]. A further complication is that
security price reactions are also a function of the timeliness of the earnings releases.
If it can be shown that reporting lags systematically vary with firm size, the
increased stock price reactions to earnings releases of small firms may be resulting
from differences in the timeliness of earnings releases rather than the size of the
reporting firm. Therefore, studies on the timeliness of disclosures by smaller firms
and their implications for the studies on security price reaction will be discussed in
the following section.
2.3.2.2 Firm size and the timeliness of disclosures . ' •
The intensity of market reactions to earnings releases is a function of their timeliness
[Givoly and Palmon, 1982, p. 487]. Longer reporting lags provide the opportunity
for more of the information in the financial report to be supplied by other sources
(e.g. search activities by investors or predictions from earnings reports released by
other firms), resulting in lower market reactions [Chambers and Penman, 1984,
p. 21]. Empirical data supports this assumption, provided that timeliness is defined
as the date of announcement relative to the expected date of announcement (and not
relative to the end of the financial year for the firm) [Chambers and Penman, 1984,
p. 22]. This 'timing effect' was found to be persistent whether the earnings
announcement (1) contained good or bad news, (2) was an annual or interim
announcement, (3) was made by large or small firms [Kross and Schroeder, 1984,
p. 173, Atiase, Bamber and Tse, 1989].
Studies showing larger market reactions for smaller firms (section 2.3.2.1) are
confounded by these findings, given the fact that small firms generally have larger
reporting lags [Dyer and McHugh, 1975, Courtis, 1976, Chambers and Penman,
1984] and that the timeliness of the reports are negatively correlated with the firm's
profitability [Courtis, 1976, p. 50]*. The firm size effect on the timeliness of
' The profitability effect stems from the discretion of managers on the timing of
information releases in the sense that the announcement of 'bad' news is intentionally
delayed [Givoly and Palmon, 1982, p. 488, Patell and Wolfson, 1982, p. 523, Kross and
Schroeder, 1984, p. 164]. An alternative explanation for the delayed announcement of 'bad'
news is that a longer period of time is required to audit earnings reports reflecting bad news
[Trueman, 1990, p. 286]. In fact, Givoly and Palmon [1982, p. 491] suggest that the length
of the audit is the single most important determinant of the timeliness of earnings
announcements. Initially it was hypothesised that larger companies would present more
auditing problems and therefore would require a longer time period to complete the audit
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disclosures is explained from the premise that large firms have better data processing
devices and control procedures, resulting in faster preparation of the financial
statements and also shorter audit periods. Also, large firms can claim higher priority
from audit firms and 'purchase' less delay [Givoly and Palmon, 1982, p. 500, Haw
and Ro, 1990, p. 558-559]. Haw and Ro [1990] have tested the effect of firm size on
market reaction to earnings releases controlling for the timeliness of the earnings
releases and found some evidence that the firm size effect disappears for firms with
corresponding reporting lags. Their study seems to indicate that differences in stock
price reactions for firms of different sizes may be explained by differences in
reporting lags and not by firm size as such.
Several studies have looked at the timeliness of disclosures by small firms that are
not active in the securities markets (e.g. Tsang [1986], Robertson [1986]). These
studies all show that a large portion of small firms disclose their annual accounts
well over a year after the end of the financial year. Therefore, the usefulness of such
disclosures to interested parties may be doubted. In these studies, the timeliness of
disclosure typically is used as a measure of compliance with financial reporting
regulations. In studies among large firms, non-compliance with accounting
regulations is often ignored. In the small firm sector, however, non-compliance
seems to be a much more serious problem. Several studies in various countries have
demonstrated a considerable level of non-compliance by small firms with financial
reporting regulations. These studies will be discussed in the following section.
2.3.2.3 Finn size and compliance with disclosure regulations ' -
The potential of government regulation to facilitate the use of financial accounting
information of small firms often is questioned. Of course, company law and
accounting standards can reduce the range of possible accounting alternatives for
managers, thus reducing management chances to manipulate the accounting
information disclosed, and can also provide guidelines to ensure a minimum level of
financial disclosures by firms. But the enforcement of such regulations in the small
firm sector, given the large number and heterogeneity of firms, would provide an
immense task for any regulator. In fact it has been suggested that "many of the
financial reporting requirements appear not to be as vigorously enforced as they are
for widely held, publicly listed enterprises" [Keasey and Watson, 1988] and also that
[Gilling, 1977, p. 35]. However, empirical results indicated the reverse to be true [Gilling,
1977, p. 35]. Later studies have tested a large number of alternative explanatory variables
[e.g. Ashton, Willingham and Elliot, 1987, Ashton, Graul and Newton, 1989 and Carslaw
and Kaplan, 1991], generally resulting in relatively low performing prediction models for
audit delay. Other studies, however, have shown that the audit of qualified financial reports
is more time-consuming and results in a reduction of the timeliness of the report [Whittled,
1980, Keller, 1986]. ' =; • • • - . •<•• '
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in most European countries comparatively little attention has been given to securing
actual compliance with accounting standards [Zeff, 1994, p. 3].
The effectiveness of government regulation to prevent misrepresentations in financial
reporting may be established by studying non-compliance. Firms can either ignore
certain requirements for the disclosure of particular information items or they can
diminish the usefulness of such information by delaying the disclosure of the
financial statements. A number of studies have examined the contents of financial
statements disclosed. Literature on the contents of disclosures contains surveys of
corporate disclosures (1) to simply array the information content, or (2) to document
disclosure levels under different regulatory systems, or (3) to make inferences about
disclosure adequacy using disclosure indexes from the perspective that more
disclosure is better [Ball and Foster, 1982, pp. 198-199]'.
Studies that have surveyed the financial statements of small firms have shown
considerable non-compliance with accounting standards or disclosure requirements. A
study of small company financial reporting by Carsberg et al. [1985, chapter 4]
includes a small survey of accounts from small UK firms, filed with the Registrar of
Companies. The analysis of accounts was conducted in order to assess the quality of
the accounts filed, in terms of (1) the extent of compliance with accounting standards
and company law requirements and (2) the presentation of information, taking into
account understandability. The level of (detectable) non-compliance with accounting
standards and the Companies Act 1981 varied with specific requirements from 34%
of non-compliance with SSAP 12 ('Accounting for depreciation') to full compliance
with SSAP 6 ('Extraordinary items and prior year adjustments') and the disclosure of
the directors' remuneration or the auditors' remuneration as required by the
Companies Act. Out of the total sample of 113 accounts, 34 were rated as 'poor' in
terms of understandability'". Further tests revealed a statistically significant positive
association between the quality of filed accounts and (1) company-size, (2) the level
of audit fees, (3) the inclusion of an audit report and (4) the level of compliance with
accounting standards.
Tsang [1986] presents a detailed study of 58 small UK-firms regarding the quality of
the information presented and the level of compliance with the 1981 Companies Act.
A subjective classification procedure, much like the procedure used in the Carsberg
' More recent examples of disclosure content studies are Jegers and Buijink [1987], Tonkin
[1989], Cooke [1989] and Forker [1992].
" The classification was based on subjective categorisation by members of the research
team, characterised as recently qualified accountants with relatively little experience but up-
to-date technical knowledge [Carsberg, 1985, p. 77]. The authors therefore add a warning
to treat the assessment of quality with great care because of its highly subjective nature, but
seem to be able to conclude from the results of several statistical tests that the quality rating
process was reasonably reliable [Carsberg, 1985, p.78]. .•< •
33study, resulted in a quarter of the accounts to be classified as 'poor', a result fairly
consistent with the Carsberg study. The research also showed that from a sample of
256 accounts, 35% were filed too late, which is, according to Tsang, a reflection of
the difficulties of small companies in completing their accounts [Tsang, 1986, p. 55].
Robertson [1986] analyzed a sample of 100 small Scottish manufacturing companies
that had fewer than 300 employees, in order to gain (1) a better understanding of the
problems related to the auditing of small companies and (2) a better understanding of
the preparation and disclosure of small firms' financial statements. The results of the
study show that 30% of the accounts had not been filed within the required time
period. Consistent with Tsang, it was found that the smaller the company the more
likely it was to have filed statements late [Robertson, 1986, p. 9]. Compliance with
accounting standards (SSAPs) varied widely, with high non-compliance figures for
SSAP 15 on deferred taxes (32%) and SSAP 12 on depreciation (23%). The author
also found rather poor compliance with the Companies Act 1981.
Morris and Omrod [1990] studied UK company financial statements in order to
establish 1986 practice of the filing of abridged accounts. Regarding the quality of
the information provided in the financial statements examined, the authors remark
that "many instances were noted where the disclosure provisions relating to the
accounts contained in the 1981 Companies Act, did not appear to be complied with,
although the auditors did not comment on this fact" [Morris and Omrod, 1990,
p. 13].
The studies of Morris and Omrod, Tsang and Robertson also looked into the extent
to which small firms took advantage of the possibility to file abridged accounts.
Morris and Omrod found that out of 83 firms that filed accounts, 33 (40.2%) filed
abridged accounts, 40 (48.2%) voluntarily filed full accounts and 9 (10.6%) filed full
accounts because they were required to do so". Robertson's [1986, p. 11] findings
are highly consistent with Morris and Omrod, as he found that 34% of the firms in
his sample that were eligible to file abridged accounts, actually did so. Tsang found
that 25 (43.1%) of the companies in his sample filed abridged accounts in the first
year they were permitted to do so, while 6 firms (10.3%) modified their accounts
only in the second year they were permitted to. The results of Morris and Omrod
and Tsang also indicate that companies that voluntarily filed full accounts generally
appeared to be the smaller companies.
Bollen [1986] studied 94 annual reports of Dutch firms, including 64 small firms.
The financial statements reviewed were the first published by these firms after the
regulatory change of 1984, and involved the first mandatory disclosure for Dutch
" Most of these companies were required to disclose full accounts because of the size of
the holding company. For one firm that also filed full accounts there was insufficient
information to determine the reason.
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small and medium-sized firms (for details on the financial reporting requirements for
small Dutch firms, see Appendix III). The results show considerable deviation from
disclosure requirements, more seriously in the annual reports of smaller firms than of
larger ones. A similar research, published in 1986 by the Dutch Association of
Certified Accountants (Nederlandse Orde van Accountants-Administratieconsulenten,
NOvAA) reviewed 150 financial statements over 1984, filed at the Commercial
Register. Of these, four did not provide a balance sheet or accompanying notes, eight
only provided a balance sheet and sixteen used a form completely different from the
mandatory models provided in the Civil Code. Even in providing the most
elementary information like the accounting policies followed in valuation and income
calculation, a large number of companies failed to adequately comply with the
regulatory requirements. An evaluation of the results of both studies mentioned
shows considerable incompleteness of the accounts filed in the first year small firms
had to disclose their annual accounts. Roos [1992] partly replicated both studies,
using annual reports of 30 small firms concerning 1990. From the results of the
study it can be concluded tentatively that the disclosures made in 1990 are generally
more in compliance with the regulatory requirements compared to those of 1984
[Roos, 1992, p. 50]. Nevertheless, 97% of all accounts studied were still disclosed
after the latest date legally permitted, and also none of the accounts studied complied
with all legal requirements.
Other research demonstrates a reason for concern with the compliance of small
companies with accounting standards in countries outside of Europe. Ingram et al.
[1977] provide empirical data on the disclosure practices of small or closely held
businesses in the US, by analyzing the unaudited financial statements of small
businesses with which CPAs have been associated. The analysis of 169 statements
shows a considerable number of inconsistencies with the disclosure requirements
prescribed by GAAP that apply to both audited and unaudited financial statements of
both large and small enterprises. The authors conclude that disclosure in the sampled
financial statements is just as inadequate for items that are basic to fair presentation,
such as alternative accounting procedures, as it is for items that may be irrelevant in
most cases, such as earnings per share.
Ramsay and Sutcliffe [1986], in an Australian study on the financial statements of
423 unaudited exempt proprietary companies'*, analyze the extent of compliance by
proprietary companies with aspects of particular Australian Statements of Accounting
" The provisions of the Australian Companies Act and Codes establish two types of
exempted proprietary companies: audited exempt and unaudited exempt. Audited exempt
companies are not required to file their annual financial statements. Unaudited exempt
companies must file a certified copy of the company's financial statements prepared in
accordance with the Act and have to be in compliance with the Statements of Accounting
Standards issued by the Society and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia
[Ramsay and Sutcliffe, 1986, p. 49].
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Standards. Non-compliance with six accounting standards (AAS 1 through 6) ranged
from 44% to 90%. Comparing these results with several similar studies on financial
reports of listed public companies indicated a much higher level of non-compliance
among the financial statements of exempt proprietary companies.
Table 2.1. Studies on small firms' compliance with financial reporting regulation
Study Country Research sample






Ramsay and Sutcliffe [1986]










169 small or closely held businesses
113 small companies
58 small companies
100 small manufacturing companies
64 small companies
150 small companies
423 unaudited proprietary companies
83 small companies
30 small companies
Although all studies mentioned in this section, indicate that in the small firm sector,
considerable non-compliance with financial disclosure regulations does occur, none
of these studies provide any explanations for the existence or the level of non-
compliance observed. All the same, the occurrence of significant non-compliance
does indicate that regulators may have difficulty enforcing financial reporting
regulations in the small firm sector, possibly due to the large number and
heterogeneity of firms. An alternative explanation may be that regulators just have
not put much effort into trying to enforce these regulations. Since most public
attention is oriented towards large public companies, regulators may have incentives
to spend most of their resources on ensuring adequate financial reporting in that
sector. Given the relatively minor attention paid to securing compliance with small
firm accounting regulations, the usefulness of mandatory accounting disclosures by
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small firms may be questioned'*. The following section will further discuss research
on the usefulness of small firm financial statements. ; ;,_,. ,«...^-Y^,•:* &;••
2.3.2.4 Finn size and the use of financial statements > ; ^ t •,«.,,,.•.- >•:-, ,. ;>•, ,,
The parties interested in the financial reporting of large companies are numerous,
heterogeneous and with dissimilar objectives [Gutberlet, 1983, p. 18]. In this setting
the financial report contains information to satisfy the information needs of various
groups whose information needs are largely unknown. It has been argued that the
primary user groups for small firms are less diverse, more easily identifiable and
their information needs are better known [Gutberlet, 1983, p. 18]. From this
assumption it has been argued that the content of the disclosed financial accounts of a
small firm should differ from that of a large firm for two reasons:
i. 77zere are /ewer pote/ift'a/ «sm o/ r/ze /vianda/ in/orffiafzo/t
,/irroy. For large firms, an extensive list of potential financial statement users can be
formatted'''. It is unlikely, however, that such a large number of different users
would be interested in the financial statements of a small firm. Therefore, even if all
information required by regulation is relevant there are few users to benefit from it.
If the number of potential users of small firm financial statements is smaller, this
would result in fewer potential benefits and higher accounting costs per user.
" Also, the use of alternative devices to ensure the quality of financial information
disclosed, such as a mandatory audit, does not seem to be very useful in the small firm
context. The limited formal internal controls within most small companies and the limited
means of verifying whether any controls that do exist have been overridden by the
management, raises doubts concerning the feasability of a small firm audit [Keasey, Watson
and Wynarczyk, 1988, p. 124]. Furthermore, based on the assumption that small firms are
more often audited by small audit firms, the adherence to accounting and auditing standards
by small firm auditors may be less and auditor independency may be more of a problem. It
has therefore been argued that "the audit of small firm financial statements does not appear
to provide external stakeholders with much ground for supposing they are not being misled"
[Keasey and Watson, 1993, p. 58].
" Such a list could include owners, lenders, suppliers, potential investors and creditors,
employees, management, directors, customers, financial analysts and advisors, brokers,-
underwriters, stock exchangers, lawyers, economists, taxing authorities, regulatory
authorities, legislators, financial press and reporting agencies, labour unions, trade
associations, business researchers, teachers and students and the public [FASB, SFAC 1,
p. 24].
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The information needs of users dealing with small firms might be different compared
to the information needs of similar users dealing with large firms, for three reasons:
a. Users, when dealing with small firms, are involved with rfzj(fi?7wtf dec/s/o/w and
therefore (1) need other information or (2) ascribe different relevance to particular
information items. For example, a small company may have only a bank lender
making short term decisions, whereas a large company usually has numerous
investors and creditors making various types of decisions [FASB, 1981, p. 30].
£. Users dealing with small firms have d/jffe/wtr <feci,H0R-/na&(ng modeAs. The basic
issues here are (1) whether users of small firms' financial statements are substantially
less sophisticated than their large company counterparts, and, if so, (2) whether this
lack of sophistication renders the information generated by current regulation less
useful. Although it seems reasonable to assume that banks will assign their more
experienced loan officers to large loans and their less experienced officers to loans of
smaller size, it does not necessarily mean these officers associated with smaller loans
are confused by current regulation [Murray and Johnson, 1983, pp. 8-9].
c. Groups involved with small firms have a dzj^renf retozo/iy/zzp with these firms
and as a result have access to sources of information additional to the financial
statements. Their knowledge of the enterprise affairs may be more intimate or they
may be in a position to obtain the information they need directly from a small firm
from knowledge about the management of the firm and detailed information of the
company's plans [Abdel-Khalik, 1983, pp. 81-83]. As a result certain financial
statement items may be less useful to these users.
In order to gather empirical evidence on the arguments presented above, the first
issue would be to establish whether the information needs of a particular user vary
with the size of the reporting firm. Several empirical studies have specifically looked
into differences in user needs as a result of the size of the reporting firm. Falk et al.
[1976] looked into the information needs of commercial lending officers when
dealing with financial statements of closely held companies. The study produces a list
of 43 financial statement items and the importance lending officers attached to each
item. Baker [1990] tried to establish whether loan officers would charge higher
interest premiums if the financial report of a company was not audited or if the
financial statements were not based on GAAP but were income-tax based. The
results of the study indicate that financial statements that are not audited or not
GAAP-based, may (separately) result in higher interest premiums. Obviously, such
reports will be most often used by small closely held firms. In both studies however,
the results are not directly compared to information needs related to large public
firms. •
Stanga and Tiller [1983] compared the information needs of bank loan officers
making lending decisions that involve large public companies with the information
needs of bank loan officers making lending decisions involving small private
companies. The authors conclude "that the information needs of bank loan officers
do not differ substantially between large public companies and small private
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companies". Information needs were not identical but the responses were
substantially similar for loan officers of large banks and those of smaller banks
(which were assumed to be more familiar with decision processes involved in
evaluating loans for small companies). A similar study by Berry, Citron and Jarvis
[1987] used a postal questionnaire and interviews to study the perceptions of UK
bankers on the information requirements when dealing with large and small
companies. The results of the study show that irrespective of the size of the company
they are dealing with, bankers use the full financial statements as the primary source
of accounting information. It was, however, also found that there were differences in
emphasis placed on certain information-items as a result of the complexity of the
business and the availability of alternative information sources, indicating that on a
more detailed level the information needs of bankers are different when they are
dealing with smaller firms.
Since in some countries small firms are allowed to disclose abridged financial
statements, some studies have looked at the effect of such reduced disclosure on the
user groups, particularly bankers. Berry, Citron and Jarvis [1987] show that the
audited full statutory accounts are the most important source of financial information
used by bankers irrespective of the size of the company they are dealing with. They
also found it to be unlikely that in the case of small firms alternative sources of
information could replace the statutory accounts as most of these are not readily
available. From the results of their study, the authors conclude that a move towards a
reduction in disclosure requirements for small firms is not likely to reduce the
burden on these firms unless an alternative approach to lending is taken by bankers.
Morris and Omrod [1990], surveying assessment agencies and credit managers, also
find the full filed accounts, when they are available, to be the single most important
source of information for both groups when dealing with small firms. If modified
(abridged) accounts were filed by a small company, the respondents in the study felt
it would be possible to compensate half of the information lost through other sources
of information but that the costs to obtain this information would be considerable
[Morris and Omrod, 1990]. Both the studies by Berry Citron and Jarvis [1987] and
Morris and Omrod [1990] as well as a study by Egginton [1977] show that lending
bankers dealing with small firms rely extensively on other sources of information in
addition to the annual report, particularly plant visits and internal bank records of
past experiences with the client. These sources of non-accounting information are
more important in the context of a small firm to compensate for the restricted
number of alternative sources of information on these firms.
On the issue of whether accounting information disclosed by small firms is useful
given the decision making processes of users of such information, there is virtually
no research available". Empirical research on the use of accounting information in
" Some evidence may be gathered from research by Libby [1975] indicating there is no
significant difference in the ability to predict company failure using accounting information
39banks' loan-granting decisions has shown that accounting information plays an
important part in this context'*, but few of these studies have specifically looked at
loan granting decisions in a small firm context. Danos, Holt and Imhoff [1989]
conducted an experimental study on the use of accounting data in the lending
decisions in the context of medium-sized firms. As far as the decision models of
bankers dealing with small versus large firms are concerned, no empirical literature
has been published to our knowledge'^.
The empirical studies presented in this section do not seem to provide strong
evidence of differences in information needs of bankers when dealing with small
versus large firms. However, several points should be taken into account here.
Firstly, in most of the studies bankers indicated that the full statutory accounts are
preferred over abridged accounts. Secondly, bankers require the statutory accounts to
be audited and rely much less on internal management accounts that are not audited
by an external accountant. Therefore the mandatory disclosure of unaudited abridged
accounts, as in the Dutch company law, does not seem to fit the information needs of
bankers very much. Also, none of the studies mentioned here considered the reliance
of bankers on regulation to ensure an adequate level of financial accounting
between a group of bankers with large customers and a group with smaller customers.
Keasey and Watson [1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1988] have conducted a series of studies
concerning the predictability of small company failure. The results of these studies indicate
that public information on small firms does not result in adequate failure prediction by
credit analysts. The authors also concluded that "the ratios selected for this study do not
allow the same level of accuracy to be achieved as that obtained in the majority of the large
company studies" [Keasey and Watson, 1986b]. Including non-financial information in the
evaluation process resulted in only marginally better predictions [Keasey and Watson,
1987]. In a further study the same authors find the inclusion of information on non-
submission of accounts an improvement to models of small firms' failure prediction,
contrary to studies including the same kind of information in failure prediction models for
large firms [Keasey and Watson, 1988]. According to the authors the lower failure
prediction ability of small company models results from the inherent variability of small
company performance over time, the ability of the director/manager to manipulate or
exclude transactions from the books and the less stringent reporting requirements for small
companies [Keasey and Watson, 1988].
" For a more elaborate discussion of this line of research see for example Foster [1986]
and Griffin [1987].
" Campbell [1984] studied the decision processes of bank loan officers using protocol
analysis, to determine whether two proposed and two implemented differential requirements
in GAAP had any effect on the credit decisions involving small closely held companies.
The study, however, included only 4 loan officers, and the cases used in the study mostly
included information items most loan officers were very unfamiliar with. Therefore, the
results of the study are of little use in assessing the usefulness of Little-GAAP financial
statements in the small firm context.
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information or the ability of banks to force small firms into the preparation of full
audited accounts in the absence of a statutory requirements to do so. And finally, it
should be remembered that in questionnaire studies, users tend to overstate their
information needs since they are in no way affected by the costs of producing that
information. The costs of complying with financial reporting regulations will be the
topic of the following section. - ... • - ; ^.: . • ••••*-, -;v"'^.
Table 2.2. Survey studies on the usefulness of accounting information disclosed by small firms.
Study
Falk, Gobdel and Nauss
[1976]
Egginton [1977]
Stanga and Tiller [1983]
Abdel-Khalik [1983]
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2.3.2.5 Firm size and compliance costs
Probably the most frequently used argument to advocate differential financial
reporting regulations for small firms, relates to the costs of adhering to accounting
standards and financial reporting regulations. Regulatory costs are said to be borne
disproportionately by small companies, resulting from relatively higher production
costs and larger competitive disadvantage costs. A small company may not have
anyone in its employ to maintain accounting records and may rely more heavily on
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the outside CPA to perform accounting tasks, obviously resulting in higher fees.
Also, a small company's outside accountant will probably be required to educate his
client to ensure a sufficient level of knowledge of the enterprise's activities and
financial condition and the applicable accounting principles so that the client can
accept responsibility regarding the fairness of valuation and presentation and
adequacy of disclosure. The outside CPA is likely to be a small practitioner incurring
relatively greater costs for maintaining his professional expertise to deal with
complex accounting rules. Small firms are relatively infrequently confronted with
complex measurement and disclosure rules and therefore lack the possibility of
developing routine procedures and the advantage of economies of scale large firms
enjoy as a result of a highly defined process used to handle a large number of similar
transactions or events [Murray and Johnson, 1983, p. 12]. Finally, large firms can
spread fixed production costs of regulation over larger revenues.
For empirical studies on the costs of financial reporting regulations, an essential
problem is to gather reliable cost-estimates. Firstly, this kind of data is hardly
available in many countries because the disclosure of the costs related to the
production and distribution of annual accounts is not mandated. But even when these
figures can be derived from firms, strong incentives exist to distort the information
provided on the cost effects of regulations. Therefore, cost data provided by firms
have a serious danger of being over-estimates". A second problem is that many of
the costs related to financial reporting regulations are indirect costs that are difficult
to trace and even more difficult to measure".
" The extreme difficulty to gather reiiafr/e estimates on the costs of regulation is well
demonstrated by Benston [1984]. During legal proceedings concerning the 'Line of Business
Program' (LB Program) of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), both the FTC and the
firms opposing the LB Program came up with estimates on the costs for firms to comply
with the program. The FTC estimated annual costs per firm ranging from $ 10,000 to
$ 20,000 in the first year and from $ 5,000 to $ 10,000 in subsequent years. These
estimates where based on data from 25 firms, that ranged from $ 40,000 to $ 2,000,000
(average $ 548,000) and were corrected by the FTC for firm size, the number of LBs and
for (suspected) over-estimation of costs by the firms. Estimates of the opposing firms,
based on detailed data provided by five firms, were at least 30 times higher. Initial start-up
costs were estimated from $ 350,000 to $ 1,800,000 and annual maintenance costs ranged
from $ 95,000 to $ 325,000. The judge presiding the legal proceedings concluded the
companies' estimates where not representative of the costs for all firms and also believed
that the estimates of the opposing firms overstated the actual cost [Benston, 1984, p. 134].
Benston, however, provides evidence that the FTCs estimates were also inaccurate because
"the assumption on which the FTCs cost estimation procedure rests is demonstratively not
valid" and "the methods [..] followed [..] seem very crude - even dishonest" [Benston,
1984, pp. 134-135]. . ..-..,,..,,.,; ::,,.. . -..- v- .,,-,-
" Empirical studies on the costs of financial reporting regulations are Bastable [1977],
Phlips and Zecher [1981], Horwitz and Kolodny [1982] and Espahbodi and Hendrickson
[1986]. These studies, however, include only large firms and suffer from the use of very
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Nair and Rittenberg [1983] address the issue of the relationship between the size of
business and accounting costs both qualitatively and quantitatively, using a
questionnaire survey of CPAs, bankers and businessmen of relatively small
businesses. The qualitative analyses show strong agreement across the three groups
that accounting costs for small businesses are disproportionately high compared to
their larger counterparts. In the quantitative analyses, a distinction is made between
annual cost of accounting personnel (averaging $ 219,000) and annual fees paid to
outside CPAs (averaging $ 28,000). The results showed a significant negative
correlation between the annual fees paid to an outside CPA as a percentage of some
measure of firm size, and the size of the firm measured by sales, total assets,
number of employees and number of shareholders. This relationship is consistent
regardless the type of outside accountant (Big 8 - Non-Big 8) and the type of service
provided (audit, review or compilation). From the negative relationship between
internal accounting personnel costs and firm size also reported in the study, the
authors conclude that the proportionately higher CPA fees paid by smaller companies
can not be explained from the supposition that small firms may be hiring a CPA for
work done by internal accountants in larger businesses. Although this result seems
rather counter-intuitive the authors provide no further comment on this finding.
Whether accounting costs are disproportionately higher for small firms can not be
concluded from the study since this would require a comparison between accounting
costs and benefits [Nair and Rittenberg, 1983, p. 241]. Benefits, however, were not
investigated in the study.
Another strand of research has concentrated on the determinants of the audit fees
charged to companies. In these studies, models of the audit fee-setting process are
built, relating the audit fee charged to auditor and auditee characteristics*". A number
of these studies has concentrated on audit pricing for large versus small firms and on
differences between the pricing behaviour of large versus small audit firms in these
respective company sectors (e.g. Simunic [1980], Francis and Stokes [1986], Francis
and Simon [1987] and Brinn et al. [1991]). These studies generally indicate that the
models used to explain the audit fee setting process for large (auditee) firms are less
suited to be used with small firms. When applied to small firms, the models built
explain less of the variability in audit fees and also incorporate a larger number of
significant explanatory variables, both suggesting the small firm audit fee model may
small sample sizes. Bastable [1977] used data from only 14 firms and Philips and Zecher
[1981] from 22 firms. Espahbodi and Hendrickson [1986] used data from 11 firms which,
however, was of less influence on the results of their study because (1) the data were used
to estimate the total costs for a group of 22 firms and (2) the costs-figures, even if
misstated by 1000%, would not have effected the conclusions of their study [Espahbodi and
Hendrickson, 1986, p. 48]
*° Most of these studies have concentrated on large firms. For an overview and discussion
of existing empirical research in this area see Francis and Simon [1987] and Brinn et al.
[1991].
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be more complex in nature [Brinn et al., 1991, p. 10]. The studies also provide
evidence for the existence of a price-premium paid by relatively small auditees
dealing with large audit firms [Francis and Simon, 1987, p. 147], indicating small
auditees pay relatively larger audit fees when dealing with a large audit company,
while for large auditees the size of the audit firm has no effect on the audit fee paid.
A Dutch study by Bak et al. [1985] showed that the total cost of the external
accountants as a percentage of sales, are negatively correlated with firm size,
confirming the findings of Nair and Rittenberg. The cost of the internal accountants
of a company as a percentage of the company's sales, however, were positively
related with firm size. Hence, Dutch smaller companies tend to employ external
accountants for activities for which larger companies use internal accountants.
However, the study mentioned here involved relatively large, mostly publicly traded
firms and may therefore have limited applicability to small closely held firms.
The application of audit fee research to the small private firm setting may be limited
because performing an audit may not be the most important service provided by an
external accountant to these firms. Page [1984], Carsberg et al. [1985] and
Humphrey and Turley [1986, p. 29] found that the most important service of
professional accountants to small firms are the preparation of the accounts and tax
advice. The preparation of the accounts was also perceived to be the most time-
consuming (i.e. the most costly) activity of the external accountant. The average
yearly fee paid by small UK firms reported in empirical studies ranges from f 1200
for firms with 5 to 10 employees [Carsberg, 1985] to £ 2164 for firms with 10-20
employees [Robertson, 1986, p. 23]. Research among small company auditors
indicates that of the fees paid by small companies, 23% is accounted for by audit
services, indicating that at an aggregate level the small company audit is not a major
source of fees to auditors [Humphrey and Turley, 1986, p. 30].
A considerable number of studies does not aim at measuring the cost and benefits of
financial reporting regulation, but tries to identify the /wcepttons of respondents on
the economic effects of financial reporting regulation*'. To resolve the problem of
gathering reliable cost-benefit estimates, these studies use the degree of consensus
among interested parties on cost-benefit issues as a measure of the reliability and
magnitude of the costs of financial reporting regulations (see table 2.3).
Studies by Abdel-Khalik [1983, p. 57-67] and Nair and Rittenberg [1983, p. 236-
238] asked respondents (small firm managers and CPAs) to indicate the five main
reasons for increases in total accounting costs. The results of Nair and Rittenberg
" Studies involving large firms by Mautz and May [1978], Horwitz and Kolodny [1982],
McKinnon [1984], Butterworth and Falk [1984] and Gray and Roberts [1986] all use
questionnaires to study respondents' views on the economic effects of financial accounting
regulation. These studies usually include financial analysts, corporate executives and CPAs.indicate that businessmen are much less likely to blame the increased complexity of
accounting regulations for an increase in their accounting costs. 75% of the CPAs
and 35% of the managers thought that the reduction in accounting costs from not
having to comply with existing accounting standards in 14 areas would be greater
than 5 percent. Nevertheless the increase in accounting standards was rated as the
second most important factor in increasing accountants' fees by both CPAs and
managers. In both studies, general inflationary conditions were perceived to have
caused most of the fees' increases by both groups of respondents.
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* Most of the auditors in this sample were from the auditing firms of the companies that participated
in the study, that were interviewed with permission (and through intervention) of these companies.
UK studies by Page [1984] and Carsberg et al. [1985] indicate that the mandatory
filing is seen, both by managers and auditors, as the most important administrative
burden which small firms are facing. Auditing costs were considered less
burdensome. Keasey and Short [1990] studied (UK) small firm perceptions on the
relative burden of annual account preparation and their relation with firm size, firm
organisation, firm financing and type of accounting procedures. By means of a
questionnaire study, small firm managers were asked to rank the burden of preparing
annual accounts against the burden resulting from other administrative requirements
(e.g. tax information, bank information). The results of their study, involving twelve
explanatory variables (including firm size, firm age, and experience of the owner in
45business)**, indicate that the perceived relative burden of preparing annual accounts is
not influenced by any of the factors investigated (Keasey and Short, 1990, p. 310).
Also, less than half of the respondents indicated that the burden of annual account
preparation was one of the top four out of eight administrative requirements
presented to them, indicating financial reporting is not considered to be an important
burden by many small firms.
2.3.2.6 Finn size and competitive disadvantages
A frequently used argument to oppose mandated financial disclosure for small
companies is that disclosure might have a substantial negative effect on the
competitive position of these firms. Salamon and Dhaliwal [1980, p. 557] argue that
opportunity costs of disclosure are greater for small firms because disclosures will
tell competitors much more about the details of the managerial practices of small
firms than they do of the practices of large firms. However, the effect of firm size
on opportunity costs, such as competitive disadvantage costs, is not very clear-cut. In
fact, it is debatable whether any competitive disadvantages result from financial
disclosure regulation. It can be argued that each company would be better off when
provided with more information about competitors. This proposition, however,
implies that all of the companies competing in a market need to comply with the
same financial accounting regulations. If, however, some of these firms do not have
to publish accounts, competitive disadvantages could well exist*-'. The magnitude of
these competitive costs depends on the nature of the information to be disclosed, the
nature of the firm and the nature of the competition.
Foster [1980] comments on the argument that firms will suffer from competitive
disadvantages when supposedly sensitive items are disclosed, by stating that there is
very little empirical evidence to substantiate this argument:
" The model included ten dummy variables code 1 if (1) the firm was an incorporated
company, (2) benefits from the preparation of accounts were perceived, (3) a large
accounting firm was used, (4) all general accounting needs of the firm were believed to be
provided by its professional firm of accountants, (5) the accounts were prepared externally
by an accountancy firm, (6) management accounts were prepared at least monthly, (7) the
volume of turnover had grown between 1982 and 1986, (8) computers were used by the
firm to prepare annual accounts, (9) the owner/founder had previous business experience
and (10) start-up advice was received. Additionally, firm size was measured by the natural
log of the number of employees and firm age was measured by its natural log.
" In the Netherlands this argument applies for example to subsidiary companies that are
consolidated in the accounts of the parent-company, and also to proprietorships.
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"apart from a questionnaire by Mautz and May there is little empirical
research that pertains to this argument. Empirical research that probes
, reasons for a 'competitive disadvantage' would appear to be very useful to a
policy maker" [Foster, 1980, p. 524]. , , , .
The research of Mautz and May [1978] was not intended to measure competitive
disadvantage costs. They merely tried to find out whether these costs were
recognized by managers and by financial analysts and found that there were
differences in the perceptions on competitive disadvantage costs resulting from
financial disclosure between the groups as well as considerable differences within
each of the these groups. . .-.....,-.. ,.
The existence of competitive disadvantages resulting from financial reporting
activities is an area that is typically covered by perception studies. Mautz and May
[1978] studied the perceptions of corporate executives and financial analysts of
competitive disadvantages resulting from financial disclosure. By far the greater part
of the respondents from both groups finds that existing (in 1978) disclosure levels
had not affected or increased the competition in the US economy, while only a
relatively small number felt that it lead to a decrease in competition [Mautz and
May, 1978, p. 99]. Slightly more than half of all corporate executives felt that there
was a degree of competitive disadvantage in existing (1978) reporting requirements
while only less than one third of the analysts felt the same. Although differences
between the perceptions of both groups where identified, differences of opinion
within each of the groups were at least as great.
Page [1984, pp. 276] also comments on the use of small company accounting
information by competitors. From the results of a survey among 413 active and
independent small companies, Page concludes that "there does not seem to be
extensive experience of identified harm arising from disclosure of financial
information". Furthermore, 72% of the respondents indicated that during the last
year they had no cause to gather and examine publicly filed information about a
business contact company. As to the use of publicly filed information concerning the
respondent's firm by any competitors to the filing firm's disadvantage, 10% of the
respondents were aware of such an event. Although most respondents did not give
any details of these instances, the events mentioned were (a) the use of information
by business contacts, (b) approaches to purchase the company and (c) information
used in credit evaluation [Page, 1984, p. 276].
Following Page, Carsberg et al. [1985] also investigated competitive disadvantage
costs. Managers of small firms generally believed that their accounts contained items
they would rather not disclose to their competitors. On the other hand, there was
disagreement on the question whether other companies' accounts were of use to their
business. Of the respondents, 10% had investigated the accounts of another company
in the last 3 years and 38% had done so indirectly (through purchasing external
services). The main reason for this lack of interest in competitors' accounts was said
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to be the tendency of these figures to be out of date. Although many managers (66%)
find there are items in the accounts they would rather not disclose to competitors, an
equal number of respondents (64%) does not mind how much information is publicly
disclosed, as long as the cost of producing the accounts is kept down [Carsberg et
al., 1985, p. 32].
2.3.3 Financial reporting regulation and ownership structure
Many authors have pointed out that firm size might not be the key-criterion for
granting exemptions from financial reporting regulation. It has been argued that the
most important factor in determining whether a firm should be compelled to provide
certain accounting information is the ownership structure of the firm and not its size.
The arguments used to advocate differential regulations for private firms as opposed
to public firms** concentrate on the specific characteristics of private firms that may
give rise to the idea that they should be exempted from financial reporting
regulations. The central issue is that, in comparison to a public firms, different
relationships exist between a private firm and interested parties such as managers,
owners and outside stakeholders (i.e. banks). Therefore, the role of accounting
information is different within privately held firms which as a result could give rise
to different financial reporting requirements.
2.3.3.1 Ownership structure and the primary users of financial reports.
Regarding the purpose of financial statements of public firms, the focus has
predominantly been on the information needs of investors who are regarded as the
primary user group of annual accounts. With private firms, (potential) investors may
be of less importance since shares of private firms are not publicly traded and the
number of investors associated with a private firm is generally far smaller compared
to a public firm of comparable size. Absentee-owners and lenders seem parties of
more importance when considering the goal of private firms' financial statements
(see table 2.4).
" Although it is primarily the public-private company dichotomy that is addressed when
differential regulation based on legal form is discussed, other differences in legal forms
may also lead to different reporting rules. Financial reporting regulation in most countries
is limited to certain businesses mostly excluding firms with full liability. The Fourth EC
Directive only applies to limited liability companies, and mutual insurance companies. As a
result all proprietorships are excluded from the regulations, as are less frequently used legal
forms like general partnerships (vennootschap onder firma), civil law companies
(maatschappen) and limited partnerships (commanditaire venootschappen). Later
amendments on die Fourth and Seventh EC Directives, however, have extended the scope
of Dutch financial accounting legislation to a subset of general partnerships and limited
partnerships [Nederlandse Staatscourant, September 30, 1991, p. 5].
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Table 2.4. Parties with interests in financial reports issued by smaller privately owned businesses
(adapted from Gutberlet, 1983, p. 19]
Internal
Owner-manager
Other owners actively involved
Internal
Professional manager
Other key management personnel




Other parties at interest
External
Lenders and other creditors (primary)
Taxing authorities
State and federal regulatory agencies
Bonding companies , • .
Credit agencies
If investors are not the principal users of small businesses' financial statements, the
accounting rules defined for public firms that are aimed at the needs of investors may
not be appropriate in the context of a private firm. As current standards are primarily
designed for the parties interested in publicly owned entities, members of other user-
classes (which may be primary users of information about privately owned
businesses) may incur substantial costs from analysis and interpretation only to find
that the information is of little or no interest to them.
An essential empirical issue to substantiate this argument, is to establish whether
information needs do actually vary between user groups. Various empirical studies
have focused on differences in information needs between two or more groups of
users. These studies typically use a list of information items, which are rated in
terms of usefulness by various user groups (mostly investors and bankers). A US
study by Benjamin and Stanga [1977] reported that the preferences of commercial
bank loan officers and professional financial analysts for the disclosure of accounting
items in financial statements differed significantly for 51 out of the 79 items
mentioned in the questionnaire. This result would indicate that the information needs
of both groups differ considerably. The results of this study were contradicted by
Firth [1978], who reported no important differences in disclosure needs of UK
financial analysts and bank loan officers regarding 75 items similar to those used in
the Benjamin and Stanga study. McCaslin and Stanga [1986] looked into the
differences in preferences for methods of measurement in financial statements
between chartered financial analysts and chief commercial loan officers in the US.
Their results are consistent with the study of Firth as they find only a small number
of significant differences between the measurement needs of bankers and analysts.
The results of the studies mentioned here, tentatively suggest that the information
needs of investors and bankers may be generally similar. So, the mere fact that not
investors but bankers may be the primary users of private company financial
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regulations for these firms. Nevertheless, there may be other reasons why the
information needs of users dealing with private firms may be different from those of
users dealing with public firms. These arguments, that are based on the role of
accounting information within private firms, will be discussed next.
2.3.3.2 Ownership structure and the stewardship function of accounting
information
In privately owned businesses the number of owners is much smaller and there is
less diversity in their objectives and consequently their information needs. Also,
owners may have an intimate ownership-management relationship and in many
instances ownership and management are synonymous [Gutberlet, 1983, pp. 18-20].
Other owners might have a non-management position within the firm and are actively
involved in its operations. In those instances in which an owner is not an active
participant in the management of the enterprise he may still have the authority to
obtain the information desired for decision-making purposes. Hence, as a
consequence of proximity, association, or access to information, absentee owners
may not need all the information an investor in public firms may need [Gutberlet,
1983, p. 20].
Very few empirical studies have looked at differences in the role of accounting
information within private versus public firms. Penno and Simon [1986] have
focused on differences in accounting method choice between private and public
firms. If private firms are more likely to be owner-controlled than public firms and
the use of accounting numbers as a performance metric for resolving incentive
problems is more a characteristic of management-controlled firms, we may expect to
see differences in accounting choice between publicly traded and privately held firms
[Penno and Simon, 1986, p. 562]. The results of the study provide evidence that
such differences do exist.
2.3.3.3 Ownership structure and the monitoring function of accounting
information -•• > •- .;.; .
Regarding private companies, the stewardship role of the financial statements related
to the separation of ownership from control may be considerably less relevant, since
most major shareholders are usually also the directors of the enterprise and thus have
direct control over operational and strategic decision making [Keasey and Watson,
1993, p. 41]. Nevertheless, the information asymmetry problem may still be a major
concern in the private firm context. The lack of separation of ownership from
control, coupled with the limited liability, gives the owner /manager both the scope
and the incentive to engage in opportunistic activities at the expense of other factor
suppliers. Although a large majority of private firm owner-managers may have no
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intention of acting opportunistically, great uncertainty and the lack of reliable
information about the firm and its owner-managers mean that outside stakeholders
are often unable to distinguish successfully between the opportunistic and non-
opportunistic firm. Hence, the closely held nature of these firms makes adequate
monitoring of the firm by creditors difficult and relatively costly. This would place
particular importance on the role of accounting information in reducing uncertainty
by facilitating the monitoring of small firm owner-managers by external contracting
parties such as bankers, creditors, taxing authorities, etc. .„.>,., ^
However, in a private firm setting, bonding and signalling behaviour will be likely to
be of more importance to outside stakeholders than historical financial information on
the firm's performance [Keasey and Watson, 1993, p. 42]. To fulfil its role,
accounting information has to be perceived to posses a number of characteristics: it
has to be seen as credible, reliable, relevant and timely. The significant information
asymmetry problems within a private firm, resulting from the owner-manager's full
scrutiny over business decisions and the choice of accounting methods to report on
the firm's financial position, as well as the lack of incentives for third parties such as
analysts to overcome information deficiencies by collecting and analyzing information
for sale, given the limited size of the market for financial information on individual
private firms, may strongly hamper the use of financial accounting information by
stake holders [Keasey and Watson, 1993, p. 46]. Whether this would result in an
increased desirability of financial reporting regulation, from an economic point of
view depends on the effectiveness of government intervention compared to alternative
arrangements to achieve an adequate level of financial information production.
Bankers can reduce the risk asymmetry with limited liability company managers by
granting loans only on a short term basis and securing them on the personal assets of
the owner. In this way, banks are able to discourage owner-managers from
undertaking excessively risky projects. On the other hand, owner-managers will tend
to over emphasize short term solvency and over-invest in safe, saleable assets,
though this may not be optimal in business terms. Also, owners with good projects
but little collateral may end up not being financed. Thus, private firm owners have
incentives to engage in signalling activities. Given the difficulty of proving the
credibility of accounting information produced by the firm, alternative solutions may
be sought, such as establishing a good reputation, or strong and frequent
relationships with fewer stake holders thereby voluntary bonding the firm [Keasey
and Watson, 1993, p. 61]. The availability of alternative ways of solving agency
problems would reduce the necessity of financial reporting by smaller private firms.
These arguments would indicate that there is little need for financial reporting
regulation regarding the private firm.
Empirical studies have shown that the perceptions of user-groups, such as investors
and bankers, of the usefulness of private firm financial statements differ considerably
from the perceptions of firm managers and CPAs on this point. A FASB study on
financial reporting by privately owned companies showed strong disagreement
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between practitioners and bankers on this theme. Practitioners argue that (1) less
reliance is placed on the financial statements of private companies and (2) more
information can be obtained from private companies at request. Bankers stated that
the same information is needed from public and private companies for making
similar decisions and that they are not always as successful in obtaining information
from private companies at request [Abdel-Khalik, 1983, pp. 80-81]. Nair and
Rittenberg [1983] conducted a survey-study among (1) CPAs who have small and/or
private businesses as their clients, (2) managers of privately held businesses and (3)
bankers who grant loans to small and/or private businesses. Their findings also
indicate that there are considerable differences in perceptions between businessmen
and CPAs versus bankers on the issue of varying information needs of users dealing
with small or private firms versus users dealing with large public firms.
There is little empirical evidence that accounting information disclosed by private
firms is significantly different from accounting information disclosed by public firms.
For example, the findings of capital market research have limited bearing on the
arguments for differential reporting requirements for private versus public firms
since the studies in this area only deal with public firms. Consequently, the empirical
evidence on the firm size effect found in capital market studies (see section 2.3.2.1)
applies only to publicly held companies. The potential differential information
content of financial statements of private versus public companies has virtually not
been addressed in empirical research [Atiase, Bamber and Freeman, 1988, p. 25].
An exception is a study on audit delay by Ashton, Willingham and Elliot [1987], that
has shown that the explanation that large firms have better control procedures and
can claim higher priority from audit firms and 'purchase' less delay may only hold
for public firms as they found a /ww/ttve relationship between timeliness and firm size
for nonpublic companies. The results of this study also show that audit delay (which
is a measure of the timeliness of disclosures) is significantly larger for companies
that are not publicly traded. In addition, Carslaw and Kaplan [1991] found that audit
delay was longer for firms which are largely owner-controlled compared to
companies that were manager-controlled. These results would indicate that it is more
difficult to audit private companies, resulting in longer reporting lags for these firms.
2.4 Concluding remarks ; • ' •-'•*; ;.<*>; i
In this chapter, the application of existing economic theories of financial reporting
regulation to the small private firm context has been explored. Next, the debate on
differential reporting standards for small or private companies was presented. The
arguments used to defend exemptions from financial reporting regulation based on
firm size were presented and the difficulties of following such an approach to the
differential reporting problem were discussed. Then, the discussion switched to the
ownership structure of businesses and arguments were presented to advocate
differential financial reporting regulation for private firms.
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Whether the existence of differential reporting systems can be explained by public
interest arguments or from private interest theory remains largely an empirical
question. To test the public interest explanation it should be established whether the
actual economic effects of the regulation are in line with the intended economic
effects expressed by regulators. Private interest explanations depend on the ability to
explain existing regulations from economic effects on parties concerned and the
organization and information costs of these parties. However, it is not the aim of this
dissertation to provide evidence whether the current financial reporting regulations
can be explained from public interest of from private interest arguments.
On the question whether financial reporting regulations should be uniform for all
firms, most attention has been focussed on the need for exemptions for either small
firms or private firms. A problem with empirical studies on small firms is that there
is no general consensus on when a firm is to be defined as a small firm. Therefore
the studies in this area tend to have very different sets of firms included in their
samples. This makes the results of these studies often difficult to compare. And even
if empirical evidence would show that financial reporting regulations have
disproportionate economic effects for smaller firms it would be extremely difficult to
decide on an adequate cut-off point to separate smaller firms from large firms.
This problem generally applies to providing exemptions to small firms. Any
regulator that wants to implement differential reporting regulations based on firm size
has to solve the problem of defining the set of firms that these exemptions should
apply to. This constitutes a major drawback in building differential reporting
regulations on firm size. : u
In the case of private versus public firms the basic issue is that financial reporting
regulation that is aimed at protecting the primary user group of financial statements
of public firms, investors, does not seem to be adequate for private firms. In private
firms there is much less distinction between ownership and control and also the
number of shareholders and the transfer of shares is more more restricted. However,
private companies that have limited liability still may need to be regulated to protect
outside stakeholdes such as bankers. In this respect it is argued that information
asymetry problems may be much larger in private firms. However, there are much
more private firms than there are public firms. This makes the enforcement of
compliance with financial reporting regulations for private firms a much larger
problem. If compliance can not be adequately ensured, bankers may rely much more
on alternative monitoring devices and alternative sources of information. In that case
the effectiveness of financial reporting regulations for private firms to protect
bankers may be questionable. ; - r . . '
In the debate on standards overload and differential reporting the distinction between
small versus large firms and public versus private companies is often intertwined. It
also seems that most attention has been on firms that are small as well as private, as
is underlined by a remark of the FASB that ""most concerns about financial
reporting by private companies have focused on small business" [FASB, 1981, p.
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33]. Several studies have indicated that small firm managers consider the ownership
structure the most significant characteristic to distinguish them from other companies
[McCahey, 1987]. Page found that in 95.9% of the small independent companies in
his sample 50% voting control was in the hands of two owners owning most shares
and in 77.5% of the cases these two shareholders had almost complete control given
by possession of 75% or more of the share capital [Page, 1984, p. 274]. Chittenden
[1989] studied the legal structure of small UK firms and found 50% were limited
compames, 25% were partnerships and the rest were sole traders. Family businesses
(98% or more of the partners or shareholders are members of one family) are an
extremely important part of the small business sector, as 82.5% of the partnerships
and 63% of the companies are family owned. . , .;» r
In the Netherlands, many private firms are small firms with a small degree of
separation of ownership and control [Slagter, 1983, p. 143]. In 1983, when the
Fourth Directive was implemented in the Dutch company law, 63% of all private
companies had less than 10 employees, while 98% of all private companies did not








of differential reporting in relation to
Small firms
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firm characteristics.
Large firms '^
If differential reporting regulation is to be introduced, it will be most easily accepted
for small or medium-sized private companies. The position of the large private
companies and the small public companies in the differential reporting debate is
much more complicated. Knutson and Wichmann explicitly distinguish between the
small/large and the private/public dimension of the differential reporting problem.
Their study among 659 CPAs (with a response rate of 35.8%) suggests that in the
CPAs views regarding the importance of disclosure requirements, disclosure
requirements should be equal for all public compames but should be less for private
companies (versus public companies) and for small private companies (versus large
private companies) [Knutson and Wichmann, 1985]. A similar study among 273
Australian accountants (response rate 33%) confirms these findings as the results
show that legal structure is an important factor in the applicability of accounting
requirements and size is an important factor for private companies but not for public
compames and sole traders [Hohnes et al., 1991, p. 128]. It thus seems that in the
view of auditors, differential reporting regulation would be less acceptable for small
public firms while differential regulations for large private firms might be more
tolerable (see table 2.5).ia/ /tepo/t/ng
But ultimately, no matter how difficult the definition of criteria for the application of
differential reporting rules might be, it should not lead to a denial of differential
reporting, impeding many companies that feel burdened by complex accounting
standards solely because arbitrary criteria may exclude some that also arguably need
relief. And even if firms were to be permitted to avoid certain recognition or
measurement requirements when this may not be the preferable course of action,
these entities should be few in number [Larson and Kelly, 1984, p. 84]. Various
solutions to the standards overload for small closely held firms have been suggested
and implemented (see Appendix I and II). It seems, however, that each of these
solutions has distinctive implications for the various elements of the standards
overload problem. Also, most of the solutions suggested, while solving some of the
problems connected with a standards overload, tend to create additional problems of
their own. From the point of simplicity, total exemption for small private firms from
all financial reporting regulation would seem to be the most appropriate solution to
the standard overload problem. Such an approach follows the clear principle that a
firm either has use for the financial report and consequently will prepare such a
report complying with all accounting regulations, or a firm has no use for an annual
report and thus is relieved from all financial reporting regulations. Following these
arguments, there is no place for a mandatory simplified, summary, abridged or
otherwise impaired report that would almost inevitably be in conflict with presenting
a true and fair view. The problem of defining firms that should be exempted as well
as the factual disclosure of accounting information by exempted firms could largely
be left to market forces, relying on adverse economic consequences for firms that
inappropriately fail to disclose full accounts.
What role can an accounting researcher, studying the economic effects of financial
reporting regulation, play in explaining and improving financial reporting
regulation ? It is generally acknowledged that the feasibility of a full cost benefit
analysis of financial reporting regulation is, at the least, highly questionable [Sunder,
1988, Demski, 1973]. Whether one system of standard setting and enforcement is
'best' therefore cannot be determined [Benston, 1980, p. 51]". Economic research
can provide evidence of the consequences of financial reporting regulation but it
cannot provide a basis for judging the desirability of those effects. The role of the
researcher therefore is restricted to providing evidence of the economic effects of
financial reporting regulation [Sunder, 1988, p. 41]. Though the benefits (net of
costs) of accounting standards to society cannot, in principle, be measured, it may be
possible to assess "the benefits and costs to groups of similarly affected individuals
" Some authors have argued the desirability of efficiency effects can be assessed by
economics while the desirability of distributional effects cannot, while others have argued
convincingly that either evaluation lies beyond the boundaries of accounting and even
economics. Judging the desirability of economic effects involves political choices and
cannot be dealt with from an economic perspective. These discussions, as well as
alternatives to an economic approach are extensively described by Maijoor [1991].
55can be indicated and perhaps measured, the results of which should aid those
interested in making judgements about the desirability of alternative types of
accounting standards and methods of enforcement" [Benston, 1980, p. 51].
From the overview presented in this chapter, it should be clear that empirical
research into the economic consequences of financial reporting regulation is far from
conclusive. The studies presented are inevitably incomplete in identifying all cost and
benefits and in including all parties affected by regulation. Also, there are serious
difficulties in measuring costs as well as benefits, which makes the use of subjective
criteria like perceived costs and benefits inevitable. Furthermore, it is very difficult
to assess the net benefits or costs to be attributed to regulation compared to a
situation of voluntary disclosure. Researchers reviewing the empirical literature,
derive contradictory conclusions ranging from the statement that "this evidence leads
one to doubt, though not entirely discount, the value to the public [..] of government
required disclosure" [Benston, 1976, p. 97] to the observation that "there is no good
evidence that the rules are (a) harmful, or (b) very costly" [Easterbrook and Fishel,
1984, p. 714]. .-,.,., .-._ . . J ...,., ,:^ • ; .
From the existing research into the costs and benefits of financial reporting
regulation for small closely held firms, it can not be concluded whether a standards
overload problem actually exists. It seems further evidence on a large number of
areas is necessary, such as:
a. fne app//caZ>i//ry to .wia// anrf 7ned/M/n-.y/zed pnvate compan/es o/ reyearc/z on Zarge
/?KMC JTrww. Most empirical studies on the economic effects of financial reporting
regulation relates to large public firms. Whether the results of those studies also
apply to the small private firm context remains unclear. Only few researchers have
incorporated small or private firms in their samples. And even fewer studies
explicitly test differences between public versus private firms and small versus large
firms. Such research can indicate to what extent existing research on large firms can
be useful in the standards overload debate. It also pertains to the basic question
whether financial reporting regulation should be different for small closely held firms
from a user oriented perspective. - - • . s c
ft. «wjpftance vwYA yina/icw/ reporft'ng reg«fa//o/is. The financial reporting practice of
small firms seems to be an issue of considerable concern. Non-compliance with
financial reporting regulations may be an option used by firms to avoid accounting
costs resulting from these regulations. Small firms tend to file accounts late and the
contents of the accounts often are not (fully) in compliance with relevant standards or
regulations. As a result the quality of the information provided in these accounts is
often dubious. All these elements indicate that managers of small firms do not very
much appreciate the value of disclosing the financial accounts to third parties.
c. fne re/ar/onsnip fterween accounting catts and ./zrm size. Some studies have
indicated that small private firms are disproportionately bearing the costs of financial
reporting regulation. Given the difficulty of getting reliable accounting cost
estimates, further evidence is needed to verify the findings of existing studies. The
conclusion that small closely held firms bear proportionately higher compliance costs
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would, in combination with the conclusion that the number of users of small firms'
financial statements is also smaller, indicate that small closely held firms are put in a
negative position by financial reporting regulation compared to large firms.
d. /Ae reto/o/is/z/p berwmi sma// private compan/as anJ r/ie primary users 0/ rA«>
yina/ic/a/ sratewze/tfs. If financial reporting regulation is a means of protection for the
primary users of financial accounting information, it should be established whether
primary users of financial statements of small closely held firms are in a position to
get the information they need without intervention from the government or a private
standard setting body. If so, financial reporting regulation would be abundant for
these firms because the market would ensure a sufficient level of information
disclosure. Primary users (firm-owners and banks as indicated by research) can
demand the information they need. If the company refuses it either has to pay higher
costs (capital costs, tighter loan restrictions, etc.) or the user will break the
relationship with the company (does not grant the loan). If so, regulation could be
avoided for these firms regardless of the information needs and decision models of
primary user groups. Evidently, other user-groups in this situation would have
trouble in finding information on small firms, but it is not clear whether these
groups, which would likely consist of a limited number of individuals, should be
protected by financial reporting regulation.
The change in financial reporting regulations in the Netherlands provides an excellent
opportunity to obtain information on the economic effects for small private firms.
For these firms, the regulatory change embodied a change from a largely unregulated
to a more strictly regulated financial accounting environment. In the following
chapters, empirical studies will be presented concerning the impact of Dutch financial
reporting regulation on small private firms in terms of (1) compliance with regulation
(chapter 3), (2) perceptions of small private firms' management on financial
reporting regulation and the costs of financial reporting regulation to these firms
(chapter 4). Finally, the usefulness to credit analysts of financial reports of medium-
sized private companies will be explored in chapter 5.
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Empirical studies into the economic effects of financial reporting regulation, usually
contain few references to the level of compliance with the regulations studied. In doing
so, they implicitly assume full compliance by all firms concerned. In the small firm
context, where compliance with financial reporting requirements and the quality of the
financial statements disclosed seem to be matters of considerable concern, evidence on
the level of non-compliance with financial reporting requirements is of particular
importance (see chapter 2).
The importance of the degree of compliance with financial reporting regulations seems
obvious as it effects both costs and benefits to be expected from disclosure regulation.
The expected benefits from financial reporting regulation - e.g. the provision of more
and better financial accounting information - will decrease considerably if there is a
substantial level of non-compliance. Also, through non-compliance, firms might attempt
to reduce information production costs or avoid (perceived) competitive disadvantages'.
In spite of the many potential economic effects of the level of compliance with
regulation, little empirical evidence can be found on the extent of non-compliance or on
factors explaining observed compliance [Buijink, 1992, p.41].
Objections against financial reporting regulations can be expressed in various stages of
the regulators' decision-making process. Once regulation has been passed, non-
compliance with regulation can involve (1) the non-disclosure of financial statements,
(2) deliberate deferral of the disclosure of mandated information to reduce its timeliness
and (3) the omission of certain required information in financial statements or the misuse
of 'mistakes' or vagueness to cover certain information. In the remainder of this
chapter, empirical evidence on these three issues will be presented. First, the overall
level of non-disclosure of financial statements by small Dutch firms will be studied
(section 3.2). Next, the results of an inspection of financial statements disclosed by
small Dutch firms will be presented, emphasizing the timeliness and the content of the
' These cost-savings, again, may be offset by actions of government agencies or user-groups,
leading to the payment of fines or resulting in litigation costs.
59C/zoprer J
information disclosed (section 3.3). Finally, an exploratory examination of determinants
of the observed level of compliance will be presented (section 3.4). A detailed
description of the company law requirements for the preparation and disclosure of Dutch
small firm financial statements is provided in Appendix m, to serve as a background
for the present chapter as well as the two following.
3.2 Non-disclosure of financial statements by small firms
At the time of the adaptation of the Dutch company law to the Fourth EC Directive in
1983, the opposition from small firms against (the first-time) disclosure of annual
accounts was extensive [e.g. Wittenburg, 1985, Van Duuren, 1986, Poorthuis, 1990].
The opposition of the small firm sector was most distinctly demonstrated by the
reluctance of these firms to meet the disclosure requirements^. The financial statements
for 1984 should have been filed at the Chambers of Commerce by approximately
February 10th, 1986 at the latest. By the end of January 1986, out of a total of 172,400
small firms that were subject to the company law requirements, only 30% mandated to
file accounts had done so' [Bollen, 1986]. In March 1986, one month after the final date
of publication of financial statements for 1984,40% of all statements to be disclosed had
not yet been received at the Chambers of Commerce [Van Duuren, 1986]*.
From these figures, however, it can not be concluded that all firms that had not
complied with the legal requirement to file financial statements, did so intentionally. For
* Another example of the opposition of firms against the disclosure regulations is represented
by a law suit that was filed by twelve Dutch private companies in 1987 and finally was decided
on by the European Committee for Human Rights. The companies claimed that the mandatory
disclosure of financial statements violated article 8 of the European Treaty on Human Rights,
which states that every individual is entitled to privacy concerning his personal live and
undisturbed pleasure from his properties. However, the claim of the companies to be exempted
from the disclosure requirements was denied based on the argument the disclosure of financial
statements serves a legitime purpose, being the economic wellbeing of the country and the
protection of the rights of third parties. • - ... ,
' The reluctance of small firms to meet the financial disclosure requirements is not a Dutch
exclusive. Weilbach [1991, p. 800 and 1992, p. 935] has suggested that in Germany as many
as 90% of the limited liability companies do not publish their accounts, although they are
legally required to do so. ^ :-. ;-,...•.» . v •• •-.-••->•••• .••<. . ; - - •"...•:. -, •,
* Apart from refusing to conform to the regulation, firms can also try to avoid it. Maijoor
[1991] provides evidence that in 1970 the vast majority of Dutch public companies confronted
with new accounting regulation evaded the financial reporting requirements by changing legal
form from public company (Naamloze Vennootschap, NV) to private company (Besloten
Vennootschap, BV). In 1983, such a reaction by firms could hardly be found because the costs
of switching to a legal form discharged of the obligation to disclose annual accounts would
have been substantial (see Maijoor, 1991, pp. 147-151]. ; < ••••••• - «
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most firms involved, the regulatory change in 1983 represented the first financial
reporting requirements ever. Consequently, many firms may have been unaware of these
new financial reporting requirements. Also, necessary adaptation of their administrative
systems in order to produce the information required by the new company law may have
hindered the timely disclosure of financial statements of many small firms. But also,
many small firm managers may have followed a 'wait and see' strategy, to await the
reaction of the government towards non-compliance with the company law requirements
[Wittenburg, 1985]. . .-,












































































source: Database Foundation of the Chambers of Commerce.
The number of annual accounts disclosed in the Netherlands has risen considerably since
the introduction of the Fourth EC Directive. The data presented in table 3.1 represent
the number of disclosures by Dutch public and private companies, per financial year the
statements relate to. Since 1984, the first financial year to which the revised company
law applied, the number of disclosures has risen consistently to a total of 241.378
concerning the financial year 1992*, a rise of over 186% compared to the number of
disclosures relating to 1984. Evidently, part of the increase in the number of disclosures
results from an increase in the number of public and private companies. But also a rise
in the level of compliance with the disclosure regulations may explain the increase in
' The data presented were collected in the autumn of 1994. The number of disclosures is
determined by the number of firms that has met the dislosure requirements, either by filing the
financial statements or by filing a statement of liability (see Appendix III). •
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the number of disclosures*. Recent data indicate that the overall level of compliance has
risen considerably in later years. Poorthuis [1990, p. 56] estimates the level of
compliance with the financial reporting regulations in 1989 at 70%^.
Table 3.2 Financial statement disclosures by small Dutch firms
1984' 1991-
Total number of small ' • i
companies under disclosure 172,400 248,839
regulation _ , ; . ... •;_ >
Level of compliance with .\, \ : 47-50%' ^ >- ; 86.43% ...v/.~^.
disclosure requirements
1. data from van Duuren [1986] . •, ••••-,.•
2. data from Database Foundation of the Chambers of Commerce. - ••••--• -
3. corrected for incomplete data (see Appendix 3 A for details)
From detailed data concerning the financial year 1991 derived from the Database
Foundation of the Chambers of Commerce, an accurate estimate of the number of non-
disclosing firms can be derived (see table 3.2 and Appendix 3A). From these data it can
be concluded that with respect to 1991, overall compliance by small Dutch companies
with the financial reporting requirements varies from 70% to 100% depending on the
Chamber of Commerce-district, and averages at 86%. Out of a total of 248,839 small
companies that are mandated to file their annual accounts, some 34,000 had not filed
their accounts concerning the financial year 1991 by June 1993. The vast majority of
the financial statements filed are disclosed by small companies. Out of a total of 224,843
disclosures concerning 1991, 3,000 (1.3%) came from large firms, 6,778 (3.0%) came
' The database from which the data presented were gathered only includes the most recent legal
form of each firm. As a result the number of private and public companies in earlier years
could not be derived. Although other statistics present the number of companies per year (e.g.
the Central Bureau of Statistics), these data suggest that the number of private companies is
smaller than the number of disclosures as reported by the Chambers of Commerce, which
seems impossible. Therefore, compliance figures for each separate year could not be
determined.
' Statistics on the level of non-reporting firms in the UK are provided by Morris and Omrod
[1990] who studied UK company financial statements in order to establish 1986 practice
regarding the filing of abridged accounts. From their initial sample of 255 firms, 155 (61%)
had not filed any financial statements and 32 of these had failed to file accounts in at least two
consecutive years. However, many firms in the sample (104) were newly incorporated or
inactive companies. Excluding these firms from the analysis, it seemed that of the remaining
151 firms, 51 (33.8%) were in clear default with the filing requirements of the Companies Act.w/r/i Fi/uyjcj'a/ /?eporrin^
from medium-sized firms and between 196,461 (87%) and 215.063 (95.7%) came from
small firms*. ,.-...• . -- • ....... .-,
The level of compliance varies considerably across the various Chambers of Commerce
(see Appendix 3A). In the largest district, Amsterdam, the level of compliance is the
lowest (70%), while in the district of Deventer, which is one of the smallest districts,
all firms meet the financial disclosure requirements. Generally, the level of compliance
is negatively correlated with the size of the district measured by the number of firms
registered, both in 1984 and 1991'. The differences between districts also may be the
result of the dissimilarity in actions taken by Chambers towards firms that do not file
any accounts or file accounts that clearly do not meet the regulatory requirements. The
formal task of the Chambers of Commerce is restricted to accepting the accounts and
does not include the responsibility to take any actions against firms that do not file
accounts. Nevertheless, some Chambers have taken some action against non-compliance
by sending mailings to firms, urging them to file their accounts, or by returning
financial accounts that grossly violate the regulatory requirements'".
Through non-compliance, firms may attempt to reduce information production costs or
avoid (perceived) competitive disadvantages. These cost-savings may be offset by actions
of government agencies or user-groups resulting in the payment of fines or litigation
costs. From an economic standpoint,, the level of compliance may depend on a number
of factors (Posner [1992, ch. 7]):
a. the potential benefits (or cost-savings) to the offender resulting from non-compliance;
ft. the potential costs of non-compliance to the offender (the cost of crime);
• A number of firms (18,602, 8.3%) did not file financial statements but filed a document that
exempted the firm from the financial disclosure requirements. For example, firms that are a
group-company having its financial data disclosed in the consolidated financial statements of
the parent company, are exempted from the mandatory filing of the financial statements and
have met the disclosure requirements if they file a 'statement of liability' (see Appendix III).
For these companies it can not be established from the database of the Database Foundation
of the Chambers of Commerce whether they are to be classified as a small, a medium-sized
or a large firm. In general, however, these statements mostly relate to small firms.
' The correlation between the number of firms registered in a district and the level of
compliance for 1984 is -0.19 and for 1991 is -0.68.
" Currently, a new bill is being prepared by the Dutch government that will give the Chambers
of Commerce the right to dissolve a private companies if two of the following four violations
have occurred: ,,.-.
• the company is at least one year late with filing its financial statements;
• the company is at least one year late with paying its contribution for the Chamber of
Commerce;
• the company is at least one year late with entering its directors in the registrar of companies;
• the company is at least one year late with filing its tax-return.
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c. the risk of detection that is a result of the level of enforcement, that in itself is a
result of the costs of catching and convicting an offender;
rf. other factors such as the financial means of the offender to pay any potential fines,
the (moral) willingness to commit an illegal act, the response to punishment, etc.
ad a.
The costs of meeting the regulatory financial reporting requirements will be discussed
extensively in chapter 4. For now, it will only be mentioned that the cost-savings from
non-disclosure generally will increase with the size of a firm although it can be shown
that accounting costs tend to be proportionally higher for small firms compared to large
firms. It should also be mentioned that even for small firms the accounting costs
generally present only a relatively small fraction of the total annual costs of a firm.
ad b. '.-..;•. x;f;^>,; ... -..-.! -. -••,-••.> •.-.• .- •••; - •
The punishment for violating the financial reporting regulations in the Netherlands
consists of a combination of a fine, imprisonment and liability. Non-compliance with the
obligation to disclose the annual accounts in the Netherlands constitutes a criminal
offence. Initial fines for not disclosing the annual account can be as high as /25.000,-
and may result in a maximum of six months of imprisonment for the firm's directors.
Also the court can set the obligation to disclose the required information after all.
Violation of this obligation may result in a fine of maximum /100.000,- and a
maximum of 6 years of imprisonment [Beckman, 1994, p. 149].
All interested parties may institute civil proceedings in the appropriate court to require
the filing of the financial statements.
In case of insolvency, a firm's directors can be held personally liable for any deficits
if they have not met the obligation (1) to keep books properly, (2) to prepare a balance
sheet and a profit and loss account annually, (3) to retain the accounting information for
a designated period of time or (4) to disclose the financial statements annually.
A further consequence of not disclosing the annual accounts may result from a bill that
currently is being prepared by the Dutch government and that will give the Chambers
of Commerce the right to dissolve a private company if two of the following four
violations have occurred:
• the company is at least one year late with filing its financial statements;
• the company is at least one year late with paying its contribution for the Chamber of
Commerce;
• the company is at least one year late with entering its directors in the registrar of
companies;
• the company is at least one year late with filing its tax-return.
ad c.
Kelly-Newton [1980, p. 128] discusses the importance of the policy maker's power for
the likelihood of compliance. The likelihood and magnitude of punishment actions by
regulatory bodies will obviously influence conformity with disclosure regulations issued.
However, with a large number of firms affected by accounting regulations, the
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effectiveness of coercive government actions seems limited". With respect to financial
reporting regulation, Zeff [1994, p. 23] has argued that in Western European countries
that have to deal with a large number of companies affected by regulatory accounting
rules, the problems of enforcing compliance can be expected to be substantial.
Non-compliance with financial reporting regulations through non-disclosure constitutes
a highly visible violation of these regulations. Therefore, for large firms, that are
monitored by a relatively large number of interested parties, the risk of detection is
high. For small firms, however, the risk of detection may be much lower given the
large number of firms and the limited economical impact each individual firm has.
Therefore the chance of requisition of disclosure by some interested party may be low.
A rigid enforcement of the financial reporting regulations for small firms, therefore,
would involve considerable social costs and effort from the government.
The Dutch regulatory system, however, does not provide in a systematic check of all
annual accounts filed at the Chambers of Commerce. The formal task of the checking
of filed accounts in the Netherlands lies with the 'Economische Controle Dienst' (ECD).
In 1985 the ECD inspected 12,000 firms and fined 50% of them, but since then the
number of inspections (3,810 in 1988) as well as the number of fines (33%) has
gradually declined [Poorthuis, 1990]'*
add.
Other economic factors, such as the financial means of the offender to pay any potential
fines or the ability to pay lawyers and litigation costs, also may explain differences in
the level of compliance between individuals or firms, or groups of individuals or firms
[Becker, 1968, p. 198].
In the case of financial reporting regulation differences between the level of compliance
between large firms and small firms may be explained by the fact that the fine for
violating the disclosure requirements may harm smaller firms more severely since larger
firms have larger resources to pay fines. Also smaller firms are less able to spend
resources on preventing conviction through good lawyers and legal appeals.
Furthermore, since the benefits of violation are smaller to small firms, these firms not
" Also, coercive actions may enhance overt behavioral compliance with regulations, but on the
other hand may not affect, or even hinder, attitudinal acceptance of new regulations, resulting
in long term non-compliance through covert actions (e.g. by finding loopholes in the
regulations or by avoiding regulations by transforming the firm's situation or actions). ... ,
'- A change in the risk of detection is argued to have more effect than a change in the level of
punishment [Becker, 1968, p. 180]. However, an increase in the risk of detection is more
expensive while an increase in the level of punishment is fairly cheap.
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only are less able, but also less willing to spend resources to prevent conviction (e.g.
through bribery)".
Concluding, it would seem that the level of non-compliance among small firms with
financial reporting regulation could result from the relatively low benefits to be expected
from non-disclosure and from the relatively high potential punishment related to non-
disclosure. With respect to the risk of detection it can be mentioned that non-disclosure
constitutes a highly visible violation of the company law but that the risk of detection
decreases with firm size.
In recent years, the declining number of inspections by the ECD may have resulted in
a further decline in the risk of detection since for smaller firms the chance of requisition
of disclosure by other interested parties may be low. However, the actions of the ECD
shortly after the introduction of the Fourth Directive, may have convinced many small
firms that the risk of detection would be high. Although the actions of the ECD have
decreased considerably since then, many firms, once they had started to prepare and
disclose their annual accounts, may have remained doing so'*. • . -
Although the number of disclosures by small firms has risen considerably since 1985,
the mere filing of a document with the title 'Financial statements' printed on the cover
does not necessarily mean that the information provided is actually useful. The
usefulness of the financial statements disclosed to interested parties heavily depends on
the timeliness, quality and quantity of the information provided. This is investigated in
the next section.
3.3 Characteristics of small firm financial statements
3.3.1 Introduction - - -
The compliance of publicly available financial statements with prevailing financial
reporting regulation has been the theme of various empirical studies (see chapter 2).
With the introduction of the Fourth EC Directive in the national legislation of its
member countries, a series of studies has concentrated on the contents and form of
accounts of small firms to assess the quality of the accounts filed. The quality of the
accounts filed can be considered an indication of the costs financial accounting
regulation imposes on small firms: a low level of compliance and a poor quality of
" As Becker [1968, p. 198] points out, these relationships also depend on the sort of
punishment (e.g. a fine or imprisonment)
'* Also, the level of automation among the Chambers of Commerce has increased considerably
over the last few years. Therefore, the task of the ECD to detect the non-disclosure of annual
reports may be much easier now, resulting in an increase in the risk of detection for firms.wirA Fi/iancia/
presentation of information suggest that the financial burden on small companies,
resulting from financial accounting disclosure requirements, is significant.
In this section, the results of a detailed examination of financial statements disclosed by
small Dutch firms will be presented to assess the level of compliance with the regulatory
requirements and to provide an overview of current small firm financial reporting
practice. Our main emphasis will be on the development of financial reporting practice
over a period of time since the introduction of the obligatory disclosure of financial
statements in 1984. . . .-,.•.- ••...(.
The regulatory requirements as well as the exemptions for small firms are different for
the preparario/i of the financial statements and for the d/sc/aswre of the financial
statements (see Appendix IH). Since the analysis presented here is based on the
information filed at the Chambers of Commerce, this study only concerns compliance
with disclosure requirements. Information about the level of compliance with financial
reporting requirements regarding the preparation of accounts can only be assessed if
firms disclose information in excess of the disclosure requirements, e.g. by disclosing
the full financial statements prepared rather than the abridged financial statements based
on the disclosure-exemptions for small firms.
A major difficulty in assessing the level of compliance with regulatory disclosure
requirements is introduced by the fact that it is troublesome to determine whether
information-items required to be disclosed by company law that are not incorporated in
a firm's financial statements are omitted because the information requested is not
applicable to the firm or because the firm does not comply with the legal requirements.
Items that are not applicable to a firm's situation may be omitted from the financial
statements without any further comment. Also, firms may leave out any information that
is not material, i.e. not of sufficient importance to users to meet the costs necessary to
include the information in the accounts. Therefore the level of compliance as well as the
quality of the information disclosed can only be assessed using a conservative approach,
assuming all information not included in the financial statements analyzed constitutes no
violation of the legal requirements. As a result, any indication of the level of compliance
or the quality of the information disclosed constitutes an optimistic estimation, that may
actually be lower if firms have left out any information unjustified.
The study presented in this section will provide data on the disclosure practice of small
firms, affected by the 1984 adaptation of Dutch law to the Fourth EC Directive. The
results of an inspection of 144 small firms' financial statements will be presented.
Financial statements examined are taken from 1984 and 1990 to check for any changes
in the disclosures made by small firms over a length of time. . .
In section 3.3.2, the relation between our research and existing empirical literature on
small firms' disclosure practices will be discussed. Further details on research design
and sample selection will be presented in section 3.3.3 and the results of the study will
be presented in section 3.3.4 to 3.3.7. In the subsequent section, firm characteristics
«7will be used to explain the level of compliance among the small firms studied, using
disclosure indexes (section 3.4).
3.3.2 Relation to existing empirical research
The results of the studies on the disclosure practices of small firms discussed in
chapter 2 provide an, albeit rather restricted, basis for drawing general conclusions
about the quality of small firm financial statements and the level of compliance with
prevailing financial reporting regulations. The studies cover a number of countries (such
as the US, UK, Australia and the Netherlands) and varying levels of regulation. Also,
diverging definitions of small firms are used and in several studies the research design
does not leave the results open for generalisation. ^ -
Nevertheless, from the results presented in these studies some general tendencies can
be observed, which can be summarised as follows:
2. The occurrence of a considerable level of non-compliance in small firms' financial
statements with existing accounting regulations is evident from all studies cited, although
the actual level of non-compliance varies considerably among firms and accounting
standards studied.
2. Among the authors cited, there is a general concern about the quality of the
information provided in small firm financial statements. The fact that some of the small
firms' accounts are prepared or audited by an external accountant does not seem to
guarantee an adequate quality of disclosure [Morris and Omrod, 1990, p. 13].
3. Publicly available accounting information on small firms tends to be rather outdated
as a considerable number of small firms fails to file the accounts within the time limits
prescribed [Tsang, 1986, Robertson, 1986].
4. Few studies have looked at the level of voluntary disclosures made in addition to the
information required by regulations. The scant data available suggest that small firms
have little incentives to provide such information in the accounts filed. Several UK-
studies, however, have indicated that an important number of small firms publish full
accounts even though they are allowed to file abridged accounts [e.g. Tsang, 1986,
Robertson, 1986, Morris and Omrod, 1990]. This type of 'voluntary' disclosure may
be explained by the fact that abridged accounts have to be prepared in addition to the
full accounts and therefore may result in higher disclosure costs for the firms involved.
Contrary to these UK findings, a number of Dutch studies has shown that only few
Dutch small firms provide any information not required by law and most of these firms
take full advantage of the exemptions provided [Bollen, 1986, NOvAA, 1986].
In the remainder of this chapter, a study will be presented concerning the financial
accounting disclosures made by small Dutch firms, which adds to the previously
mentioned studies in two ways:
2. Most studies look at compliance at one moment in time, often shortly after the
introduction of some kind of new legislation. The study presented here will explicitly
look at the change in quality and the level of compliance over a period of time. The
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accounts studied are from 1984 and 1990, thereby taking into account a period of 7
years after the regulatory change in 1984. The study will focus on (1) the timeliness of
disclosures by small firms, (2) the compliance with formal financial reporting
requirements and (3) the (voluntary) disclosure of financial accounting information not
mandated by company law.
2. Only few studies use statistical tests to assess the relationship between quality or
compliance with explanatory variables other than firm size. Exceptions are the
questionnaire-studies by Hohnes and Nichols [1989] and Keasey and Short [1990] that
provide some initial insight into the relationship between small firms, accounting
information and accounting information requirements. In section 3.4 of this chapter,
explanations for differences in level of compliance and quality will be examined. Since
there is little theory to guide the choice of explanatory variables, this part of the study
is exploratory. Building on the theoretical discussion and the relevant existing empirical
evidence (see chapter 2), a number of potential explanatory variables will be tested.
3.3.3 Sample selection.
In the research presented in this chapter, the contents of financial statements of small
companies are studied to determine the timeliness, the quantity and the quality of the
financial information disclosed. The original accounts, filed at the Registrar of
Commerce at the various Chambers of Commerce, were used in this study. Financial
accounts regarding the financial year 1984 (when not available, 1985) and 1990 (when
not available, 1989) were selected.
The sample of small firms to be included in the study was selected from the Database
Foundation of the Dutch Chambers of Commerce. The characteristics used to select
firms to be included in the sample are described in table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Sample selection criteria.
1. Banks and insurance companies are excluded
2. Legal form is private company.
3. Number of personnel is more then 1 but less then 50.
4. Firms are selected from 10 Chambers of Commerce.
The selection criteria used are motivated as follows:
ad /. Banks and insurance companies were excluded from the sample because of the
special requirements for these firms in Dutch company law.
ad 2. Dutch company law applies to (1) public companies, (2) private companies, (3)
general partnerships, (4) limited partnerships and (5) civil law companies. The vast
majority of these firms are private companies [see Appendix 3A, table 3A.2]. As in this
study our main interest is in small private companies, other legal forms have been
excluded. , .>.- , ....,- • , -,.,,,= ...C/uzpfer 5
ad 3. The legislative definition of a small firm is based on three criteria: total sales,
total assets and average number of personnel. The database of the Database Foundation
only included information on the number of personnel, which consequently is the sole
size-criterion used. The size of the selected companies were checked based on the data
on sales and assets provided in the financial statements disclosed. To exclude inactive
or dormant companies from the sample, a minimum-level of personnel of 1 was used.
ad 4. There are 35 Chambers of Commerce in the Netherlands. Since the accounts to
be used had to be studied at the Chamber it had been filed, a limited number of
Chambers was selected to avoid excessive travelling-time. The ten Chambers selected
were regionally spread over the Netherlands and included both large and small
Chambers of Commerce'*. ......
Using these criteria, an initial firm sample of 160 firms was constructed. During the
process of gathering the annual accounts of these firms, a number of firms (5) turned
out to be medium-sized firms and therefore were excluded from the sample. Also, for
a number of firms the financial statements could not be retrieved, either because the
firm had filed a statement of liability exempting it from disclosing its financial
statements or because the firm had not met the disclosure requirements. Ultimately, a
usable sample of 169 annual accounts from a total of 139 firms remained.
Table 3.4 Sample construction
H
Initial selection
Not a small firm
Statement of liability
Usable sample of firms






























From the total usable sample of 169 accounts two sub-samples were constructed. To
obtain a sample with an equal number of financial statements from both periods, an
equal sized sub-sample of 144 accounts from 114 small firms was constructed, relating
to 72 accounts for 1984 and 72 accounts for 1990. For a number of firms in this
sample, the financial statements from both 1984 and 1990 were available. These firms
were used to construct a paired sub-sample, containing 30 firms with accounts available
for 1984 as well as for 1990 (see table 3.4). *'- ;s ^ :-
" The districts selected were: Amsterdam, Arnhem, Breda, Eindhoven, the Hague, Maastricht,
Rotterdam, Utrecht, Venlo and Zwolle.
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Firm size characteristics of the firms included in the various samples are provided in
table 3.5. All data presented are based on the financial statements that were filed by the
firm at the Chamber of Commerce. Comparing the characteristics for 1984 and 1990
it can be concluded that, in terms of number of employees, the financial statements
concerning 1990 relate to firms that on average are larger than the firms with financial
statements concerning 1984. This result pertains to both samples constructed. With
respect to total assets, firms are larger in 1990 compared to 1984 only for the paired
sample. For the full sample differences in total assets between 1984 and 1990 are not
significant (see panel C. of table 3.5). . . - - , .-
Table 3.5 Firm size characteristics
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for total assets
|;Tptal assets N Average Sid. dev. Min. Max.
Full sample 1984 72 1,715,966 1,994,428 29,870 11,304,197
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Panel C. Mann Whitney U tests
Full sample : 1984 vs 1990





















Significance levels are indicated as * for or=0.1, ** for <x=0.05 and *** for a=0.01.
Data for 1990 are corrected for inflation.
•.."•• • .-4-
These tests on difference in firm size between 1984 and 1990 are important because
differences in firm size introduce a difficulty in interpreting any changes in disclosure
characteristics between 1984 and 1990, since it is difficult to establish whether an
observed change can be attributed to an increase in firm size or to any learning effects
resulting from dealing with financial reporting over a longer period of time. Since
differences in firm size over time are smallest for the full sample, the discussion in the
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remainder of this chapter will be concentrated on the results for that sample.
Nevertheless, all tests presented have been conducted for both the full sample of 144
accounts as well as the paired sample of 60 accounts and any material differences
between the results for both samples will be mentioned. ^
3.3.4 The timeliness of small company financial statements. -.- • < •
Many studies have focused on the timing of accounting information releases by public
firms (see chapter 2) but evidence on the timeliness of financial disclosures by private
firms seems virtually non-existent [Atiase, Bamber and Freeman, 1988, p. 300]. This
section presents evidence on the timeliness of financial accounting disclosures by small
Dutch private companies that are subject to the 1983 Dutch Company Act. To determine
any changes in reporting lags over time, the timeliness of disclosures is studied at two
moments in time, involving the disclosure of financial statements on 1984, immediately
after the enactment of the company law requirements for small private firms, and the
disclosure of accounts on 1990.
Three measures of timeliness are used. Prepara//on fag is defined as the time from the
end of the financial year to the date of approval of the accounts by the shareholders
meeting. The^/mg tog is defined as the time from the approval of the accounts by the
shareholders meeting to the date of filing of the accounts at the Chamber of Commerce,
/teporri/jg tog is defined as the time from the end of the financial year to the date of the
filing of the accounts at the Chamber of Commerce.
Dutch company law requires that the preparation of financial statements is completed
within five months after the ending of the financial year (see Appendix III). Within six
months after the ending of the financial year, the annual accounts have to be presented
at the annual meeting of shareholders that has to approve (or disapprove) the financial
statements. Next, the balance sheet and the notes thereto have to be filed at the Chamber
of Commerce within 8 working days. This would mean that the financial statements
would have to be filed at the Chamber of Commerce no longer than 203 days after the
end of the financial year.
The annual meeting of shareholders can, however, agree to extend the period for
preparing the accounts by a maximum of six months. Then, the accounts have to be
presented to the shareholders' meeting no longer than two months after the preparation
is completed. The accounts have to be presented for approval to the shareholders no
longer than 13 months after the ending of the financial year. Consequently, the ultimate
date of filing the financial statements over the financial year 199x is somewhere around
february 12th, 199(x+2), some 408 days after the ending of the financial year.
Information on the date of approval of the accounts and the date of disclosure should be
available for all financial statements filed at the Chambers of Commerce. Firms have
to indicate the date of approval by the shareholders' meeting in the notes to the balance
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sheet. The Chamber of Commerce indicates the date of receipt on each of the disclosed
financial statements. Based on this information an analysis can be made on the timeliness
of filing of small firms' financial statements.
Frequency distributions for the reporting lags in 1984 and 1990 are presented in figure
3.1. For 1984, the disclosure of annual reports is strongly clustered between 200 and
400 days after the end of the financial year. In 1990, the distribution has shifted to the
left, centering around a 200-300 days time lag. In 1984, 37.5% of all reports were filed
within 365 days while in 1990 this has grown to 63.4%. Also the number of reports
filed extremely late (after 550 days) has declined from 10 (14%) in 1984 to 1 (1.5%)
in 1990. - ..-.-..,= •. ,.
Figure 3.1 Frequency distribution for reporting lag in 1984 and 1990.
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• 1990
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Summary statistics for preparation, filing and reporting lags are presented in panel A.
of table 3.6. The time lag between the end of the financial year and the filing of the
financial statements on average is 388 days in 1984 and has declined with more than
18% to 316 days in 1990. This constitutes a significant decline in reporting-lag over this
period. The longest delay between the end of the financial year and the disclosure of the
financial statements was 722 days (8 days short of two years) for 1984 and 648 days
(over 21 months) for the accounts of 1990.
Note that few firms file their financial statements within the 'normal' period of 203 days
at the Commercial Register (table 3.6, panel B.). For the majority of firms it seems that
the shareholders have agreed to extend the date of preparation, since the financial
statements were not filed within 203 days after the ending of the financial year. None
of the financial statements included any reference to such an agreement. Apparently, a
large number of small firms encounter situations that lead to a deferral of the
preparation of the annual accounts. In 1984 the adjustment to the new regulatory
73requirements could provide an explanation for this deferral. But even in 1990, seven
years after the introduction of these requirements, many small firms still seem to have
great difficulty in preparing their financial statements within six months. The preparation
lag has declined from 277 days in 1984 to 262 days in 1990, but this is not a statistically
significant reduction. .........
Table 3.6 Analysis of preparation lag, filing lag and reporting lag. •,-...;
Panel A. . .,.-,. , . ........ .. .,.. . , • - •,. .. , .v^:. ... "• - ' .•/


































































































*In 5 cases the date of the shareholders meeting could not be derived from the financial statements.
In 1 case the date of filing was not indicated on the financial statsments filed. . . ,,_. .. , .
An alternative explanation could be that firms deliberately defer the preparation of the
accounts to delay the disclosure of the financial information as much as possible.
Further evidence for the intentional stalling of the filing of the financial statements could
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be provided by data on the filing lag. Firstly, firms may want to stall the disclosure of
the financial statements by stalling the filing of the accounts in adtf/rion to deferring the
preparation of the accounts. In this scenario, both the preparation lag and the filing lag
should not have declined much in 1990. This hypothesis is supported only partly by the
data. Although in 1990 all of the accounts in the sample were approved within 396 days,
43 (59.7%) of these firms did not file their accounts within 12 days after the approval
by the shareholders (see panel B of table 3.6). Nevertheless, in 1990 firms on average
filed their accounts 52 days after approval by the shareholders meeting, which is
significantly less than the 113 days (166 days for the paired sample) recorded for the
period 1984. The number of firms filing the accounts within 12 days after approval by
the shareholders has declined only marginally and the largest delay between approval
and filing of the accounts in 1990 was still 364 days.
The decline of the average filing lag does not support the idea of firms deliberately
stalling the disclosure of the accounts. However, since the ultimate goal is only to
lengthen the reporting lag, either the preparation or the filing of the financial statements
could be stalled. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the preparation lag and
the filing lag are negatively correlated (r = -0.4326, p<0.01). This result would
indicate that firms stall either the preparation or the filing of the accounts, but not both.
With time, the number of firms evidently filing their financial statements late (i.e. not
within the 'maximum' period of 408 days), and consequently violating the company law,
has declined from 26 (36.1%) to 12 (16.9%)'*. In 1990, virtually of all these firms had
their accounts prepared and approved by the shareholders meeting within 396 days after
the ending of the financial year, but chose to stall disclosure of the accounts with, on
average, over four months. These results again support the hypothesis that it is not
exceptional for small firms to delay the disclosure of the financial accounts firstly by
extending the period allowed for preparation with the maximum period legally allowed
and secondly by delaying the filing of the accounts substantially'^.
Eventually all firms in the sample filed their accounts, possibly to avoid any fines for
violating the company law. However, these disclosure were made with the knowledge
that information disclosed well over 13 months after the ending of the financial year,
may be of little use to anyone.
" The 1984 results are consistent with studies by Robertson [1986, p. 9], Tsang [1986, p. 55]
and NOvAA [1986, p. 17] which all surveyed the timeliness of disclosures by small firms
within one or two years after a regulatory change, and found that respectively 30%, 35% and
52% of die companies in their samples had not filed the financial statements within the required
time period. . ......
" Corresponding data for the paired sub sample of accounts are presented in Appendix 3B. The
results presented there are generally in line with the results for the full sample as presented in
this section.
753.3.5 Formal disclosure requirements
Most provisions in Dutch company law deal with the content of the financial statements
to be prepared and disclosed, and determine the items to be included and the accounting
rules to be used in the financial statements. Additionally, the company law provides a
number of requirements concerning the lay out of the accounts and the sequence and
naming of items to be disclosed. These formal requirements involve issues like the
paper-size to be used, the language the financial statements have to be presented in, the
lay out of the financial statements and the signing of the financial statements by the
company directors (see Appendix HI). As part of the research, all annual accounts were
checked in the way these formal requirements were met. The results are presented in
Appendix 3C, table 3C.1.
3.3.5.1 The use of balance sheet models.
Compliance with formal requirements, especially those concerning the lay out of the
financial statements, can be of considerable importance to users. The use of standard
models enhances the comparability of information between firms and between years. The
provision of obligatory standard models in the company law, therefore, should enhance
the usefulness of financial statements of firms considerably, provided that firms do not
grossly deviate from these models.
Table 3.7 Use of standard models for balance sheet and profit and loss account
Standard model used 1984 1990
Balance sheet

















Dutch company law specifies a number of lay out models for both statements to be used
by small firms (see Appendix III for a detailed description). For the balance sheet, four
models are presented, of which two (a columnar and an account form model) are
designed specifically for small firms. The classification of the balance sheets disclosed
turned out to be relatively straightforward, as only one copy in 1984 and 2 copies in
1990 deviated so much from any model that they could not be classified (see table 3.7).
From the results on the paired sample (not presented here) it can be concluded that few
firms (1 out of 30 firms in the sample) have changed the balance sheet format with time.
In 1984, 28 (38.9%) firms in the sample used an exact or almost exact copy of one of
the standard models provided by company law. By 1990 this number had risen to 44
(61.1 %). All other balance sheets, although mostly based on one of the standard models,
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deviated from the standard model by adding new items to the model or by using
alternative items or alternative categorisation of standard items. In 1984, 30 (41.7%)
balance sheets included one or more items not mentioned in the standard-model. Most
of these deviations were breakdowns of one of the standard-items, which is permitted.
Also, a large number of balance sheets lacked a number of items provided on the
standard models. In 1990, firms followed the standard models more closely. Details on
standard-items were still provided, but were placed in the notes to the balance-sheet.
Other formal requirements (e.g. the provision to state the way the distribution of profits
is incorporated in the balance sheet) not only enhance the comparability of the
information provided but also present information that is essential for the interpretation
of the figures provided in the balance sheet. At this point, a considerable number of
firms (41.3% in 1984, 27.8% in 1990) does not provide this information as required
(see Appendix 3C, table 3C.2).
3.3.5.2 Appearance of balance sheet items
All individual items appearing in the balance sheets disclosed were compared to the
items available in the standard balance sheet model. For all general-level items (referred
to as group-headings here) the results are presented in table 3.8.


















































































For these items, any deviation from the exact naming in the standard model is
prohibited. Group-headings may be omitted, however, if they do not apply to the firm's
situation. In 1984, a total of 27 (7.6%) deviations were found in 11 (15.3%) balance
sheets, a number that had decreased to 22 (5.9%) deviations in 10 (13.8%) accounts in
1990. In some cases a group-heading was left out while it was clear from other items
on the balance sheets or from the accompanying notes that the item should have been
mentioned. Including these deficiencies, the number of group-item errors has declined
slightly from 10.6% in 1984 to 8.4% in 1990. , , :
77For all items in the standard models other than group-headings, the naming may differ
from the model naming if the new name chosen is 'equally informative'. Since it is hard
to infer when a naming is no longer to be considered 'equally informative', in the
analysis presented below no distinction will be made between deviations that can be
considered permissable and those that might be non-permissable (see table 3.9).
Table 3.9 Use of deviating names for items in the balance sheet
Hi
Use of deviating item-names per
balance sheet (all accounts)
Use of deviating item-names per









































The number of deviations is much higher compared to the results for the group-
headings'*. Details on the naming of individual items are presented in appendix 3C,
table 3C.3. By 1990, the average number of deviations, counting all accounts, has
declined significantly. This result mainly stems from the fact that the number of
accounts with deviations has declined (from 44 (61.1 %) in 1984 to 28 (38.9%) in 1990)
while the number of deviations per non-standard account has remained fairly constant
(2.9 in 1984, 2.6 in 1990). From these results it again seems clear that more firms tend
to follow the standard models more closely in 1990. Also, with the exception of a few
extreme cases, most deviations do not seem to conflict with the understandability or
comparability of the balance sheets presented". _ . . . , J\
" A special case has to be made for the inclusion of government grants in the balance sheet.
In the prescribed models no item is presented to incorporate government grants. Company law
permits adding items to the balance sheet if none of the available items seems to be
appropriate. The most important government grant for small firms, Government Investment
Grant (Wet Investerings Premies, WIR), was changed considerably in 1986 which resulted in
large differences at this point between the accounts of 1984 and 1990. To avoid any
difficulties, all items related to government grants were left out of the analysis.
" The item 'other reserves' has the largest number of deviations from the standard naming (see
Appendix 3C, table 3C.3). Most firms, however, used names like 'general reserves' or just
'reserves', which, in most cases anyway, may be considered equally informative.
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3.3.6 The information volume of small firms' financial statements - • ••••••
Although the quantity of information provided in financial statements has no direct
bearing on the quality of the information provided, an analysis of the volume of
information included in the financial statements disclosed gives an insight into the extent
of the disclosures made by small firms. In some cases the quality and quantity of
information are very closely related, such as in the disclosure of the accounting
principles used in the valuation of items on the balance sheet. Inadequate disclosure of
such elementary items relates directly to the usefulness and the quality of the
information provided in the financial statements disclosed.
Table 3.10 Volume of information disclosed
Number of pages
Number of elements
Number of accounts containing a:
- Directors report
- Balance sheet
- Profit and loss account
- Notes to the balance sheet
- Notes to the P&L account
- General notes
- Auditor's report
Number of items in:
- Balance sheet
- Profit and loss account
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The annual accounts of a Dutch small firm on average covers three and a half page in
1984 and has extended to almost four pages in 1990 (see table 3.10). Most accounts
consist of three elements: the balance sheet, the notes to the balance sheet and the
general notes. A small number of firms (4 in 1984 and 3 in 1990) disclosed only a
balance sheet, thereby clearly violating the company law requirements to disclose a
number of notes to the balance sheet. On the other hand other accounts included a profit
and loss account or an auditor's report, thereby disclosing more information than
required. The average number of financial statement-elements was 2.7 in 1984 and 3.2
in 1990. In most cases the general notes were not clearly separated from the notes to
the balance sheet, so that the average number of elements as separated in the actual
accounts is slightly less (2.25 in 1984 and 2.14 in 1990).
The number of items on the balance sheet declined from 15.0 in 1984 to 14.4 in 1990
(the number of items in the prescribed standard balance sheet lay out is 23 for the
79account form model and 19 for the columnar model). The number of items in the
accompanying notes increased slightly from 9.3 in 1984 to 10.3 in 1990. As indicated
before, this illustrates the fact that in 1990 firms tended to follow the standard balance
sheet models provided in the company law more closely and moved details on these
items to the accompanying notes. •-- -
A further indication of the amount of information incorporated in small firms' annual
accounts, is provided by the number of specifications for balance sheet items that are
disclosed (see table 3.11). The items in the standard balance sheet model may be
supplemented or replaced by an itemization. These breakdowns are mostly voluntary
information disclosures, although for the owners' equity, a breakdown and table of
changes is mandated to be incorporated in the notes to the balance sheet.
Table 3.11 Specification of balance sheet items
1984 1990 Mann Whitney
U test
No. of Specifica- No. of Specifica-






























Total 71 6.254 71 6.563 0.408 (0.684)
Specifications of balance sheet items can be located either in the balance sheet (in
addition to or replacing one of the standard items) or in the accompanying notes. The
vast majority of all commentaries were placed in the notes to the balance sheet (92.9%).
The vast majority of the specifications of balance items were of a verbal nature. Of all
commentaries counted (910, an average of 6.4 per account), 34.9% (317) included
numeric information while all others were entirely textual. The number of numerical
commentaries and that of textual commentaries are negatively correlated (r = - 0.44),
indicating that firms tend to treat these as substitutes rather than that firms providing a
large number of numerical commentaries also provide a relatively large number of
textual notes. A total of 2 accounts (1 in both 1984 and 1990) contained no
commentaries on balance sheet items at all and were in clear violation with multiple
disclosure regulations™. Furthermore, 35 accounts included only textual commentaries.
* As mentioned before, a total of seven accounts (4 in 1984 and 3 in 1990) included no
accompanying notes. Five of these, however, included at least some specifications in the
balance sheet. ,.,--.. ^ •—•••..
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The notes to the balance sheet have to provide a range of information items, mostly as
a supplement to items appearing on the balance sheet (see appendix HI). Firms may
leave any information out of the financial statements if an item does not apply to the
firm's situation or if the item is of such insignificance that it can be left out without
violating the required insight into the firm's financial position. Obviously, this creates
a serious problem in evaluating compliance since it is very hard to determine whether
the absence of an item of information constitutes a violation of company law
requirements, or whether the item is left out for reasons within the legal provisions.
Consequently, as mentioned before, any indication of the level of compliance or the
quality of the information disclosed constitutes an optimistic estimation, which may
actually be lower if firms have left out any information unjustifiedly.
Details on the items specified in the notes to the balance sheet are presented in
Appendix 3C (table 3C.4). Compliance levels for 1990 vary strongly from as high as
93% (80% in 1984) for depreciation methods used for tangible assets to 22% (28% in
1984) for accounts receivable falling due within one year. For most of the items for
which the level of compliance can positively be established, compliance has improved
over time. Nevertheless, it is clear that most financial statements' notes entail only a
fraction of the number of items required by law. This, however, might be due to the
fact that most items required generally do not apply to small firms so that the omissions
of items can not be positively identified as non-compliance with financial reporting
regulations.
Table 3.12 Valuation methods
1984 1990
N HC CC NV NM N HC CC NV NM
20 12 50 - 50
12 69 91 - - 9
7 43 29 20 25 - 40 35
22 61 87 - - 13
HC = Historical cost, CC = Current cost, NV = Net asset value, NM = Not mentioned
An essential item in the accompanying notes concerns the disclosure of accounting
policies used for valuation. The accounting policies have to be disclosed for any of the
items presented in the financial statements. For the valuation of assets and liabilities,
firms may choose the cost price or productions cost (historical cost) and also, for
tangible and financial fixed assets and stocks, the current value may be used*'. The
disclosures on valuation principles and the valuation methods used are presented in
table 3.12. Sample firms almost exclusively use historical cost for the valuation of













*' The 'General Order on Current Cost' of December 22, 1983 entails detailed prescriptions
on the content, limits and application of restatement of assets at current costs.
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used to value subsidiaries. None of the small firms used current cost asset valuation for
other than the financial assets^. However, a notable number of firms did not provide
any information on asset valuation, although this information is essential for
understanding the financial statements. Also, this situation does not seem to have
improved over time. ,
3.3.7 Voluntary disclosures. ••<•:, •....••:-•;••. .v .-.<:...
In the previous section the focus was on information required by company law and
compliance of small Dutch firms with financial accounting disclosure requirements. In
this section the emphasis will be on the voluntary disclosures made by small firms.
Small firms may have various incentives to disclose information in addition to the
information legally required:
/. Additional information may be required to enable users to form a well-founded
opinion of the company's assets, liabilities and results. Such additions are not of a
strictly voluntary nature, since in principle they are required by law.
2. Firms may be unwilling to pay the extra costs of differentiating between accounts
prepared and accounts disclosed. Therefore they may choose to disclose the prepared
accounts, although these may well include more information than legally required to be
disclosed.
3. Firms may be unaware of all legal requirements and exemptions provided in the
company law requirements.
4. Firms may find it beneficial to provide more information than is strictly required,
e.g. if the information in the financial statements is to be used in the process of
acquiring a bank loan.
Since it is impossible to determine from the financial statements disclosed the reason for
any disclosure made, in this section voluntary disclosures are defined as any information
provided in the financial statements that is not specifically required by company law.
From table 3.13 it is clear that the number of voluntary disclosed items has increased
since 1984. This is primarily due to the fact that more firms have enclosed some kind
of non-mandatory information and only slightly results from an increase in the number
of voluntary disclosures per account. This result is particularly caused by the increasing
number of firms that has disclosed a profit and loss account and the notes thereto. The
number of accounts with voluntary information has increased from 56 (77.8%) in 1984
to 70 (97.2%) in 1990 and the number of items disclosed voluntarily has increased from
** Firms using current cost need to provide information on how the current costs are
determined. Also, firms using production costs for valuing an asset have to explain whether
interest on debts has been capitalised. None of the financial statements examined included any
details on these items. -••.-.- • ; -•;;••
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2.25 items per account in 1984 to 3.66 items in 1990. So, although many accounts entail
some items not specifically required by company law, even with the increase in
voluntary disclosures, the number of items disclosed in 1990 by small firms in addition
to the company law requirements is generally limited.
































3.3.8 Concluding remarks. /
This section has provided some descriptive results on the timeliness, quantity and quality
of financial reporting disclosures made by small firms. Annual accounts were studied
for 1984, the first year the company law requirements for small firms were in effect,
and 1990.
From the data on the period of time firms take to prepare and file their accounts, it
seems it is common practice among small firms to extend the 'normal' period to prepare
their annual accounts with the maximum allowable period of 6 months. For some
reason, small firms generally do not prepare their financial statements within 5 months
after the end of the financial year. For 1984, this can be explained by the fact that many
firms may have had difficulty in adjusting to the new regulatory requirement. But even
in 1990 only a small fraction of small firms filed its accounts within six months after
the end of the financial year. An alternative explanation therefore could be that many
small firms deliberately defer the preparation of the annual accounts, or stall the filing
of the accounts after they have been approved by the shareholders meeting. Although
all firms in the sample eventually filed their accounts, possibly to avoid any fines for
violating the company law, most firms did so in the knowledge that their accounts were
filed well over 13 months after the ending of the financial year.
The comparability of financial information disclosed by small firms does not seem to
pose any serious troubles. The majority of firms use an exact copy of one of the balance
sheet models provided in company law. Also, most deviations from these models
generally do not seem to harm the understandability of the information disclosed. The
volume and quality of information disclosed in the notes to the balance sheet seem to
be much more of a problem. In many cases vital information (e.g. accounting policies
used) is missing and the extent of the information provided in the notes is in most cases
83very limited. Also, there seems to be little improvement at this point with time. A major
difficulty here is that it is very hard to establish whether the omission of certain
information required by Law is a result of that information not being applicable to the
firm's situation or that the firm does not comply with the legal requirements. For those
items where the level of compliance could be positively established it can be concluded
that the level of compliance varies strongly depending on the particular information
requested.
3.4 Determinants of regulatory compliance of small firms.
3.4.1 Introduction.
Compliance of companies with financial accounting regulation varies among firms, but
there are few empirical studies on the determinants of the observed degree of
compliance. Although firm size has been repeatedly suggested as a main factor in the
financial accounting burden imposed on firms, few studies have empirically investigated
the relationship between financial accounting disclosures and firm characteristics
[Buijink, 1992, p. 41]. Only two studies, by Hohnes and Nichols [1989] and Keasey and
Short [1990], have modelled the financial reporting activities of small firms (see also
chapter 2).
Foster [1986], summarises a number of factors as determinants of the timeliness and
quality of financial accounting information of companies". The variable most
consistently reported as significant in studies examining differences in disclosure policy
across firms, is firm size [Foster, 1986, p. 44]. Firm size, however, is used as a proxy
for various underlying factors, such as political costs, information production costs and
litigation costs, which makes it hard to explain the results of empirical studies. Other
variables suggested are industry as a proxy for competitive disadvantage costs, leverage
and non-management ownership as a proxy for agency costs and leverage, profitability
and liquidity as proxies for competition for acquiring capital (e.g. bank loans) [Buijink,
1992, p. 42]. ............... . .
" These factors, however, are used by Foster to explain vo/K/tfa/y disc/osi/re by firms and may
have limited applicability to disclosure policies of firms towards ma/uia/«/ disc/ofure. Although
these factors may be important in explaining the position of firms taken towards proposed
regulations and lobbying activities to influence these proposals, other factors may dominate the
decision of firms to (not) comply with passed regulations. , ,_
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3.4.2 Independent variables •"
Using the data from the compliance study discussed in section 3.3, a number of
empirical regularities reported in the financial accounting literature can be tested. The
following explanatory variables are used**:
SIZE Firm size, measured by the firm's total assets. Larger firms are
hypothesised to have better accounting procedures, relatively lower
accounting costs and higher potential benefits from financial reporting
activities, resulting in better reporting characteristics (i.e. timeliness,
: . quantity and quality of information). Also, smaller firms are politically
less visible resulting in a reduced chance of the government monitoring
the quality of financial statements, also resulting in lower litigation
costs.
LEVERAGE Leverage, calculated as equity over total assets. Firms with more debt
are hypothesised to encounter stronger demands for financial accounting
information from outside capital suppliers resulting in improved
financial reporting characteristics.
SBI (1-6) Dummy variables for industry. Although the financial reporting
characteristics may vary between industries (e.g. as a result of varying
competitive disadvantages), the sign of the relationship is unclear. It has
been suggested that financial firms are more timely reporters since they
are less engaged in time-consuming activities such as counting inventory
[Courtis, 1976, p. 53]. However, financial firms are not included in our
sample.
ACCOUNTANT Dummy variable coded 1 if the accounts are prepared by an external
accountant and code 0 if the accounts are prepared by firm employees.
Given the expertise of a professional accountants with company law
requirements the quality of the information disclosed is hypothesised to
improve if an external accountant prepared the accounts. Also, the
volume of information disclosed is hypothesised to increase when an
external accountant is involved since the accountant will be more aware
of all company law requirements and will be less inclined to leave out
any item of information. However, the firm's management may decide
to leave certain items out of the financial statements when it is actually
disclosed which would reduce the effect of the external accountant on
the volume of information disclosed. The effect on the timeliness of the
financial statements is unclear. Although hiring an external accountant
may speed up the preparation of the accounts, firms that prepare the
accounts internally may have better accounting and control procedures.
Furthermore, the impact of the external accountant on the filing of the
accounts seems minimal since this is primarily a matter for the firm
itself.
* Where appropriate, the data for 1990 are deflated in terms of 1984 guilders.PERIOD (0-1) Dummy variable coded 1 if the dependent variable is calculated from
accounts of 1990 and code 0 if the dependent variable is calculated from
accounts of 1984. Financial reporting characteristics are hypothesised
;I to improve over time as firms are getting more familiar with financial
;, reporting procedures and regulatory requirements.
3.4.3 Dependent variables j
Various proxies for the timeliness, quantity and quality of small firm financial
disclosures are used as dependent variables. For timeliness three measures are used:
preparation lag (PREPARE), filing lag (FILE) and reporting lag (REPORT), as defined
section 3.3.4. Increasing lags relate to decreasing timeliness of disclosures. The quantity
of small firm information disclosures is measured by the number of items in the balance
sheet and the accompanying notes (ITEMCNT), the number of specifications of balance
sheet items (SPECCNT) and the number of voluntarily disclosed items (VOLUNT). The
quality of the information disclosures is measured by the number of deviating names for
group-headings (HEADNAME) and the number of deviating names for all balance sheet
items (ITEMNAME). As a consequence, the level of quality of financial disclosures in our
study is exclusively related to the comparability of the information provided. Increasing
numbers of deviations relate to a decrease in the comparability of the information
disclosed.
The expected signs for the relationships between dependent and independent variables
are summarised in table 3.14.
Table 3.14 Determinants of the financial information disclosure of small firms
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3.4.4 Univariate results
Descriptive univariate statistics for the dependent variables are presented in Appendix
3D". A summary of the statistical tests performed is presented in table 3.15. Rank
correlations are reported for ordinal independent variables (SIZE, LEVERAGE), Kmskal
Wallis tests are performed for categorical data (SBI) and Mann-Whitney U tests are
performed for dichotomous variables (ACCOUNTANT, PERIOD).





































































One-tailed probability levels are indicated by * for a = 0.10, ** for a = 0.05 and
*•• for a = 0.01 (for SBI, 2-tailed probability levels are reported)
The results found in the univariate analysis suggest that:
1. Firm size significantly affects the quality and quantity of the information disclosures
by small firms. Both the quality and quantity of the information disclosed increase with
firm size. The time to prepare the accounts generally increases with firm size, except
for the largest firms in the sample (see Appendix 3D, table 3D.1). The time to file the
accounts generally decreases with firm size, which is primarily caused by the extreme
filing lags of the very small firms in the sample. Statistically, the effect of firm size on
the timeliness of the accounts, however, is mostly only marginally significant.
2. The hypothesized effect of leverage on the quantity and quality of information
disclosed is mostly as predicted. The effect on timeliness is mixed and not consistent
with the predicted sign. The results found are only marginally significant in a few cases
(REPORT, ITEMCNT) and not significant for most independent variables
* Results for the full sample and the paired sample are very similar. Therefore only the results
for the full sample will be discussed in the remainder of this section. Univariate and
multivariate results for the paired sample are provided in Appendix 3E.CAopfer 5
3. The timeliness, quantity or quantity of financial information disclosures do not
systematically vary with industry (at a 1-digit level). Although there is a significant
result found for one individual item (SPECCNT), there is no consistent relationship
between industry and the timeliness, quality or quantity of the information disclosed.
4. The hiring of an external accountant to prepare the annual accounts improves the
quality of information disclosed. Also, firms hiring an external accountant to prepare
the annual accounts, have longer preparation lags. On the other hand, the time to file
the accounts after they have been approved by the shareholders meeting decreases when
an external accountant is hired. The effect on the volume of information disclosed is
limited and mostly not as predicted. ^ ,f; '7 v " : • r
5. With time, the timeliness, quality and quantity of information disclosed by small
firms have improved. Preparation lags have decreased only marginally. A strong
decrease in filing lags, however, resulted in a significant decrease in reporting lags. The
effect on the quantity and quality of the information disclosed is as predicted but only
significant for the voluntary disclosure of information (VOLUNT) and the naming of
balance sheet items (ITEMNAME).
3.4.5 Multivariate results
To assess the partial effect of each explanatory variable, holding all other variables
constant, and to test the combined explanatory power of the set of explanatory variables,
the following multiple regression model was estimated:
The model was estimated for each of the dependent variables defined in the previous
sections, resulting in eight models to be tested. The results of the multivariate analysis
are presented in table 3.16 and Appendix 3E for the paired sample. • - •
Table 3.16 depicts a significant effect of PERIOD in the models using FILE, REPORT, VOLUNT
and ITEMNAME as the dependent variable. Similar results are found for ACCOUNTANT with
PREPARE, HEADNAME with ITEMNAME and SIZE with VOLUNT. Partial effects of the other
explanatory variables are not significant at the 0.1 significance level. These results are
generally consistent with the univariate analysis regarding the effect observed for PERIOD
and ACCOUNTANT. The absence of any partial effect of LEVERAGE and SBI is also consistent
with the outcome of the univariate analysis. The effect of SIZE on the quantity and
quality of the information disclosures, however, has disappeared in most of the
multivariate models tested.











































































































































' significant at 0.1 level; *• significant at 0.05 level; ' significant at 0.01-level.




































sign for FiLE-variable is oppositeC/uipter 3
The performance of most of the models is weak. R*s are mostly around or below 0.10.
F statistics are significant only for REPORT (a < 0.05) , SPECCNT (a<0.1) and VOLUNT
(a < 0.01). For all other models the null hypothesis that the explanatory variables
collectively do not affect the dependent variable cannot be rejected (for a < 0.10)*',
althouugh the results are marginally significant for FILE (a=0.18) and ITEMNAME
(a=0.16). The regression models based on the paired sample (see Appendix 3E, table
3E.2) perform slightly better. R*s range from 0.12 to 0.47. F statistics are significant
for REPORT (a < 0.05), VOLUNT (a < 0.01) and FILE (a < 0.1) and marginally significant
for ITEMNAME (a=0.106).
The sign of the coefficients for the PERIOD variable in both the univariate and the
multivariate analysis are as predicted and mostly are significant (see table 3.17). For
SIZE the results relating to the quality and quantity of information disclosed are generally
as predicted. The effect of firm size on the timeliness of disclosures is also as predicted
and larger firms have shorter reporting lags. For ACCOUNTANT and LEVERAGE the
results are only consistent for the quality of the information disclosed. The hiring of an
external accountant has an adverse effect on the timeliness of disclosure whereas the
effect on the quantity of information disclosed is not consistent.
Regarding the timeliness of information disclosures the effect of SIZE, LEVERAGE and
ACCOUNTANT on the filing lag (FILE) is opposite to the sign for the two other proxies
for timeliness (PREPARE and REPORT). Finally, differences in disclosure characteristics
between firms of different industries can be found but are neither consistent nor
significant in both the univariate and multivariate analysis.
3.5 Concluding remarks. •> ;
In this chapter the compliance of Dutch small firms with financial accounting regulation
is analyzed. It was found that compliance with formal requirements, mostly facilitating
the comparability of the information disclosed over time and over firms, does not seem
to be an area of great concern. A common strategy followed by small firms is to take
an exact copy of a standard model and to leave the items that are not applicable to the
firm's situation without an amount. This strategy also seems to be common practice
among accounting firms preparing small firms' financial statements. - -
Most compliance problems pertain to the notes to the balance sheet. The amount of
information disclosed is rather limited. It is, however, not always clear whether
omissions are cases of non-compliance or just a result of the item not being applicable
to the firm's situation. Also, the number of items disclosed voluntarily is limited
* Autocorrelation (see Durbin Watson statistics in table 3.16) and multicollinearity (see
correlation matrix in Appendix 3F, table 3F.1) do not seem to pose any serious problems.
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although many accounts disclosed entail at least some items not specifically required by
company law. • >••.•-:.'.•:, > .. • -v •.;>. -ru..;-• ,;,:<•*-• -^ .'•;••-;_:.;v,;\vs!?. •;;;v,.-: *?v^
An interesting finding concerns the timing of filing accounts at the Chamber of
Commerce. The time lag between the approval of the annual accounts by the
shareholders meeting and the filing of the accounts has decreased with time. This result
is consistent with the effect predicted from the existence of learning effects that will
result in an improvement of the timeliness of filing over time. However, most firms in
1990 still violate the requirement to file the accounts within 8 working days after
approval by the shareholders meeting. In fact, the average filing lag in 1990 is still over
52 days. Although a compliance study, solely based on the information provided in the
financial statements disclosed, does not provide any explanations for these results found,
it may well be that small firms deliberately tend to delay the disclosure of the accounts.
This effect is stronger for smaller firms. In fact, the financial statements of the majority
of the sample firms are not filed within 13 months after the ending of the financial year
and consequently may be of little use to anyone.
In section 3.4, the relationship between the timeliness, quantity and quality of financial
accounting disclosures by small firms and a number of firm characteristics is analyzed.
The results both the univariate and multivariate analysis indicate there has been an
improvement in the timeliness, quality and quantity of information provided in small
firms' annual accounts. The quality of such information also is improved if an external
accountant is hired to prepare the accounts. Furthermore, the quality and quantity of the
information disclosed increases whith firm size. The effect of other explanatory
variables such as leverage or industry generally are not significant, although there is
some indication that the quality of the information disclosed is positively related to
leverage.
It should be recognised that the analysis provided does not include all relevant
explanatory variables, due to a lack of available data (e.g. profitability and management
ownership structure). A variable that may be of particular importance in a small firm
setting is the influence of a dominant individual on a firm's disclosure policy. The
presence of a dominant personality, controlling the accounting procedures within a
company and the lack of governance devices (e.g. an auditor) within small firms, may
very well have a substantial effect into the accounting disclosures of small firms.
Research on the dominant individual explanation is, however, very sparse and mostly
based on anecdotes [Foster, 1986, p. 44, Forker, 1992, p. 117].
The results of this and other studies on the quality of small firms' financial accounts
indicate that small firms are not really convinced of the desirability of disclosing their
annual accounts. The timeliness and volume of information disclosed particularly seem
to limit the usefulness of small firm financial statements. From compliance studies,
however, it is hard to infer what the underlying factors are that influence small firms'
disclosure policy. Is it that small firms want to keep their financial information private
to avoid any competitive disadvantage costs? Or it is that information production costsCAoprer 5
are a serious burden to small firms resulting in minimal information disclosures? To
present further information on the effects on the disclosure policies of small firms, a
study on the perceptions of small firms' managers and an investigation of information
production costs and firm size will be presented in chapter 4.
92Appendix 3A. Data on the number of annual accounts disclosed.

























































































































































































































47-50%' 248,839 86.43% Totaal 172,400
1. data from 1984 from van Duuren [1986].
2. data from 1991 from the Database Foundation of the Chambers of Commerce.
3. Finn-size is based on the data provided in the annual accounts disclosed. For firms that are exempted from
the disclosure of financial statements, firm-size can not be determinded. Therefore, the total number of small
companies is calculated by the total number of companies mandated to disclose annual accounts minus the total
number of large and medium sized firms that have disclosed annual accounts. So, in calculating the number of
small firms, full compliance by large and medium sized firms is assumed.






























































































































































































A total of 18,602 firms filed a statement of liability and is therefore exempted from the mandatory
filing of the financial statements. Including these firms, the total number of disclosures in 1991
amounts to 224,843. •-— — .. .. •••-.-
94Appendix 3B. Financial reporting lags (paired sample results)










































































































* For 1 annual report the date of the shareholders meeting could not be determined. Also, in 1 case
the date of filing was not indicated on the accounts filed.
95Appendix 3C. Summary of results







































Table 3C.2. Indication of the way for which the distribution of income is accounted for in
the balance sheet
= 144 1984 1990
A. Mentioned in balance sheet
- Before profit distribution
- After profit distribution
B. Not mentioned in balance sheet
- Before profit distribution
















96Table 3C.3. Occurence and naming of major items in the balance sheet
1984 1990
Item present Name correct Item present Name correct
Intangible fixed assets 15 (20.8%) 15 (100%) 12 (16.7%) 12 (100%)
Tangible fixed assets 60(83.3%) 54(90.0%) 69(95.8%) 67(97.1%)
Financial fixed assets 28(38.9%) 26(92.9%) 20(27.8%) 19(95.0%)
Stocks 50 (69.4%) 48 (96.0%) 61 (84.7%) 60 (98.4%)
Debtors 67 (93.0%) 62 (92.5%) 72 (100%) 71 (97.2%)
Investments 3(4.2%) 3(100%) 8(11.1%) 8(100%)
Liquidassets 64(88.9%) 61(95.3%) 72(100%) 69(95.8%)
Prepayments and accrued income 34(44.4%) 32(94.1%) 23(31.9%) 23(100%)
Called up share capital 71(98.6%) 54(76.1%) 69(95.8%) 65(94.2%)
Share premium account . 4(5.6%) 4(100%) 3(4.2%) 3(100%)
Revaluation reserves 5 (6.9%) 5 (100%) 2 (1.4%) 2 (100%)
Statutory reserves . 8(11.1%) 7(87.5%) 23(31.9%) 23(100%)
Other reserves .... . . 58(80.6%) 30(51.7%) 57(79.2%) 35(52.2%)
Profit 18(25.0%) 7(38.9%) 4(5.6%) 4(100%)
Provisions 44(61.1%) 41(93.2%) 53(73.6%) 51(96.2%)
Long term liabilities 40(55.6%) 35(87.5%) 45(62.5%) 40(88.9%)
Current liabilities 69(95.8%) 60(86.9%) 72(100%) 62(86.1%)
Accruals and deferred income 27(36.1%) 25(92.3%) 20(27.8%) 19(95.0%)Table 3C.4. Required notes to the
A. Debtors
- amount falling due within one year
- loans to (former) directors and
(former) commisioners
B. Information about debts
- liabilities not due within S years
- collateral provided for debts
- guarantees given in behalf of third
parties
- long term financial obligations not
appearing in the balance sheet
C. Translation of foreign currencies
- principles for translation
- treatment of exchange differences
D. Depreciation methods
- Intangible fixed assets - - -
- Tangible fixed assets
- Financial fixed assets
E. Shareholders equity
- capital issued, paid and called
- changes in share capital
- Details on self owned share capital
F. Details on statutory reserves
G. Average number of personnel
H. Subsidiaries
- pan in issued capital
- name of the subsidiary



































































































































98Table 3C.5. Voluntary notes to the financial statements ^ -
Financial statement section
A. Directors' report
B. Profit and loss account
C. Notes to Profit and loss account
D. Auditor's report
Information items
A. Information about personnel
- segmentation of personnel
- mutations in personnel
- information about wages and salaries
paid
B. Expected future developments
C. Salaries of directors

























































99Appendix 3D. Univariate analysis '--'
One-tailed probability levels are indicated by * for a = 0.10, ** for a = 0.05,
***fora = 0.01 - .. ..- . :..

















































































































































100Table 3D.3. Timeliness, quality and quantity of financial accounting disclosure per 1 digit
SBI industry
Industry Manuf. Construe- Retail/ Transport Bussiness/ Service
tion Wholesale Finance




























































* 10 cases could not be classified due to missing data
** based on a series of Kruskal Wallis tests for differences between classes of industry, a significant
effect can only be found for the VOLUNT variable (2 tailed, a=0.1).
Table 3D.4. Timeliness, quality and quantity of financial accounting disclosure and the
external accountant.
Preparation of Internal External accountant Mann Whitney U test
accounts (z score)






















































































102Appendix 3E. Univariate and multivariate analysis for the paired sample






































































One-tailed probability levels are indicated by * for a = 0.10, *• for a












































































































































* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at O.QS level; *** significant at 0.01-level.Appendix 3F. Correlations for independent variables
Tabel 3F.1 Spearman rank correlation coefficients (full sample)



































Costs for Small Private Firms
4.1 Introduction' " ' ,
Perceptions of participants in the corporate disclosure process, form an important input
in the governmental debates on financial reporting regulation and also in the
corresponding financial accounting literature. The views of parliament on the anticipated
impact of the adaptation of the Dutch legislation to the Fourth EC Directive on the
participants of the corporate disclosure process can be found in the reports of the
parliamentary debates*. Given the evident lack of empirical evidence on these matters
(see chapter 2), it is hardly surprising that the views on the presumed impact of the
proposed financial reporting regulations are quite diverging.
Some parliamentary members felt the proposed adaptation of the Dutch company law
was not far-reaching enough and should be extended to include proprietorships as well*.
Other members of parliament suggested that the proposed regulatory changes were far
too extensive and a motion was submitted, urging the minister to keep the EC Directives
as limited as possible*. To substantiate this motion, the following statement of a Dutch
' This chapter is based on two previously published articles: Bollen, L.H.H., 1990a,
Regulering van jaarverslaggeving: een onderzoek naar percepties van ondernemingen (1),
Maart^iadvoorfiedn^admmisrrarieen 0rgam'.sarie, juli/augustus and Bollen, L.H.H., 1990b,
Regulering van jaarverslaggeving: een onderzoek naar percepties van ondernemingen (2),
Moamüfetod voor Bedh^radronw/ranc en Ogam'sarie, September. An earlier version of part of
this chapter was presented at the 14th Annual congress of the EAA (European Accounting
Association) in Maastricht in April 1991. The research project was supported and partly
financed by the Chamber of Commerce of Maastricht.
* A historical overview of the advancement of the regulations for small and medium-sized firms
within the Fourth Directive, is provided in appendix I at the end of the dissertation.
' Wessel-Tuinstra (D'66), Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Handelingen, nr. 33, June 1983,
p. 4540.
* Motion Tripels/Van de Burg on the size of the EC legislation (16 326, nr. 28).
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scholar was cited, to point out that the costs resulting from the new legislation might be
substantial compared to the expected benefits:
"To my conviction, the composers of the [Fourth] Directive have never
considered the costs this new legislation shall impose on companies [...]. Also,
a critical analysis of the benefits of such legislation seems to be lacking."
[translated from Van der Grinten, 1981]
The government, by word of the minister of justice, took the position that financial
reporting regulation should be limited to avoid a standards overload, especially where
small firms were concerned. But in his opinion all options within the restrictions of the
Fourth Directive had been used to limit the regulatory burden for the firms concerned*.
Also, the minister expressed the belief that the benefits of the implementation of the
Fourth Directive would outweigh the costs associated with it. This view apparently was
based on his perceptions rather than on empirical facts as he recognized that a cost-
benefit analysis of the proposed regulation would be very hard, if not impossible to
conduct*. , ....... , ;..„...
Given the difficulty of adequately measuring benefits and costs of (proposed) regulation,
many empirical studies use questionnaires to survey the opinion of users and producers
of accounting information on the effects of accounting regulation (see chapter 2). Studies
among users of accounting information, which dominate this line of research, typically
involve the ranking of information items in order of their importance in decision making
processes to asses the importance of information-items disclosed in financial statements.
Other studies ask respondents to categorize accounting standards based on some costs-
benefit criterion. ....,,.,.,.
In the differential reporting regulation debate, perceptions of users and preparers of
small firms' accounting information are of particular importance since other research
methods (e.g. capital market research) are less suitable in the small private firm context.
Questionnaire studies could provide useful insight into questions like:
2. do information needs differ if users are dealing with a small firm instead of a large
firm;
2. to what extent is the information disclosed by small firms adequate to fulfil the
information needs of users;
3. how do managers of small firms feel about the usefulness of financial reporting
(voluntary or mandatory) for their firms or for parties dealing with their firms;
</. how do managers of small firms and users dealing with small firms perceive the
adequacy of the current regulatory requirements for small private firms?
' Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Handelingen, nr. 33, June 1983, p. 4543. >* >
' Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Handelingen, nr. 33, June 1983, p. 4544. ' ;;;: i-i
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The reliability of the outcome of questionnaire-studies may be contested given some
inherent methodological limitations. Firstly, respondents might have incentives to
misrepresent their preferences. Also, the settings are hypothetical and little attempt is
made to determine the reasoning underlying the stated preferences of the respondents
[Ball and Foster, 1982, p. 201]. Therefore, questionnaires are not ideal substitutes for
actual data.
Most empirical studies in this area have concentrated on the users of accounting
information, particularly on investors, thereby largely ignoring other user groups likely
to have diverging views such as accountants and management. Obviously, perception-
studies will gain in reliability if many parties involved in financial accounting were to
be included in these studies. On themes where there is consensus within and among
different parties involved, perception studies can provide useful input into the accounting
regulation debate. Given the existing over-emphasis on users of accounting information,
in the first part of this chapter the focus will be on the perceptions of the preparers of
financial accounting information, i.e. managers of firms.
In the following section (section 4.2) the relation between our research and existing
empirical studies on the perceptions of small firms' management and accountants of
financial disclosure will be discussed. The remainder of this chapter consists of a
questionnaire-study among managers of Dutch small firms. After a discussion of the
research design (section 4.3), the results of the study will be presented and compared
to the results of existing studies (section 4.4).
In the second part of this chapter the focus will be on the accounting costs of small
firms. Several studies have shown that small private firms might be disproportionately
bearing the costs of financial reporting regulations (see chapter 2). Evidence on the costs
of financial reporting for small Dutch firms is, however, non-existent. Therefore,
section 4.5 will provide some evidence on the accounting costs for small Dutch firms
and also on the relationship between accounting costs and firm size.
4.2 Relation to existing empirical research.
Existing studies on the perceptions of producers of accounting information (i.e.
managers and accountants) have been discussed in chapter 2. These studies typically
involve small firm management or external accountants dealing with small firms and
focus on the perceptions of respondents of (1) the application of prevailing financial
reporting regulations to small private firms, (2) the usefulness of accounting information
provided by small firms to outside parties, and (3) the costs of financial reporting
regulations (e.g. competitive disadvantage costs). The research presented in this chapter
will replicate and augment these studies in the Dutch context.
Only a few studies have empirically investigated the costs imposed by financial reporting
regulations on small private firms (e.g. Horwitz and Kolodny [1982] and Nair and
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Rittenberg [1983] (for a more detailed discussion see chapter 2)). Although there is
some further evidence of accounting costs being disproportionately borne by small firms
from research on audit fees, the application of such research to small private firms that
are not mandated to have their financial statements audited seems troublesome. The
inclusion of accountants' fees as one of the cost categories to be researched in
section 4.5, therefore, deserves some further attention. The absence of a mandatory
audit for Dutch small firms might raise some doubts to the relevance of accountants'
fees for small companies. However, the absence of an audit does not imply that
accountants are not involved with smaller firms. Basically, the role of an external
accountant in small companies may include (1) the preparation of the annual accounts,
(2) the audit of the annual accounts and (3) the provision of advice on general business
matters or tax matters. The importance of the external accountant in the accounting
procedures of a small firm may be illustrated by the fact that in a study on small UK
firms, 72% of all responding firms agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the
principal burden of preparing annual accounts is the fee paid to the external accountant
[Carsberg et al., 1985, p. 32f.
As to the relative importance of the various services provided by external accountants,
Page [1984], Carsberg et al. [1985] and Humphrey and Turley [1986, p. 29] all found
that the most important service of professional accountants to small firms is the
preparation of the accounts and tax advice. The preparation of the accounts was also
perceived to be the most time-consuming (i.e. the most costly) activity of the external
accountant. The average yearly fee paid by small UK. firms reported in empirical
studies ranges from £ 1,200 for firms with typically 5 to 10 employees [Carsberg, 1985]
to £ 2,164 for firms with on average 10-20 employees [Robertson, 1986, p. 23].
Research among small company auditors indicates that of the fees paid by small
companies, 23% is accounted for by audit services, indicating that at an aggregate level
the small company audit is not a major source of fees to auditors [Humphrey and
Turley, 1986, p. 30]. These results indicate that even in the absence of an audit, the fee
paid to the external accountant will still constitute a major part of the accounting costs
of small firms.
4.3 Research design. *
- . :•' ••."'.- •:ÄV-.-\'.-^ ..•'••»•" i •••:,-; '->?i'-£;•.,•••••'•>.• -•?**; -'V^Xäsii'-
4.3.1 Introduction ; :::••;:-;••? ;• ;:.^..;i-'+*t :->/;•'• .:.,:;-^ <-^' ^-:/^ •: ••
The main concern of the study presented in the first part of this chapter is to investigate
the perceptions of small firms' management on financial reporting and the regulation
thereof.
' In the study, the same statement was presented to accountants dealing with small firms, of
whom 58% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.
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Specific themes addressed in the study include: i.: .
2. the attitude of management towards financial reporting in general;
2. the attitude of management towards current financial reporting regulation;
3. the perceived main purposes and users of small firms' financial statements;
4. factors driving the attitudes of managers, such as information production costs,
accountants' fees or competitive disadvantages.
As this kind of research, to our knowledge, is non-existent in the Netherlands, and given
the time and financial limits of the study, the primary objective was to conduct an
exploratory study into the perceptions of small firms' management on the issues
mentioned above. However, when possible, the results of the study will also be used in
trying to explain the attitudes of small firm management to financial accounting. Also,
the results of the study will be compared to existing studies in this area.
The second part of this chapter is concerned with the costs imposed on small private
firms as a result of financial reporting regulations and with the relationship between
accounting costs and firm size. The data used in this part of the research were gathered
using the questionnaires. The results of this part of the study will be discussed in
section 4.5.
4.3.2 Research method.
The empirical data for this study were gathered using a postal questionnaire that was
sent to small firms*. The forms were sent on July 1, 1988 and the deadline for responses
to be included in the study was September 30, 1988.
The questionnaires mailed were accompanied by a guiding letter, explaining the aim of
the study and ensuring the anonymity of the respondents and the confidentiality of the
information provided. Finally, a short instruction note was included. After three and a
half weeks (July 25, 1988), a reminder was sent to all firms in the sample. To conclude
the data collection process, a small telephonic survey among non-responding firms was
conducted to gather information on the reasons for not participating in the study. The
data gathered from this survey were used in the analysis of non-response bias.
The basic set of questions is divided into five headings:
A. General items including characteristics of respondents;
ß. Reporting practice of firms in an unregulated environment;
C. Reporting practice of firms in a regulated environment; -
Z). Perceptions on costs and benefits of financial reporting;
is. Financial reporting and current regulation and the competitive position of the firm.
' The questionnaires used, which are in Dutch, are available from the author.
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The questionnaire was pretested using a small number of small company managers (6)
and a number of faculty-members (5). The results of this pilot-study resulted in some
adaptations of the questionnaire. A major problem, indicated by the managers involved
in the pilot-study, was the length of the questionnaire. Taking into account their
comments the questionnaire was revised and a number of questions were removed while
a number of other questions were restructured.
In the study three different questionnaires were used that generally address the same
items but are slightly adapted to the characteristics of the firms in the sample. The
sample of private companies is divided into two subgroups of which one received the
basic questionnaire. The other subgroup received a questionnaire in which a number of
questions on competitive disadvantages (section E) were rephrased. In the questionnaire
that was sent to proprietorships, some questions were rephrased to fit the situation of
these firms where it differed from the private companies. Also, some questions were left
out as they were of no relevance to these firms'.
4.3.3 Sample selection ; ;
The sample of firms selected for this study consists of Dutch private companies that fit
the definition of a small company used in the Dutch company law of 1988 (see
Appendix III for more details). A second sample of firms consisted of proprietorships
of generally the same size as the companies-sample. This second sample is used as a
control group consisting of firms which are considered to be the most direct competitors
of small private companies, but are excluded from the legal financial reporting
requirements.
Table 4.1. Sample selection criteria
1. Banks and insurance companies are excluded;
2. Legal form is private company or proprietorship;
3. Number of personnel is less than 50; '
4. Industry sector is retail/wholesale or construction. • : ,- .
The samples are derived from a database of the Database Foundation of the Dutch
Chambers of Commerce, which includes data on virtually all Dutch businesses. The
database is fed from the Chambers of Commerce to which all Dutch enterprises are
required to register. The database includes address-information along with several firm
characteristics such as number of personnel, industry code and legal form. The
characteristics used to select firms to be included in the sample are described in
table 4.1.
' Most notably the questions on the effects of the 1984 regulatory change were left out since
the new regulations do not apply to proprietorships.
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The selection criteria used are motivated as follows: s c; rrs. ^««ssjt >H: ^
orf 7. Banks and insurance companies were excluded from the sample because of the
deviating financial reporting requirements for these firms in the Dutch company law.
arf 2. Dutch company law applies to (1) public companies, (2) private companies, (3)
general partnerships, (4) limited partnerships and (5) civil law companies (see
Appendix III). The vast majority of these firms are private companies (see Appendix 3A
of chapter 3). Since the focus of this dissertation is on small private firms, only private
companies were included in the first sample. As mentioned, a second sample consisted
of proprietorships that are generally small firms and considered to be direct competitors
of private companies, but are not effected by Dutch company law.
arf 3. The legislative definition of a small firm is based on three criteria: total sales,
total assets and average number of personnel. The database, however, only included
information on the number of personnel, which therefore is the sole size-criterion used.
The size of the responding firms were checked with data on sales and assets provided
by respondents in the questionnaire.
arf 4. Given the low response rate to be expected from studies among small businesses,
firms were selected from two industries to facilitate the testing of industry-effects. Firms
were selected from the retail/wholesale sector and construction businesses, which were
the industries containing the largest number of firms.












The selected sample consists of 570 firms which are registered at the Chamber of
Commerce in Maastricht (see table 4.2). From existing studies among small firms as
well as the pilot study, it was clear that non-response to the questionnaire would be a
major problem in this study. To motivate sample firms to return the questionnaire the
involvement of the Chamber of Commerce of Maastricht in the project was sought'". To
maximize this effect, only firms that were registered at the Maastricht Chamber of
Commerce were selected".
" The involvement of the Chamber of Commerce of Maastricht was made clear to the firms
in the letter accompanying the questionnaire.
" The necessity of such a strategy may be demonstrated by the results of two later Dutch
studies among small and medium-sized firms, which had response rates as low as 5% and 3%
[Drop and Schuit, 1990, NOvAA, 1991a]. u.. :
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4.3.4 Response analysis.
From the 570 questionnaires mailed, 144 forms were returned, resulting in an overall
response rate of 25.3%. Including the telephonic survey of 20 firms, the total response
to the survey is 29%. ..-. , ,.
































































A number of questionnaires was not included in the study for various reasons:
• 11 firms returned the questionnaire unanswered, mentioning they did not fit the
(legislative) definition of a small firm;
• 7 forms where returned unanswered because the firm was inactive;
• 2 firms returned the questionnaire unanswered because they where founded less then
one year ago, giving them very little experience with accounting matters;
• 5 forms were excluded because they were badly filled out or because too many
questions had been left unanswered.
This screening procedure resulted in a total of 119 (20.9%) usable questionnaires. The
sizes and response rates of each sample are given in table 4.3'*.
Several checks were carried out to test for evidence of non-response bias. First, for a
number of key-questions in the questionnaire, it was tested wether responses of late-
respondents (received at least 6 days after the sending of the reminder (i.e. August 1,
1988)) deviated from early-respondents. Further, it was tested whether responding firms
were larger or smaller than non-responding firms. Two additional tests were carried out
to check whether the distribution of legal form and industry of response group,
significantly deviated from the original sample. These and other tests conducted gave
" The corresponding response rates in analogous studies are 19% for Abdel-Khalik [1983],
41 % for Page [1984], and 30 % for Carsberg [1985]. These figures indicate the response rate
for our study was normal. • • «v •-. • - • •. , i
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no indication of non-response bias'^. The sole exception was that respondents from the
retail sector tended to be larger then non-respondents from this industry'*. Also, firms
from the construction business were over-represented in the responding group
(x2= 12.393, p<0.05)
Non-response can partly be explained by the nature of the database used to select the
original sample:
• firm size could only be determined by the number of personnel. This may have
resulted in medium-sized or large firms receiving the questionnaire, which may have
found most of the questions in the study of little relevance to their situation and decided
not to return the form;
• some responses indicated that the database was not fully up-to-date. Some
questionnaires were returned undeliverable while other firms turned out to be inactive.
Finally the telephonic survey among non-responding firms can provide some further
explanations for firms not responding to the survey. The most important reason for not
returning the questionnaire turned out to be a lack of time to complete the form (50%),
lack of interest in financial accounting issues (35%), or privacy considerations (15%).
The telephone survey also confirmed the limitations of using the Database Foundation
database as some firms could not be reached on the phone-number available from the
database while some other firms turned out to be at least medium-sized firms.
4.3.5 Respondents' characteristics.
4.3.5.1 Profile of responding firms
All firms in the response group, based on the size data provided in the questionnaires,
fell within the legislative definition of a small firm. Details on the corresponding size
variables used (total assets, total sales and average number of employees) are presented
in table 4.4".
From table 4.4 it is clear that responding proprietorships are on average smaller than
private companies". This, however, also holds for the original samples in the study.
" Based on a x^-test, with p>0.1.
" Based on a Mann-Whitney-U test with p<0.05
" The table presented is based on data for the fiscal year 1986, provided by the respondents
to the questionnaire.
" This conclusion holds for all three size variables, based on a series of Mann-Whitney-U tests,
with p< 0.05.
115Although the samples for both types of firms were randomly drawn from the same size
categories (based on personnel-classes), proprietorships were in general smaller than
private firms. Firm size was not dissimilar for firms from different industry-sectors.
























































4.3.5.2 Profile of individual respondents
All questionnaires were addressed to the directors of the firm. From the questionnaires
received back, 61% was actually filled out by one of the directors (table 4.5). Most
other forms were filled out by the internal accountant (12%) or an administrative
employee (15%). Several firms had their forms filled out by their external accountant".
These were mostly private companies (11, 21%) and relatively few proprietorships
(2,3%).
In terms of educational level and knowledge on current legal requirements, some
differences exists between these various groups, most notably concerning internal and
external accountants versus other respondents. For both groups of accountants, the
educational level and the knowledge of accounting requirements are significantly
higher". Accountants are typically expected to have an education in administration
(78.6%), whereas members of the latter group generally have an education on secondary
level. . ••.••-• ••••-• •-••».. .:'-v•>••:*• >-3-.*.v\- .,'.•.:..-•••.
" The external accountant can be a registered accountant but will typically be an accountant-
administratieconsulent.
" Based on a Mann-Whitney-U test with p<0.01 ' *
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Education categories: (1) elementary level, (2) secondary level, (3) higher education/non-economics, (4) higher
education/economics, (5) academic/non-economics, (6) academic/economics)
Knowledge on current legal requirements on a 5 point scale (1= low, 5 =high) .
Regarding the level of knowledge of current accounting regulations, based on the
judgement of the respondent and indicated on a scale ranging from 1 (no knowledge) to
5 (very high knowledge), accountants score an average of 3.32, which is significantly
higher than the score of the other groups, separately or combined. However, given the
fact that accountants are better trained in accounting, the question remains whether the
better knowledge of legal requirements is primarily a result of their function as an
accountant or a result of their better training. Additional tests show that the level of
education is the primary factor explaining the level of knowledge on current accounting
regulation".
Comparing the characteristics of respondents from proprietorships with respondents from
private companies, it seems that the latter group is better educated and is also more
familiar with legal accounting requirements. The difference in educational level is not
driven by the fact that more private firms had their external accountant fill out the
questionnaire; non-accountants in private companies also had a better education in
accounting compared to their counterparts in proprietorships. The differences in
" This conclusion is based on a series of Mann-Whitney-U tests (a=0.05), where the effect
of educational level on knowledge of regulation was tested separately for each function-group
and vice versa. The tests indicate that the level of education remains a significant factor for
explaining the level of knowledge of regulation when keeping the respondents position constant,
while a respondent's position had no significant effect if the level of education was kept
constant.
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educational level also result in the higher knowledge of current legal requirements for
respondents from private companies**.
Finally, respondents' characteristics are not different for respondents from a firm in the
construction sector versus the retail sector.
Given the somewhat deviating characteristics of accountants, this group will be analyzed
separately from other respondents. Although external accountants who answer the
questionnaire for their clients may be expected to give answers from the clients' point
of view instead of stating their private deliberations on the questions asked, any
systematic differences in answers between external accountants and other respondents
will be tested for in section 4.4.5.
4.4 Perceptions of small firm managers on financial reporting issues.
4.4.1 Introduction. • " •':•'; '^" • • •• ' • >•" ' ':' U>-. • '• •• -•' ••-•-•• .-. ?-. • -:-•-•-.••
The remainder of the chapter consists of an analysis of the major findings based on the
responses to the questionnaires. The analysis presented in this section deals with small
firms' management perceptions on the following issues":
1. the attitudes towards financial reporting in general and the impact of current
disclosure regulation on small firms;
2. the perceived users of small firm financial statements; >-
3. the disclosure of specific items in the financial statements of small firms;
4. the effect of financial accounting disclosures on the competitive position of a small
firm.
In the first part of this section, descriptive statistics on the issues mentioned will be
presented and compared to the results of previous studies (sections 4.4.2 through 4.4.4).
The latter part of this section contains a cross analysis of answers and a statistical
analysis of the effect of firm- and respondent characteristics on the answers provided in
the questionnaires (section 4.4.5).
" These findings are based on a series of Mann-Whitney-U tests (a=0.05). Although more
private companies have external accountants fill out the questionnaire, the difference in
educational level between private companies and proprietorships also holds for the non-
accountant respondents. The difference in knowledge of current legal requirements does not
hold if the level of training in accounting is kept constant.
" In section 4.5 the part of the questionnaire dealing with the perceived costs and benefits of
financial reporting regulation is dealt with. ••.•--• ••--•*
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4.4.2 Financial reporting regulation.
The primary objective of the questions in this section concerns the incentives for small
firms to disclose financial accounting information to third parties. To test the effect of
accounting regulation on the disclosure practice of small firms, disclosures prior to the
regulatory change in 1983 (see appendix HI) were compared to disclosures since 1984.
The effect should be clear for private companies while there should be little differences
for the disclosures of proprietorships.
From table 4.6 it is clear that the regulatory change had a dramatic effect on the
quantity of disclosures made by small firms. The number of private companies
disclosing annual accounts has risen from 9.6% to 96% while the number of
proprietorships, which were not effected by the mandatory disclosures, publishing
financial statements has only risen slightly from 11.9 to 13.4%. Private companies
which disclosed their financial statements voluntarily before 1984 (5) were not
unanimous in the effect the regulations had on the contents of the financial statements
disclosed. One firm indicated that the financial statements after 1984 entailed less
information compared to prior years, while two firms indicated the contents of their
financial statements had increased as a result of the new regulations. The remaining two
firms felt the regulation of the financial accounting disclosure had no effect on the
contents of the financial statements they disclosed. Finally, after 1984 a number of firms
voluntary disclose information in addition to the information that is required by
Table 4.6. Financial reporting disclosure practices
Disclosure of financial





































A number of conclusions may be drawn from these findings. Regulation has extended
disclosure, not only directly by mandating disclosure of financial statements but also by
encouraging more firms to publish additional information. It is not clear whether the
additional disclosures are made to meet the information needs of specific user-groups
^ Most additional disclosures were made to banks (llx). Other disclosures were made to the
Central Bureau of Statistics (2x), potential customers (lx), taxing authorities (lx) and industrial
organisations (lx).
119or to counter any (perceived) negative effects of the mandatory disclosures. The latter
explanation is partially confirmed by the findings of the Carsberg-study, in which 40%
of the respondents found that regulations on the disclosure of financial accounts reduced
the usefulness of the accounts. Additional disclosures may also result from requests of
users of the disclosed financial statement who find the information required by law not
adequate to fit their information needs and therefore request additional disclosures from
the firm. In fact, 30% of the responding managers in the Carsberg-study indicated their
bank did ask for additional information [Carsberg et al., 1985, p. 44].
Given the fact that small companies do not seem to have much incentive to disclose their
annual accounts voluntarily, it could be expected that the reaction of small firm
managers towards mandatory disclosure of the accounts would be hostile. The results
of this study only partially confirm this hypothesis (table 4.7). Although a number of
respondents from private companies (14, 26.9%) feel that current disclosure
requirements are completely redundant and other respondents (10, 19.2%) indicate that
current legal requirements are far too extensive, there are a considerable number of
managers (26,49.9%) who have few or no problems with current disclosure regulations.
Table 4.7. Perceptions on financial reporting regulation ;
1
What is your opinion on









regulations were to be
abolished, would you
continue to disclose annual
statements?
1. Completely redundant
2. Far too extended
3. A bit to extended
4. Fairly right
5. Too limited
































































Respondents from proprietorships are generally more positive about the regulatory
disclosure requirements, which is hardly surprising given the fact that these firms are
not affected by these regulations. Although the reactions towards current company law
requirements are at least not overwhelmingly negative, a large majority of private
companies (86%) would stop disclosing their financial statements if they were no longer
required to do so. »,,,;-.. ;•-;•-.?.•.,-;•«,-^:-v^.... •..•--.••.• . •-.- •;-:.'-;-o-w:;cw-- ;
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The findings reported here are consistent with the studies by Page [1984], Carsberg
[1985] and Abdel-Khalik [1983]. In the Page-study, 52% of the respondents wanted less
disclosure requirements while 43% of the respondents indicated they had few problems
with the amount of information which they were mandated to disclose [Page, 1984,
p. 276]. Carsberg et al. [1985, p. 32] found that 64% of the responding managers did
not mind what information had to be filed with the Registrar of Companies as long as
the cost of producing the information was kept down. Also, none of the respondents
indicated that accounting requirements or accounting standards were a main problem to
their business [Carsberg et al., 1985, p. 27]. Abdel-Khalik [1983] studied the
satisfaction of small US-firms with generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP).
The results of the study indicate that managers were very divided on their evaluation of
GAAP. On most of the questions on the perceived advantages and disadvantages of
applying GAAP, managers tended to strongly disagree with each other. It should be
remembered that private companies in the US do not face statutory or regulatory
financial reporting requirements other than for tax purposes. > •
To gain further insight into the attitudes of small firm managers towards current
financial accounting regulations, respondents were asked whether, in their opinion,
current legal financial reporting requirements should be extended to include
proprietorships as well as private companies. Respondent from private companies
disagreed on the subject (see table 4.7) but respondents from proprietorships generally
were against such an extension of the company law. Still, a number of proprietorships
(10, 14.9%) indicated that they would have no objection if they were to be obliged to
disclose their financial statements.
Table 4.8. Compliance with financial reporting regulation
Question
Did your financial statements, to your
knowledge, comply fully with the legal
requirements?
Did your financial statements, to your
knowledge, contain information not
required by law?
Do the internally used financial statements
deviate from the disclosed financial
statements?
Did the prepared financial statements


























Regarding the compliance with financial reporting requirements, most respondents felt
that the financial statements they had disclosed fully complied with all regulatory
financial disclosure requirements (table 4.8). Also, a number of respondents indicated
that the financial statements contained information that is not required by company law.
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A last item in the questionnaire on accounting regulation concerned the differences
between the company law requirements for the preparation versus the disclosure of the
financial statements. As indicated in Appendix in, the amount of information required
for the prepared financial statements is different from the information to be disclosed.
Respondents were therefore asked whether the prepared (internal) financial statements
deviated from the financial accounts disclosed. Only a few respondents (8, 15%)
indicated the internal financial statements were different from those disclosed. The
requirement to prepare a profit and loss account is only met by a limited number of
companies (25%), which may be caused by the fact that this information does not have
to be disclosed. >..-..:-: - ,v- -.-:;•...-..Ä •:•,-;«.<.•••••.•.:.•--•• :••••;••:-.:'• •.•••••--- •-.• •.:.-•••<• w
The results for the level of compliance must be interpreted with caution, because from
the respondents' characteristics it is clear that small company managers do not seem to
know very much about the legal financial disclosure requirements. So the information
provided in chapter 3, which is based on the actual information disclosed by small
firms, would provide more unbiased information on the level of compliance with
financial accounting disclosure requirements. The fact that few companies prepare a
profit and loss account, however, provides some additional information on the level of
compliance with financial accounting preparation requirements, indicating that small
firms in general do not produce much information they are not explicitly mandated to
disclose, although company law requires them to prepare this information.
4.4.3 Users of small firm financial statements.
Any consideration of the perception on the burden (costs) of financial accounting and
its regulation should also consider the perceived uses (benefits) of producing and
disclosing such reports. Financial accounting information is prepared and disclosed to
meet the information needs of users of this kind of information. Since small companies'
securities are not traded in the public market, the question of the primary users of small
firm financial information is especially interesting. Respondents were asked to rank the
importance of various groups as potential users of the financial accounting information
disclosed (table 4.9).
Managers rank themselves as the most important user group. On a scale ranging from
0 (not important) to 10 (most important), managers/shareholders received an average of
9.0. Bankers were ranked as the second most important users of financial statements of
small companies. The government ranked third, resulting mainly from the perceived use
of financial reports by taxing authorities. All other potential user-groups scored very low
and obviously were not considered to be important users of small firms' financial
statements. An interesting finding is the very low scoring of competitors as potential
users of financial statements, indicating that managers do not feel that the information
they disclose is widely used by competing firms.
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What user-groups do you consider to be the most important Mean score Standard
users of the financial statements? {scale: 0-10) deviation
Managers/Shareholders
Other capital suppliers (e.g. banks) ....•-.
Government (including taxing authorities) "* ,
Financial analysts ...
Employees . : ..' •
; Suppliers • . < •/ • •, .: • ;
Customers • •':.• •..
Financial press ., :.
Investors
Competitors
The findings reported here are consistent with existing studies. The studies by Abdel-
Khalik [1983], Page [1984] and Carsberg et al. [1985] all indicate that managers find
themselves to be the most important users of their company's financial statements, while
bankers were always ranked in the top three. The importance of taxing authorities is
somewhat unclear since they were not included as an option in the Abdel-Khalik study,
while the results of the Page and Carsberg study are somewhat contradictory. Although
both are UK-studies, the results of the study by Page indicate that the use of financial
reports in tax computations is considered to be the second most important use of small
firm financial account [Page, 1984, p. 275], while the Carsberg-study reports a much
lower importance of this function of small firm financial statements [Carsberg et al.,
1985, p. 42].
Table 4.10. Importance of annual accounts
|: Private companies ^,
How important are the
financial statements in the total
of financial disclosures made
by your firm ?
1. Its the most important
2. Very important
3. Mediocre
4. Not very important


















The usefulness of financial statements to potential users is influenced by the availability
of other sources of financial accounting information of firms. Respondents therefore
were asked what role they thought the financial statements play in the total of
disclosures made by small firms (table 4.10). The significance of the responses to this
question are rather hard to asses. The results do not support the view that the financial
accounts are generally regarded as the primary means of financial accounting disclosures
made by small firms. Nevertheless, they do play a more or less important role in the
123publishing of financial information in many small firms. It seems clear, however, that
small companies have alternative ways besides the annual accounts to supply financial
accounting information to interested parties (e.g. through special purpose reports,
personal contacts).
The use of financial statements for management decision support is somewhat surprising
since it is widely recognized that the infrequency and delay of production of annual
accounts severely limits their usefulness for decision and control [Page, 1984, p. 275].
Nevertheless, the Carsberg-study indicates that the majority of managers who used
accounts for management purposes thought that they were adequate for that purpose.
Annual accounts were particularly used for decisions about dividends and directors' pay
and to a lesser extend for decisions on capital expenditures [Carsberg et al., 1985,
p. 42]. The financial statements used internally may be different from those that are
actually disclosed. This may be especially true in a situation where the statutory
requirements for the financial statements' preparations are more extensive than the
disclosure requirements, as in the Netherlands. It should therefore be noted that in a
number of cases respondents have indicated that their financial statements contained
more information than legally required. This extra information might have been added
specifically for internal management decisions making. Also, in an number of cases the
disclosed accounts did not deviate from the prepared accounts because the prepared
accounts, including for example a profit and loss statement, were fully disclosed. In
these cases the accounts entailed more information than legally required which may be
useful for aiding internal decision making.
4.4.4 Disclosure of specific items.
This section will further analyze what information items, for which the disclosure is
required by company law, are particularly troublesome to managers of small firms.
Respondent were asked to indicate what information items they would be willing to
include in their published accounts in the absence of any regulatory obligation to provide
the information. The list of information items included a number of general level
disclosures (i.e. balance sheet, profit and loss account) and was followed by a list of
specific information items which small firms are currently required to include in their
financial statements. Respondents answered using a five-point Likert scale, where a
score of 1 indicates strong resistance against the publication of the specific information
and a score of 5 indicates little resistance against disclosure of the information item. The
results are summarized in table 4.11.
Statistical differences between private companies and proprietorships can be found only
for information about employees (a=0.05) and a categorisation of employees (a=0.1).
Both results are based on a Mann-Whitney U test. Conform the responses to the
questions discussed in the previous section, small firms are not very willing to disclose
any financial information in annual reports, given the low scores on almost all of the
items in the list. • - •••'••• - • - •' ••- '•'""•• ••'• '^ - -^ *- ^'
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Table 4.11. Disclosure of specific annual account items
Items
Balance sheet
Profit and loss account
Notes to the balance sheet
Notes to the P&L account
Complementary information
Valuation methods ,.•• ;
Method of depreciation





Information on self owned
share capital








Obligations not appearing in
the balance sheet



















































































































































All average scores are below the middle score on the scale used (three) - a level that
would indicate that respondents in general would be neutral to disclosing the information
item. Disclosure of the balance sheet meets relatively little resistance among
respondents, along with the disclosure of valuation and depreciation methods used.
Surprisingly, the disclosure of the profit and loss account and the 'growth of sales' seem
to meet relatively little resistance. Disclosure of both items is not required by company
law but it seems that responding firms are not particularly bothered with the disclosure
of either item. However, the average scores for these items still indicate that small firms
are not very willing to provide this kind of information. There is most resistance to
disclosure of information about extraordinary costs and benefits and loans to (former)
directors and (former) commissioners. v, - - •.?
The standard deviations are rather small for most items, indicating that there is little
disagreement among respondents within groups. Also, few differences exist in the
answers of respondents from private companies and proprietorships at this point.
Generally speaking, private companies seem less negative about disclosing financial
accounting information, since for most items the average score for this group of
companies is somewhat higher. However, this observation does not hold for all items
on the list and only very few differences between respondents from private companies
and proprietorships are statistically significant. The only significant differences concern
the disclosure of information about the number of employees and the segregation of
employees, which meet relatively little resistance among proprietorships while private
companies are much more reluctant to provide this information.
4.4.5 Effect of financial accounting disclosure on competitive position.
It is often argued that mandatory financial reporting may have a substantial negative
effect on the competitive position of firms, most notably on small firms, depending on
the nature of the information to be disclosed and the nature and level of competition.
Empirical studies on small private firms [e.g. Page, 1984, p. 276 and Carsberg et al.,
1985], however, have indicated that the use of competitors' annal accounts among small
firms is extremely limited, indicating that there seems to be little reason for concern for
substantial competitive disadvantages arising from the disclosure of financial accounting
information.
In our study, firms were asked whether they used accounting-information about
competitors (table 4.12). Out of the 96 firms which answered this question, 77 (80%)
firms did not gather any information about their competitors. 12 companies use the
annual accounts of competitors, 6 of which also gather additional information from other
sources, while 13 firms only use other sources such as banks or the press. In total, 84
(87.5%) did not use annual accounts of competitors in any way. These findings are
consistent with a case-study by Van Alten et al. [1988] involving 10 Dutch medium-
sized companies, that showed there was little attention paid to competitive analysis while
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annual reports of competitors were considered of little importance to perform a
competitive analysis. .,, . ...
Table 4.12. Use of accounting information of competitors
Use of accounting information of competitors {N=96)
v No information at all , - /> •-. = 77(80.2%) •-;••..• --y • •
'•• Use of annual accounts only . • • ' , • 6(6.3%)
Use of other sources only _ _ 7(7.3%)
Use of annual accounts as well as other sources 6 (6.3%)
However, management perceptions on the effect of disclosure on the competitive
position of the firm were not in total agreement with these findings (table 4.13). At this
point firms were split into two groups, each receiving different sets of questions. One
group, consisting of private companies only.was asked whether they thought financial
disclosure might lead to a competitive disadvantage for their firm. Out of the 20
companies that answered this question, 7 (35%) answered the question affirmatively. In
addition, these respondents were asked whether they felt current government regulation
had a negative effect on their company's competitive position. 60% (12) thought that
this was the case, but only two firms thought that the effect was substantial while all
others felt regulation had only a mild effect.
Table 4.13. Potential competitive disadvantages
Yes _No
Disclosure of accounts results in competitive 7(35%) 13(65%)
disadvantages
Current financial accounting regulation results in 12 (60%) 8 (40%)
competitive disadvantages
Disclosure of accounts results in competitive 52 (52%) 38 (38%)
disadvantages for competitors
Current financial accounting regulation results in 55(55%) 32(32%)
competitive disadvantages for competitors
A second group of companies (private companies as well as proprietorships, N=99) was
asked whether they thought competitors would suffer any competitive disadvantage if
they would have to disclose their accounts. Fifty-two (52%) companies thought this was
the case, while 38 (38%) had an opposite opinion (9 (9%) respondents did not answer
the question). Out of this group of companies, 25 (25 %) believed that current regulation
had a substantial negative effect on the competitive position of firms, while 30 (30%)
felt that there was only a mild effect and 32 (32%) assumed regulation had no effect at
all. Both proprietorships and private companies responded to these questions in a similar
way. :,,^-i.-»-**..----.-.-.- ..s.S.,-.,. ..-,- :. • •. . , • • •-
127The results of both sets of companies indicate that companies disagree considerably
about whether financial disclosure leads to competitive disadvantages. But most
companies agree that current regulation does not have a substantial effect on the
competitive position of the firms concerned. The importance of general purpose
accounting information in this respect, may depend upon the availability of alternative
sources of financial information as well as the level of competition firms that are facing.
In our sample, virtually all the firms in both industries (construction business and
retail/wholesale) found competition was high or very high, so the impact of the level of
competition can not be tested. Additionally, the level of competition might have an
impact especially if competitors are not required to disclose an annual report. In our
sample, private companies in the retail/wholesale-business indicate that there is
competition from proprietorships, in contrast to the construction business, where
proprietorships were not considered to be important competitors. However, for none of
the questions mentioned above could a significant industry-effect be found.
Finally, companies were asked what information-items disclosed by competitors, were
regarded as to be of particular importance for competitive analysis. The results were
different for private companies and for proprietorships (table 4.14). Not only did they
disagree on the relative importance of the items mentioned but also the average scores
of proprietorships were much lower, indicating that they felt that none of the
information-items mentioned were of very great importance to them.
Table 4.14. Importance of competitors' annual report information items.
Private companies Mean score Proprietorships Mean score
(scale 1-5) (scale 1-5)
1. Notes on P&L Account
2. Profit and loss account
3. Growth of sales
4. Notes on balance sheet







1. Growth of sales
2. Number of employees
3. Profit and loss account
4. Notes on P&L Account






Private companies were asked which information-items that they had to disclose could
lead to competitive disadvantages (table 4.15). The information-items mentioned differ
only slightly from those mentioned before as being important information from
competitors. Apparently, managers think that the information they find of importance
about competitors does not differ much from the information disclosed by their own firm
which competitors find of importance.
Most of the results shown in this section indicate that the cost due to competitive
disadvantages are not considered to be of much importance among small and medium-
sized firms. There is no reason to accept competitive disadvantages as an important
argument to oppose accounting regulation. Very little time and effort is spent on
competitive analysis by small firms. If small companies conduct a competitive analysis,
other information besides annual reports is of at least equal importance. Finally, small
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companies do not think current regulation has a substantial effect on the competitive
position of the firms concerned. •• <•-^ ^-.»-: ^ .; >^ -w;- ,••.-,:'..•-•-=•«.
Table 4.15. Importance of annual report items to competitors. •" ' - - '•
What information in your annual report is of Score on scale 1-5
most importance to your competitors ?
1. Profit and loss account ;.{; w/» ;,•'•;,, ••<-••.. •;..;• 3.6 •. • •• -..•>..„••>••.•
2. Notes on P&L account ...^ .... , , ., 3.2 , ., . . .
3. Growth of sales ' 3.0
4. Balance sheet 2.9
5. Mutations on equity 2.8
4.4.6 Analysis of results ••;.- < '=_'•*••'-.:•'•- ' ' ; -
In this section, the results provided in the previous section will be analyzed in two ways:
1. Responses to particular questions will be related to respondents characteristics. From
this analysis it can be shown whether responses systematically vary with firm
characteristics (i.e. industry and firm size) or personal characteristics of respondents).
2. Responses to various questions will be cross analyzed. This analysis will provide
some assurance of the consistency in the answers of respondents.
In the analysis provided in this section, two types of tests are generally used: (a) non-
parametric tests making evaluative classifications of responses or ranking responses and
(b) t-tests. Non-parametric testing is used for two reasons. Firstly, parametric testing
requires meeting various conditions for the variables used, such as the drawing of
observations from a normally distributed population and, in the case of analysis
concerning two groups, equal variances between groups. Non-parametric testing requires
much fewer restrictions to the observations used and is particularly useful in the case
of relatively small sample sizes. Secondly, most responses are available on nominal
(categorical) or ordinal (ordered) scales, which prohibits the use of parametric testing".
The use of Likert-scales in gathering respondents' perceptions requires some additional
comments. Likert-scales are used to rank respondents' agreement with propositions
presented to them, mostly using a 5-point scale. Two types of problems are typically
associated with the use of this type of categorical scale. Firstly, the meaning attributed
by various respondents to a particular score might not be uniform. Secondly, the
distance between two adjacent scores might not be constant. Thus the meaning of the
ranking may differ from one respondent to another and from one statement to another.
This makes the use and interpretation of average scores and standard deviations
° For a thorough and illuminating discussion of parametric and non-parametric testing, see
Siegel and Castellan, 1988, chapter 3.
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problematic. The first problem is dealt with by using an additional testing procedure,
recoding the responses in two categories while only classifying the respondents
providing the most extreme responses (e.g. category A consists of all respondents giving
a score of 1 and category B consists of all respondents giving a score of 5 to a particular
statement, while all other respondents are ignored). The use of this procedure (typically
involving a Chi-Square test) circumvents the testing of differences in average scores
between groups in common parametric and non-parametric tests (e.g. t-tests or Mann-
Whitney U tests). The second problem resulting from the use of Likert-scales is tackled
by the cross-correlation of answers to various statements to test the consistency of
answers of the respondents.
4.4.6.1 Responses and firm- and respondents' characteristics
The results of the analysis of respondents' answers and respondents' characteristics are
presented in tables 4.16 to 4.18.































































1. MWU = Mann-Whitney U test. -.^, -
2. For CHI-square-tests the x^-statistic is reported. For Mann Whitney U tests z-scores are reported.
3. Significance levels are indicated as • for o=0.1, •• for a=0.05 and *** for a=0.01 (all 2-tailed)
Table 4.16 summarizes the analysis of respondents' perceptions on accounting
regulation. The results indicate that:
i. respondents that are external accountants and more familiar with financial accounting
regulation are more inclined to find that small firms' annual reports are a major source
of financial accounting information;
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2. respondents that are actively involved in the process of the financial statement's
preparation are less inclined to oppose financial accounting regulation. They also are
less opposed to current accounting regulation being extended to include proprietorships;
3. respondents from private companies more often find that current accounting
regulation should be extended to include proprietorships. Obviously, proprietorships
would rather avoid financial accounting regulation;
4. respondents from larger firms more often find that current accounting regulation
should be extended to include proprietorships. Further analysis indicates that this finding
mainly results from the fact that private companies in the sample are generally larger
than proprietorships;
5. perceptions of external accountants on financial accounting regulation do not deviate
significantly from the answers of other respondents
































































1. MWU = Mann-Whitney U tests; NA = Not Applicable
2. For CHI-square-tests the x^-statistic is reported. For Mann Whitney U tests z-scores are reported.
3. Significance levels are indicated as * for a=0.1, ** for a=0.05 and *•* for <x=0.01 (all 2-tailed)
Table 4.17 summarizes the analysis of the financial accounting activities of firms and
firm and respondents' characteristics. The results can be summarized as follows:
7. Larger firms are more active in financial accounting. They more often produce
accounting information that is not required to be disclosed (e.g. profit and loss account);
they more often prepare separate internal accounts and they more often include
information in the annual accounts disclosed that is not required by law;
2. No systematic effect of legal form or industry can be found.
Respondents* characteristics are not supposed to have an effect on the responses
regarding financial accounting activities of firms, since the answers do not reflect
perceptions. However, due to some personal characteristic some respondents may be
131more informed about the firm's financial accounting activities. Also, it should be
established whether respondents with certain characteristics may be systematically
manipulating the questionnaire. Consequently, all items included in table 4.17 were
correlated with several respondents' characteristics. No systematic effects could be
detected. , : .••••. • .-• A*-H-.^.7 S ".--.• •', • • • •' • • ••—-•>:••••.••".•••- ,•-• ••
Table 4.18 summarizes respondents' opinions on the competitive disadvantages of
financial accounting disclosure and financial accounting regulation, related to firms' and
respondents characteristics. The results found suggest that:
2. larger firms are more active in gathering information about their competitors. They
more often use annual accounts and other information sources and they also more often
indicate that they would like to have additional information about competitors that is not
currently found in annual accounts (e.g. sales and profits);
2. larger firms more often indicate that there is a potential negative effect from financial
accounting disclosures;
3. legal form and industry have no systematic effect on the attitude of the firm a this
point;
4. respondents' characteristics have no systematic effect on the responses given to these
particular questions.







External Know- Active in
Industry Firm size accoun- ledce of financial
tant law reporting
x*-test MWU x'-test «--test x*-test
Analysis of 3.73*
competitors' accounts






Disclosure results in 2.14
competitive
disadvantages
Regulation results in 5.93*
competitive
disadvantages
0.04 2.59*** 0.02 0.24 0.23
3.32* 2.19** 1.14 1.04 1.13
10.48* 1.65* 0.07 0.01 1.28
2.43 1.86* 0.28 0.46 1.85
3.75 0.57 1.70 0.72 0.41
1. MWU = Mann-Whitney U tests; NA = Not Applicable
2. For CHI-square-tests the x* -statistic is reported. For Mann Whitney U tests z-scores are reported.
3. Significance levels are indicated as • for t»=0.1, •* for a=0.0S and *•* for a=0.01 (all 2-tailed)
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4.4.6.2 Cross analysis of answers
The consistency of answers provided by respondents can be tested by a cross analysis
of related questions. Also, cross analysis is used to test for the consistency between
financial disclosure practice and perceptions on financial accounting issues. The results
of the tests performed are summarized in tables 4.19 and 4.20.
Table 4.19. Consistency analysis
Question 1 Question 2 x' test Mann- Rank
Whitney U correlation
test
Opposing financial Extension of disclosure 5.71** NA -0.20**
disclosure regulation regulation to
proprietorships
Voluntary preparation Voluntary disclosure of 0.016 NA 0.015
of accounting accounting information
information in presence in absence of regulation •''•"'
of regulation • '
Disclosure results in Regulation results in 37.86*** 5.89*** 0.58***
competitive competitive
disadvantage disadvantage
Analysis of annual Analysis of other 10.98*** NA 0.34***
accounts of competitors information about
competitors
Disclosure through Including non-required 2.79* NA -0.23*
alternative channels information in annual
accounts
Disclosure through Disclosure results in 11.59*** NA 0.32***
alternative channels competitive
disadvantage
Disclosure through Regulation results in 6.00** 2.017** 0.19*
alternative channels competitive .
disadvantage
1. Significance levels are indicated as * for a=0.1, ** for a=0.05 and •** for a=0.01 (all 2-tailed)
2. NA = Not Applicable
Some brief comments: •-•- • - • • - •
2. respondents which indicate that financial accounting regulation is redundant or is far
too much extended, do not think that these regulations should be extended to include
proprietorships as well;
2. firms that voluntarily prepare accounting information not required by law do not
engage in more voluntary disclosures of accounting information;
1333. respondents indicating that the disclosure of financial information may have a
negative effect on the disclosing firm's competitive position also indicate that financial
accounting regulation may have an identical effect;
4. firms that analyze financial accounts of competitors also use alternative sources to
gather information of competitors more frequently;
5. firms using alternative channels to disclose accounting information less frequently
include extra (not required by law) information in their financial statements;
<J. firms using alternative channels to disclose accounting information, more often agree
with the statements that disclosure of annual accounts and financial accounting regulation
have a negative effect on the firm's competitive position.
The perceptions of respondents on the importance of the annual accounts and the
importance of financial accounting regulation are analyzed in more detail in table 4.20.
The results of this analysis indicate that:
1. respondents opposing financial accounting regulation also find financial accounting
regulation has a negative effect on the disclosing firm's competitive position;
2. firms opposing financial accounting regulation produce less accounting information,
either voluntarily or in a regulated environment. Although the sign of the relationship
is consistent over various items, not all of the relationships are statistically significant;
3. firms indicating that the annual report is a major outlet of financial accounting
information are more inclined to add extra information in their financial statements;
4. no relationship can be found between the perception on the importance of the annual
accounts and the effect of financial accounting disclosure or its regulation on the
competitive position of the disclosing firm.
4.4.7 Concluding remarks.
In section 4.4 an empirical study was presented, studying the perceptions of small
company management on financial accounting disclosure and financial accounting
regulation for small firms. In evaluating the results of the study it should be noted that
the sample of firms used in this study is not necessarily representative for all Dutch
small firms, due to the regional and industry restrictions in selecting the firms included.
As such, the study is exploratory and not specifically aimed at generalisability. Given
the fact that this is, as far as we know, the first study to examine the perceptions of
small firm managers on financial accounting in the Netherlands, and one of the few
studies in this field published in the international accounting literature, the results of the
study may provide useful insights in the financial accounting environment of small
firms. - :-.c*^!C.-,-;jü-,,.' •
Firstly, financial accounting disclosure and financial accounting regulation do not seem
to be major issues for small companies. The lack of concern with financial accounting
is shown by the answers of small company management, indicating that almost half of
the companies do not seem to be bothered by current regulation. The reason for this
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Table 4.20. Cross analysis
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1. Significance levels are indicated as • for <*=0.1, •* for a=0.05 and *•• for a=0.01 (all 2-tailed)
2. NA = Not Applicable
reaction is certainly not that companies would disclose comparable information in a non-
regulated environment. Before the introduction of compulsory publication of annual
accounts for small companies, only very few companies disclosed any information.
Furthermore, if current regulation were to be abolished, over 90% would stop disclosing
annual accounts. It therefore seems that small and medium-sized companies do not
expect to gain much by disclosing financial information. These results are consistent
with other research in this area (see e.g. Carsberg et al. [1985], p. 27.). Carsberg's
survey-study among small companies indicated that accounting was not perceived as a
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major problem by these firms. Small companies' managers were more troubled by
commercial, financial and personnel problems than by accounting problems. Of all
administrative activities, preparing the annual accounts was seen as an important burden
in cost, time and effort to complete, but tax returns were regarded as the most
burdensome.
Costs resulting from competitive disadvantages do not seem to be a valid argument
against accounting regulation. Only a small number of small and medium-sized
companies gather information about competitors and even if they do so, annual accounts
do not seem to be a particularly important source of information. When companies are
asked whether they think financial accounting might have a negative effect on the
competitive position of the firm, there is considerable disagreement. But when asked
whether current disclosure regulation has a negative effect on the competitive position
of the firms concerned, most companies agree that there is little or no effect.
Finally, most small firm managers do not seem to appreciate the usefulness of their
financial statements to third parties. Managers rank themselves as the most important
users of the financial statements, followed at some distance by outside capital suppliers
(e.g. banks).
In the following section, evidence on the cost-effects of financial accounting regulation
for small companies will be presented. The analysis presented there will focus on the
direct cost effects on regulation, particularly the number of hours spent on accounting
within firms and the fees paid to external accountants.
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4.5 Small firms'disclosure costs •.-»?.*,•• .*> • , « ÜK-Ü••«?'-.
4.5.1 Introduction : . v -•• i, :,:/;;.'
In this section, the focus will be on the costs of financial accounting for small firms,
with special interest for the effect of financial accounting regulation on accounting costs
for small firms and the relationship between accounting costs and firm size. One of the
arguments frequently used to argue in favour of differentiation in financial accounting
regulation is based on the premise that regulation has a disproportional cost effect on
small companies. Larger firms can spread fixed accounting costs over larger revenues,
are better able to establish routine accounting procedures, and are in a better position
to hire specialized personnel to perform accounting tasks (see chapter 2). In this chapter,
existing empirical research will be discussed and new data will be presented, testing the
argument of disproportional accounting costs for smaller firms.
Classifications of accounting costs are abundant in the accounting literature. Some of
these differentiate between direct and indirect (including opportunity) costs of financial
disclosure (Benston [1976]). Also, a distinction is made between disclosure costs and
regulation costs, where the former result from the preparation and disclosure of
accounting information and the latter from regulating accounting disclosure, including
the cost of lobbying, litigation and the development and enforcement of rules (Beaver
[1989, p. 43]). Although other classifications of accounting costs are conceivable, the
classifications mentioned here are of particular importance since they direct attention to
two major difficulties in empirical research on accounting costs.
• The direct-indirect dichotomy illustrates the fact that not all cost-effects of accounting
regulation are directly traceable nor are they always directly measureable. In fact, it
seems evident that for a researcher it would be virtually impossible to asses all cost-
effects of any regulatory change. As a result, any empirical study on the cost effects of
accounting regulation is an incomplete study, as it can only cover a subset of all
potential cost effects. Obviously, most existing empirical studies on accounting costs
have concentrated on direct costs.
• The disclosure-regulation dichotomy points out that in a regulated environment only
a part of all accounting costs result from regulation. In the absence of any accounting
regulation, firms would still produce and disclose accounting information. To assess the
costs of accounting regulation only the costs above this basic level can be attributed to
the regulation. To establish, in a regulated environment, the costs of voluntary
accounting information-production and -disclosure which would exist in absence of the
regulations present obviously poses a major problem to an accounting researcher.
This section presents an empirical study on (1) the cost effects of the 1984 change in
Dutch financial accounting regulation and (2) the relationship between accounting costs
and firm size. Since the focus of this dissertation is on small companies, the cost-
categories studied are those assumed to be the most important to small firms. Our focus
on ^zms results in the exclusion of categories that are not borne by firms, such as
137governmental costs and the costs of analysis and interpretation (see table 4.21). Our
focus on s/na// firms suggests the exclusion of various cost-categories that are
specifically associated with large firms, such as political, lobbying and litigation costs.
Assuming that these costs are of relatively little importance to small firms, the analysis
will concentrate on the costs resulting from (1) the production of the accounting
information, and (2) the hiring of an external accountant. Indirect cost effects,
particularly the costs related to potential competitive disadvantages resulting from
financial accounting disclosures, have been dealt with in the previous section.
Table 4.21. Classification of accounting costs " • •
Cost-category Description
Information production resources spent on collecting, processing and organising
costs . . accounting data, putting them into financial statements and
distributing this information to parties concerned.








resources spent on making accounting figures comparable to
information from other firms or other years. -.v. :,r ,<, ;,.. -
resources spent on the hiring of an external accountant to
prepare and/or audit the accounts.
opportunity costs resulting from competitors using the disclosure
to their own advantage, particularly in an international context
when less restrictive disclosure regimes for competitors are
involved.
cost resulting from (the threat of) law suits against the firm or
its managers.
the political system's power to extract and redistribute wealth
from companies (for example by increasing tax regulations).
opportunity costs that may be related to the disclosure of
management behaviour forecasting information that puts pressure on management to
take actions that result in an actual outcome that is close to the
forecasted figure, even if these actions are not optimal from a
company (long term) viewpoint.
Governmental costs
Lobbying costs
cost of government intervention in financial disclosure, such as
developing rules, monitoring and enforcing them and the filing
and reviewing of the information disclosed.
resources spent to influence the regulatory bodies and the
regulatory process.
In testing the cost effects of financial accounting regulation, the problem of the
disclosure cost-regulation cost dichotomy, presents relatively few difficulties in our
study. The exceptional situation that the regulatory change under investigation
constitutes the transition from a non-regulated accounting environment to a regulated
accounting environment presents a unique opportunity, since the increase in accounting
costs after the introduction of the accounting regulation can be directly associated with
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the costs of complying with these regulations. By comparing the level of accounting
costs before and after the regulatory change, a fairly accurate estimation of the cost
effects of the regulations can be presented.
The results presented in the following sections are based on the sample of private
companies described in section 4.3. However, not all of the responding firms provided
data to be used in this study on accounting costs. It seems that for a number of firms
the costs of gathering or estimating the requested data on accounting costs were
significant. Also, cost-data were only gathered for the sample of private companies and
not for the proprietorships. This resulted in 35 questionnaires containing usable
estimations of accounting costs.
4.5.2 Qualitative analysis
Private companies were asked how much of the time spent on accounting was allocated
to each of the following categories: (1) assembling data and keeping records, (2)
processing and organising data, (3) producing the actual annual report and (4) the
distribution of the annual report. The results indicate that about half of the total costs
(45%) are spent on collecting data and keeping records. On data-processing and -
organising 35% is spent, while 16% is attributed to the actual production of the annual
accounts and 5% to distributing the accounts.
According to company management, the change in regulation in 1984 did have an effect
on the total accounting costs. Of the private companies, 67% indicate that accounting
costs have risen. On the other hand, 27% state that regulation has had little or no effect
on their accounting costs, which
is an interesting result since
only few companies published
annual accounts before 1984. A
possible explanation is that
there is a significant difference
in the reaction to this question
between companies that prepare
the annual accounts internally
and companies that have their
accountant draw up the annual
accounts. When the annual
accounts are prepared by










additional costs of complying
with the new disclosure
regulations are not very apparent. Companies that hire an accountant are directly
confronted with the extra costs if these are reflected in increased fees. Of the latter
group, 80% feel that costs have risen while of the former group only 25% thinks so
139(using a chi-square test, the hypothesis that there is no difference between the answers
of both groups, can be rejected at a=0.01). In the next sections a closer look will be
taken at the costs of producing annual accounts. Attention will be given to production
costs as measured by the number of hours spent on accounting within the firm and by
the level of fees paid to external accountants. Since the primary interest is in the effect
that regulation had on these various cost-categories, the results only concern private
companies.
4.5.3 Quantitative analysis
4.5.3.1 Information production costs
To study the relationship between accounting costs and financial reporting regulation,
companies were asked to state the number of hours spent on accounting over a period
of five years (1983 - 1987). The results (see table 4.22) clearly show a steady rise in
the time spent on accounting since 1983, ranging from 96.5 hours in 1983 to 107.3
hours in 1987. To study the effect of accounting regulation, our focus here will be on
the differences between two consecutive years. A Friedman two-way analysis of
variance by rank indicates that the hypothesis that the hours spent in each year between
1983 through 1987 came from the same population, can be rejected with a=0.01. The
cost increase between 1983 and 1984 was statistically significant, indicating that the new
regulation actually did lead to extra working hours in accounting. Using a Wilcoxon
signed rank test, the hypothesis that the hours spent on accounting in two consecutive
years came from the same population could only be rejected for the years 1983/1984
and 1985/1986 (a=0.01).































* significant at the 0.01 level - • --•• --"-"'' -?:.••""?
' z-scores based on Wilcoxon signed rank tests, testing for the difference in costs compared with the
previous year
Rather surprisingly, there is no statistical difference in the amount of time spent on
accounting between companies that prepare their own accounts and companies that hire
an accountant to do so. The latter group is likely to spend less time internally on
accounting. The internal accounting costs may be unaffected if the external accountant
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is hired primarily to audit the accounts or for some other reason like tax-consultation.
In our case, auditing does not seem to be a plausible explanation since there is no
mandatory audit for small Dutch companies. However, the results found here are
consistent with the findings of the study by Nair and Rittenberg [1983, p. 243], where
the conclusion from the analysis of personnel costs is also that "it cannot be argued that
the smaller businesses may be paying to outside CPAs for work done by internal
accountants in larger businesses". Neither their study nor the questionnaire used in our
study contained any questions that could provide a suitable explanation for this result.
Regarding the relationship between accounting costs and firm size, the data indicate that
the size of the company does have an effect on the time spent on accounting. Firstly,
the relationship between internal accounting costs and firm size is positive, indicating
that larger firms have higher costs. The relationships between the number of hours spent
on accounting and firm size can be illustrated by the following estimated OLS-equation
which is based on data from 1986 and 1987:
HOURS = 71.16 + 0.0238 x SiZE(assets x/1000,-) R* = 0.21
(t=1.933*) (t = 2.656**) F = 7.05**
The height of the intercept in the equation indicates that a large part of the internal
accounting costs are fixed costs, not varying with the size of the firm. Therefore,
smaller firms may bear relatively higher costs since they must spread these fixed costs
over fewer revenues. Using a Pearson correlation test, the hypothesis that there is no
correlation between firm size and internal accounting costs as a part of total assets, can
be rejected with a=0.09. The negative correlation (-0.238) between both variables
indicates that the internal accounting costs do make up a larger part of total assets for
small firms. This would imply that smaller companies pay proportionally higher
accounting cost.
The results presented in this section should be interpreted with care. Firstly, the time
spent on accounting may be affected by other factors like the introduction of computers
to perform accounting tasks, leading to a reduction in the number of man-hours.
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the hours spent on accounting by employees may not
be clear to management, so that the estimates of the respondents may be rather rough.
Furthermore, the correlation-test performed is rather indirect since production costs are
substituted by the hours spent on accounting and total assets are used as an estimate of -
total costs. A more straightforward test can be performed using accountants' fees, as
will be shown in the next section. :
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4.5.3.2 Accountants' fees
The private companies questioned were asked to state the annual amount paid to an
external accountant from 1983 to 1987. From 1983 on, the average fee annually paid
to the accountant gradually has risen from/7,500 in 1983 to over/10,000 in 1987
(table 4.22)**. A Friedman two-way analysis of variance by rank indicates that the
hypothesis that the costs spent in each year between 1983 through 1987 came from the
same population, can be rejected with a=0.001. The effect of the change in regulation
in 1984 can be shown by the fact that only the cost-increase in 1984 is significant from
a statistical point of view. Using a Wilcoxon signed rank test, the hypothesis that the
costs spent on accounting in two consecutive years came from the same population can
be rejected only for the years 1983 and 1984 (a=0.002). The rise in costs in all other
years turned out to be statistically insignificant.
In 1984, there was an absolute increase in the amount paid to the external accountant
of 19%. This compares to increases of 1 to 6% in succeeding years. As mentioned
earlier, the same results, although less distinct, were found regarding the hours spent
internally on accounting so that there is evidence that the change in regulation had a
cost-effect on small companies. This can be further emphasized by the fact that neither
the hours nor the costs reported in the questionnaire, may be fully related to complying
with financial reporting requirements. A part of the accounting-time would have been
be spent on gathering and processing other information, for example for internal
purposes. Also, although the Carsberg study mentioned earlier indicated that accountants
spend most of their time on the preparation of the accounts, some time is also spent on
fiscal computations and advice. So the increase in costs specifically concerned with
financial accounting might be even more explicit than the figures in this section
suggest". .,•: - «>-, . •
Looking at the size of the companies, large companies pay higher fees to their
accountant. As indicated in the previous section, the amount of accounting data to be
assembled and processed increases with the size of the company and the work that an
accountant has to do increases accordingly. The relationship between accountants' fees
and firm size can be described by the following estimated OLS-equation:
FEE = 5,427 + 3.562 x SlZE(assets x/1000,-) R* = 0.25
(t=5.711***) (t = 3.262***) p - F = 10.6***
" A recent study has indicated that the total accounting costs (internal as well as accountants'
fees) associated with administrative obligations in 1993 average at/21,000 for small and
medium-sized companies. On average 29% of these costs (f 6,100) were spent on preparing
and disclosing the annual accounts [EIM, 1994, pp. 26-27]. . , ,
* The EIM-study among small and medium-sized companies indicated that the accounting costs
associated with preparing and disclosing the annual accounts could be reduced by 40% if
current financial reporting regulations were to be abolished [EIM, 1994, p. 32].
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The height of the intercept in the equation indicates that a large part of the accountants'
fees are fixed costs, not varying with the size of the firm. Therefore, smaller firms may
bear relatively higher costs since they must spread these fixed costs over fewer
revenues.
Our second interest is whether these costs are proportionately higher as size increases.
Therefore the ratio between accountants' fees paid and firm size is to be studied. Three
measures of firm size are used: total sales, total assets and number of employees. The
results indicate an inverted relation between firm size and a ratio between accountants'
fees and sales, company assets and number of employees. Using a series of Spearman-
correlation tests, all correlations are negative, indicating that the ratios decline as size
increases (table 4.23)".
Table 4.23. Correlation between cost ratios and firm size (all z-scores are significant at the 0.01 level).
I Variables
Ratio of accountants' fees to sales, with sales
Ratio of accountants'fees to total assets,
with total assets
Ratio of accountants' fees to number of












An alternative way to demonstrate the relation between accountants' fees and firm size
is to split the sample of companies into 4 categories based on sales (table 4.24).
Accounting costs as a percentage of total assets are about 4 to 5 times as high for small
companies with sales under/1,000,000 compared to companies with sales over
/10,000,000. When related to company sales, relative costs for small companies are 10
times as high.
Nair and Rittenberg [1983] also studied the relationship between firm size and
accountants' fees, studying firms that, in the classification used in this study, could be
defined as medium-sized companies. Their results also show proportionately higher
accounting costs for smaller firms, ranging from 0.33% of sales for smaller companies
to 0.15% for larger companies. A Dutch study among medium-sized firms provides
essentially the same results [NOvAA, 1991a, p. 36]. Accountants' fees relative to sales
declined gradually with increasing firm size ranging from 0.054% for firms with sales
under/10,000,000 to 0.047% for firms with sales over/100,000,000. The results of
* If fees were constant for all firm sizes, the correlation between (1) the ratio of fees paid to
sales and (2) sales would still be positive because sales is in both variables. However, since
the ratio between fees and sales is positive, the disproportional rise of fees paid as firm size
decreases is still clear. Nevertheless, the z-scores and significance of the correlations found
should be interpreted with care.
143this particular study, however, have to be interpreted with great care as the study
suffered from a low response rate. Bak et al. [1985] also investigated accountants' fees
in relation to company size, but their sample contained firms that were much larger. For
companies with sales less than/100,000,000 they found that the cost of an external
accountant related to company sales were 0.17%, a figure that decreases to 0.04% for
companies with sales over/5,000,000,000. For all size-categories, accountants' fees
make up only a small percentage of the total cost of the firm, although there has been
a rise over the period 1983-1987 from 1.7% to 2.3% when related to total assets.




/1,000,000 < Sales <S/2,000,000
/2,000,000 < Sales *S/5,000,000
/5,000,000 < Sales
Nair and Rittenberg [1983]. p. 241
Sales <; $ 8,300,000
$ 8,300,000 < Sales < $ 19,800,000
$ 19,800,000 < Sales < fl. 100,000,000
; Bak et al. [1985], p. 34
Sales < /100,000,000
/100,000,000 < Sales <; /1,000,000,000
/1,000,000,000 < Sales </5,000,000,000
/5,000,000,000 < Sales
Accountants'






























4.5.4 Cross analysis of cost data ' : :i .{i >, n.- -: ^ - :: au
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In this section, the cost-data used in the previous section will be further analyzed in two
ways:
1. the cost data will be related to firm-characteristics that are expected to result in
differences in accounting costs between firms;
2. the cost data will be related to the characteristics and perceptions of respondents.
This analysis is conducted in order to test the reliability of the cost data provided by the
respondents. Firm characteristics that are expected to result in differences in accounting
costs between firms are used to test whether cost estimates do vary between firms when
expected. For example the hiring of an external accountant to prepare the financial
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statements should result in higher accountants' fees compared to firms that prepare the
financial statements internally. > • r..^ ^ ,-^s
Respondents characteristics and respondent perceptions should not systematically
influence the cost data provided by respondents. Therefore the data used in the
perception study (section 4.4) will be related to the cost data used in this section to test
the effect of respondents characteristics and perceptions on the cost data provided. A
summary of the results of the analysis is presented in table 4.25.








The financial statements are prepared by the external 0.443 2.248*
accountant
Voluntary disclosure of financial statements prior to 1984
Voluntary disclosures in financial statements after 1984
Industry
Respondent is an external accountant
Respondent is directly involved with financial reporting
of the firm
p pep
Accounting regulation is redundant















The table presents z-scores based on Mann-Whitney U tests
Significance levels are indicated by * for ot=0.1 and ** for a=0.05
Some brief comments:
/. Of the private companies questioned, 80% hired an accountant to prepare the annual
accounts. As expected, the height of the accountants' fee paid is influenced by whether
an accountant is hired to prepare the accounts: companies that prepare the financial
statements internally, on average pay lower fees. Using a Mann-Whitney U test, the
hypothesis that companies that hire an accountant to prepare their accounts pay the same
amount to their accountant as do companies that prepare their own accounts, can be
rejected with a=0.05".
2. Firms that voluntarily disclose information not specifically required by company law
have slightly higher internal accounting costs. The difference is significant with a=0.1.
" The differences between the accountants' fees paid by both groups of companies range from
10% in 1983 to 13% in 1987.
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3. Respondents that are actively involved in the process of financial reporting of the
firm present higher estimates of the internal accounting costs. This result may be
explained from the premise that these respondents have better knowledge of the internal
accounting procedures of the firm and consequently are in a better position to make an
estimate of the costs associated with these procedures.
</. Respondents who find that financial reporting regulation is redundant present slightly
higher estimates of internal accounting costs. The difference is significant with a=0.1.
In general there seems to be little reason for concern for bias regarding the cost
estimates presented by respondents. Estimates of the fees paid to the external accountant
generally vary with firm characteristics as expected and do not systematically vary with
respondent characteristics or respondent perceptions. However, the estimates of internal
accounting costs should be interpreted with care since there are some correlations to be
found with respondents characteristics and perceptions and the estimates of the number
of hours spent on accounting within the firm. As mentioned before, the number of hours
spent on accounting may not be very clear to the management, so that the estimates of
the respondents at this point may be rather rough.
4.5.5 Concluding remarks
In this section evidence was provided on (1) the cost-effect of the 1984 change in Dutch
financial accounting regulation and (2) the relationship between accounting costs and
firm size. The first conclusion that can be drawn from the research presented is that the
change in Dutch accounting regulation that became effective in 1984 did have a
significant effect on the costs of small private companies, associated with complying to
these regulations. This result was found for the number of hours spent on accounting
inside the firm as well as the amount paid to hire an external accountant. Also, small
firms pay proportionately higher accounting costs, ranging from 1.3% of sales for
smaller firms to 0.1% for larger firms in the sample. Combining these results with
studies of Nair and Rittenberg [1983] among medium-sized firms and Bak et al. [1985]
with large firms, small firms seem to pay substantially larger relative accounting costs
compared to large firms. However, even for the smallest firms, accounting costs only
make up a small fraction of the total company costs. So, from an economic point of
view, there is little reason for these companies to worry much about financial
* However, given the large number of small and medium-sized firms, the total societal costs
of financial reporting are substantial. The total costs associated with financial reporting by
Dutch firms are estimated at/2.3 bn. The total compliance costs associated with current
financial reporting regulation in the Netherlands for 1993 is estimated at/1.55 bn [ETM, 1994,
p. 32].
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From the results of the research presented here, it can not be determined whether small
firms pay ^^proportionately higher accounting costs compared to large firms. Although
the existence of a cost effect can be shown, it is not clear from our study what the cost-
effects for large firms were. Also, our study did not include all accounting costs for
small firms, although the costs studied here are assumed to be the most important cost-
categories for small firms. However, comparing our results to existing research it seems
clear that even with the current exemptions for small firms, accounting costs are
relatively higher for small firms (e.g. Nair and Rittenberg [1983], Carsberg et al. [1985]
and Brock and Evans [1986]).
Also, it can not be concluded from our study wA)> accounting costs are proportionately
higher for smaller firms. It may be that the less extensive use of computers performing
accounting tasks, the less skilled accounting personnel within small firms or the lack of
adequate accounting procedures that leads to more hours spent on accounting by
personnel or to more work for an external accountant, resulting in higher fees. Also,
higher accountants' fees may result from characteristics of the external accountant or the
accountants' firms hired by small companies. The research available, however, has
indicated that annual fees paid are higher for smaller firms, regardless of the type of
external accountant [Nair and Rittenberg, 1983].
4.6 Some final remarks.
In this chapter, evidence has been provided on the perceptions of small firm managers
towards financial reporting in general and the impact of financial reporting regulation
in particular. Also the costs imposed on small private firms as a result of prevailing
financial reporting regulation have been investigated as well as the relationship between
accounting costs and firm size.
From the results of this study it is not clear what the benefits derived from the
disclosure of annual accounts by small firms are and whether these benefits outweigh
the costs of producing this information. The indication that the costs of complying with
regulation are proportionately higher for small firms may be considered a finding
supporting the idea of lessening the regulatory burden for small firms. However, to fully
capture the cost effect of the exemptions provided to small firms, compliance costs of
medium-sized and large firms that have less or no exemptions have to be considered.
Available Dutch research on compliance costs for medium-sized and large firms seems
to indicate that the negative correlation between accountants' fees per unit of sales and
firm size is consistent for firms of all sizes [NOvAA, 1991a, Bak et al. 1985]. These
results indicate that the effect of the exemptions currently provided for small Dutch
firms in reducing compliance costs for these firms is limited as compliance costs are still
proportionally higher for small firms. Nevertheless, compliance costs for firms are only
one aspect of interest, since the costs of alternative methods of generating accounting
information should be considered and the benefits of accounting information should be
clear. Therefore, in the next chapter the focus will be on the usefulness of annual





5.1 Introduction' '' ' *" v
In the chapters 3 and 4 the focus was on the supply side of the financial reporting
environment, studying the informational characteristics of annual reports disclosed by
small firms (chapter 3) and the perceptions of small firm managers on financial
reporting issues, as well as the direct costs of complying with current financial reporting
regulations (chapter 4). As was mentioned there, the issues discussed in these studies
provide a one-sided view on the issue of financial reporting of smaller firms, as groups
on the demand side for financial accounting information are ignored. To construct a
more complete characterisation of the financial reporting environment of smaller firms,
the potential and actual benefits of financial reporting have to be considered. Therefore,
in this chapter the focus will shift to the demand side of the financial reporting
environment, studying the use of financial accounting information by bank loan officers
dealing with medium-sized firms.
In order to establish the usefulness of financial statements to loan officers dealing with
non-large firms, various issues are of particular importance:
i. To w/zar exre/ir do /oart ojfcm depend on /ina/ida/ tfateme/itt ro oöftun accou/zfwg
jn/onnariora^-om ^ma/Z^ryimiy? Is it true, as has been argued in chapter 2, that bankers
have a close relationship with these firms, have detailed knowledge of the smaller firms
they are dealing with and have substantial power to obtain any accounting information
desired, thereby leaving little significance to the role of financial statements? Or is it
true that loan officers are more dependent on the financial statements of smaller firms
because for these firms fewer alternative sources of financial information (e.g. press
reports, reports of financial analysts) are available? (see chapter 2 for a detailed
discussion of these arguments)
' The research presented in this chapter, was initiated and financed by the 'Nederlandse Orde
van Accountants-Administratieconsulenten' (NOvAA). The original study was intended to
identify the role of financial statements and the role of the external auditor as well as the
auditor's report to loan officers dealing with medium-sized firms. The results of the study have
been published (in Dutch) by the NOvAA (see NOvAA [1991b]).
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2. Wzar are rAe c/uzracterirfzcr o/cwrre«ry//ia/ida/ ,srateme/zr.s o/j/na/Zer/zmzs w re/arion
ro ozTier sowrces o/./?7ianc/a/ z/z/ormarion o/z r/zeyeyzrww? Is the information included in
financial statements of smaller firms perceived to be adequate in terms of relevance,
reliability, understandability, timeliness and comparability? It has been suggested that
the inadequate timeliness of financial reports hinders the use of this information for
specific decision making processes (such as credit analysis). Information about the
(perceived) characteristics of financial reports may provide evidence on the effectiveness
of current financial reporting regulation to ensure adequate financial reporting of small
and medium-sized firms.
3. How /mportanr are r/ze var/oMS e/emenft o/w/zzc/z ayzna/zda/ reporr ^e/iera/fy coraszsft
in ma&mg creaVf deas/o/w and Aow z'y r/ze a«aZ//y o/ f/zwe e/ementt /»erce/vea* by /oan
oncers? The results on these issues may provide evidence for (or against) the
introduction of differential disclosure regulation, allowing smaller firms to exclude
certain elements from the financial report disclosed.
4. /4re //ze z/z/ormario/z needs o/ /oa/z oö?cer5 dzj^erenf w/zen a"ea///zg w/r/z ^rmy o/
a"zj9ferenr «z«? If so, this may support the demand for differential financial reporting
requirements for firms of different sizes to ensure adequate financial reporting (e.g.
differential measurement of differential recognition).
5. Wow Aomoge/zeoi« are rne/jerce/Mons o//oan o#zcm o/z Rwanda/ reporring o/sma//
and mea'mm-5'/zed ^zr/nj? Evidently, the importance of the results of research on the
perceptions of respondents depends on the level of consensus among respondents as
strong diverging opinions on financial reporting issues provide ample basis for making
generalisations from the results found.
These questions will be investigated empirically in this chapter. The remainder of this
chapter consists of a questionnaire-study among Dutch loan officers. First the
relationship between this study and existing empirical research will be discussed
(section 5.2), followed by a discussion of the research design (section 5.3). The results
of the study will be presented and analyzed in section 5.4, followed by some concluding
remarks at the end of this chapter (section 5.5). . . .
5.2 Relation to existing empirical research. ,.• . - : ;
The choice of loan officers in this study on the usefulness of accounting information
from smaller firms, results from the general assumption that, after the owner/manager,
banks are the second most frequent users of small private firms' financial reports (e.g.
Abdel-Khalik, 1983, Page 1984, Carsberg, 1985 and chapter 4 of this dissertation).
Since smaller or private firms are not active on a securities market, the primary source
of outside capital and consequently the primary external users of the financial statements
would be bankers.
Studies among users of accounting information addressing one or several of the issues
mentioned in section 5.1, have been discussed in chapter 2. Major issues concerning the
small firm context addressed there are (1) the differential information needs of users
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depending on the size of the disclosing firm (e.g. Stanga and Tiller [1983], Berry Citron
and Jarvis [1987], Morris and Omrod [1990]), (2) a comparison of differences in
information needs of different user groups dealing with small firms (e.g. Benjamin and
Stanga [1977], Firth [1978], McCaslin and Stanga [1986]), (3) the effect of an audit on
the usefulness of the annual report (e.g. Falk et al. [1976], Baker [1990]), and (4)
failure prediction and firm size (e.g. Keasey and Watson [1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1988]).
Dutch studies in this area are scarce and deal exclusively with financial reporting by
large public firms (e.g. Klaassen and Schreuder [1980]). Studies on the usefulness of
financial statements of medium-sized firms have, to our knowledge, not been published
before.
The primary reason to focus the research on med/M/n-s/z«/ companies results from the
presumed role of bankers in smaller firms. Since smaller private firms are less able to
obtain additional capital from investors (i.e. the securities market), these firms may be
more dependent on raising loans from banks to finance their operations. Given the
relatively high risk for banks to deal with small private firms, bankers may place high
emphasis on adequate financial reporting requirements to monitor the performance of
the firm and to protect their investments. From this, the position of bankers as primary
users of small firm financial statements can be hypothesised. The initial concern of the
research project presented in this chapter was directed towards the role of accountants
and the accountants' report in medium-sized companies. The emphasis on medium-sized
companies was motivated by the fact that Dutch company law had permitted the
'smaller' medium-sized firms* to reftrain from an audit for a period of five years after
the enactment of the Law in 1984. This temporary exemption had thus ended by 1989,
which made it an opportune moment to study the perceptions of the firms concerned as
well as the primary users of medium-sized company financial statements on the
importance of a mandatory audit as well as financial reporting in general for 'smaller
medium-sized' firms.
Therefore, the research presented here will focus on the role of accounting information
in lending agreements between banks and medium-sized companies. The focus on
medium-sized firms was also chosen on the premise that within these firms there is
substantial separation of ownership and control, making the use of alternative means of
securing a loan (e.g. personal liability of the owner-manager) less suitable. Also, it is
assumed that these firms are large enough to have a non-trivial amount of long term
debt so that bankers will have incentives to monitor the activities of these firms over a
longer period of time.
* The exemptions applied to medium-sized companies with issued capital under/500,000.-, or
total assets under/ 8,000,000.- or fewer than 100 employees, stalling the compulsory audit for
these firms till 1989 [Beckman, 1988, p. 165].
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5.3 Research design « s.yr - ' / •
5.3.1 Introduction -
The objective of the study presented in this chapter is to provide evidence on (1)
information needs of loan officers dealing with medium-sized firms, (2) the importance
of financial statements of these firms in relation to other sources of financial accounting
information and (3) the adequacy of current financial reports of medium-sized firms to
meet the information needs of loan officers.
5.3.2 Research method a-- •,»-.•.' •.••••" •-•< . ^¥'s .-••-• :
The empirical data used in the study presented here were gathered using a postal
questionnaire that was sent to bank-employees working as loan officers*. The forms
were sent on April 16 1990, accompanied by a guiding letter explaining the purpose of
the study and ensuring the anonymity of the respondents and the confidentiality of the
information provided. After three weeks (May 10, 1990) a reminder was sent to all the
banks selected in the sample. The deadline for questionnaires to be included in the study
was set for June 15, 1990.
The questions in the questionnaire were structured using three categories, concerning
(1) respondents' characteristics, (2) evaluation of financial accounting information
sources and (3) the role of the auditor and the auditor's report. All questions were
constructed consistently, typically using a 5-point Likert scale to rank the respondents'
agreement with the propositions presented in the question. • ^.;
5.3.3 Sample selection • 'i .- ; . ^ ^ ;s ;u;
In the Netherlands, some 20 different banks are active at least at a regional level. These
banks have, apart from a very large number of branches, over 1600 independent
administrative offices. The research constructed here has focused on these independent
offices thereby avoiding very small offices that would be more likely to deal primarily
with very small firms or not to have a credit-agency at all. - * •*.«.- ;i - -ft •-
From the 1600 independent offices available, a sample of 200 offices was selected from
the address-files of the 'Nederlandse Bankcentrale'. The sample was selected randomly,
subject only to the condition of an even geographical spread. „
' The questionnaire used, which is in Dutch, is available from the author.
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5.3.4 Response analysis
Of the 200 questionnaires posted, 92 were returned. Of these, 12 were not filled out
because of an incorrect address. This reduces the effective sample to 188. The 80 usable
responses therefore result in an effective response rate of 43%. These results are in line
with response rates of similar studies such as Abdel-Khalik [1983], Benjamin and Stanga
[1977], Stanga and Tiller [1983] and Morris and Omrod [1990], that report response
rates of 35%, 34.6%, 57.5% and 37%.
Table 5.1 Response analysis
Questionnaires mailed 200
Returned undelivered 12
Effective sample size ' 188
Number of usable reponses . 80 " '. ;
Response rate 42.55% • - -
Although any response rate below 100% presents the problem of non-response bias, no
formal tests on nonreponse bias were conducted. The database from which the banks
were selected presented no suitable characteristics of the banks selected to conduct such
tests. Consequently, no formal statement on the representativeness of the respondents
can be given. However, both the size of the initial sample and the response rate provide
no reason to doubt the representativeness of the responses gathered. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that generalisations beyond the data actually gathered cannot be made
with complete assurance.
5.3.5 Respondents' characteristics
Characteristics of respondents were gathered regarding their age, the level of experience
as a loan officer, the level of education, and the familiarity with using financial
statements. Summary data with regard to the respondents' age and working experience
are presented in table 5.2. The respondents on average have a relatively high level of
education, as 87.5% had at least had training at the higher vocational-level, of whom
35% had an academic degree. Also, 62.5% of the respondents had training in business
administration or economies'*. ' •
Relating the various characteristics to each other shows that respondents with a relatively
low level of education are more experienced and also are slightly older (see table 5.3).
Evidently, the respondents' age and level of experience are also highly positively
correlated. Finally, virtually all respondents are adequately familiar with financial
* These findings indicate that the respondents to the loan officers-study have a higher level of
education compared to the respondent from the small firm managers' survey presented in the
previous chapter (see section 4.3.5.2). ;' ' ' '
1S3reports. Over 96% indicated that they analyzed over 10 annual reports per year, while
98.5% analyses at least 5 annual reports per year.



















































5.4 Perceptions of loan officers on financial reporting issues
5.4.1 Introduction
The remainder of this chapter consists of a presentation of the results of the
questionnaire study. Section 5.4.2 addresses the use and importance of various sources
of accounting information to loan officers, and section 5.4.3 focuses on the importance
of various elements of the financial statements. Section 5.4.4 discusses the relationship
between the information needs of loan officers and the size of the firm they are dealing
with. The final section (section 5.4.5) presents a comparison of the results of our study
with existing empirical studies on the usefulness of accounting information to loan
officers dealing with smaller firms.
5.4.2 Sources of financial accounting information
The first set of questions in the questionnaire concerned the sources of financial
accounting information used by loan officers. To assess the diversity of available sources
of information about medium-sized firms and the value of the information supplied
through those sources to loan officers, respondents were asked what sources of
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information were used either to get a general picture of a firm's financial situation or
to use as an input for a loan decision (table 5.4, panel A). The results indicate that loan
officers use a fairly broad set of information sources when dealing with medium-sized
firms. This implies that the financial statements of these companies, however important
they may be, are not the sole source of accounting information available to loan officers.
A number of other sources provide information that is typically used (or useful) for a
more general orientation on a firm's financial position (e.g. press articles and industry
data).
The indication of most respondents that, in addition to the sources explicitly mentioned
in the questionnaire, still other sources of information are used (though mostly for a
general orientation) may stress the importance of less formal sources of information such
as past experience with the subject company or direct contact with the company's
managers. This observation would be in line with other studies concerning loan officers
of banks dealing with small and medium-sized firms (e.g. Berry, Citron and Jarvis
[1987] and Morris and Omrod [1990]).
In fact, the Morris and Omrod study shows that past experience with the subject
company is ranked as the second most important source of information by credit
managers dealing with small or medium-sized firms (after the annual report), although
the dispersion of scores for this item was quite wide and some respondents did not rate
past experience as being an important source of information at all [Morris and Omrod,
1990, pp. 14-16]. Berry, Citron and Jarvis [1987] found that information from personal
interviews with representatives of a company and visits to the company's premises were
indicated as very important sources of information for loan officers when dealing with
small firms.
When faced with a specific loan decision, the financial statements of the subject firm are
clearly the most prevalent used source of information. Over 80% of the respondents
indicate that the financial statements are a very wzpo/ta/tf source of information in
making loan decisions and the financial statements are on average ranked first in
importance of the various sources of information available (see table 5.4, panel A). With
an average score of 4.7 (on a scale from 1 to 5) annual reports are the single most
important source of accounting information used in credit decisions, followed by interim
reports (score 3.9) and industry-data (score 3.5). A series of Wilcoxon signed rank tests
indicates that the annual reports are significantly more important than any other source
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Kendall coefficient of concordance: W = 0.4604 (p = 0.000)Panel A.
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0.034The perceived importance of an information-source is strongly related to its usefulness
in making specific decisions (i.e. credit analysis) in the sense that information sources
that are primarily used for general orientation, are perceived to be less important.
Spearman rank- correlation coefficients for the usefulness and importance of information
sources are positive and significant at the 0.01 level, except for the categories 'other
information' and Interim reports for which the correlation is significant only at the 0.05
level and for the industry data for which the correlation is extremely low (see table 5.4,
panel A). It seems that although industry data are primarily used for general orientation,
the importance of this kind of information is still perceived to be relatively high. The
results presented here indicate that although various sources of information may
available on medium-sized firms, the information provided by most sources is not very
well suited for making specific decisions and detailed information used in credit analysis
is primarily available from the financial statements of the company.


































Significance levels are indicated as: -; . * • v. \
* significant with a=0.10;** significant with a=0.05; **• significant with a=0.01. - •-"
Consensus among respondents on the importance of an individual source of accounting
information is indicated by the standard deviations presented in panel A of table 5.4. An
alternative procedure to assess the level of consensus among respondents is to use the
scores provided for each information source to rank the perceived importance of sources
for each respondent and measure the level of consistency of those rankings among
respondents. This procedure is used to calculate the Kendall coefficient of concordance
statistic (W) presented at the bottom of table 5.4. The score of 0.46* that is found is
significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, indicates that the rankings of
respondents are not unrelated. Nevertheless, the degree of consensus does not seem to
be particularly high.
* A score of 1 would indicate perfect agreement between the rankings of information sources
among respondents [Siegel and Castellan, 1988, pp. 262-272].
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The relative importance of accounting information sources may be further assessed by
identifying various characteristics. Therefore, respondents were asked to indicate the
relative strength of each information source in terms of (1) reliability, (2) relevance, (3)
understandability, (4) comparability and (5) timeliness. The results are presented in
panel A of table 5.5. The financial statements have the highest score in four of the five
criteria. The relevance of the financial statements information ranks particularly high
(score 4.4) and also reliability, understandability and comparability rank high with
average scores of around 4. Only in terms of timeliness are financial statements
perceived to be inadequate (score 2.7).
The importance of any information source referred to in the first two questions of the
questionnaire seems to be particularly related to the relevance of the information
provided (see panel B of table 5.5). Also, reliability is highly correlated with
importance. The use of an information source in either general orientation or in specific
decision making processes is not particularly related to any of the characteristics listed.
These results again stress the importance of the financial statements as a source of
accounting information to loan officers. Although there may be other sources available
on medium-sized firms, and most of these sources provide more timely information, the
financial statements are the primary source of information in specific decision making
processes. Alternative sources of information typically lack the necessary reliability.
Consequently, financial statements are very frequently used by loan officers and over
96% of the respondents indicate that they use over 10 annual reports yearly.
5.4.3 Importance of financial statement elements
Having established the relative importance of the financial statements compared to other
information sources available, the next step is the determine the relative importance of
the various elements of the annual report. Since the annual report of a firm includes a
number of elements (e.g. director's report, balance-sheet, profit and loss account, notes
to the financial statements, auditor's report), containing information on many subjects
and presented in various formats, it is of interest to determine the use and importance
of each separate element.
Firstly, respondents were asked to indicate the primary use of each of the elements of
the annual accounts (see table 5.7, panel A). The results indicate that each element of
the annual report contains at least some information that is of importance to loan
officers, since few respondents indicate they do not use an item of the annual accounts
at all. Also, most elements contain information that is used directly in decision making
processes. In this respect the balance sheet, profit and loss account and the notes to the
financial statements are most widely used, while the directors' report and the auditor's








Profit and loss account











































































Profit and loss account
Notes to the financial statements
Auditor's report
Summary of operations over
last 5-10 years
Fund flow statement
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The importance of an element of the annual accounts is positively related to its
usefulness in decision making processes (table 5.7, panel A). A series of rank
correlations indicates that elements that are read for general orientations are perceived
to be less important than elements that are used in specific decision making processes.
For making loan decisions, the most important element is perceived to be the profit and
loss account (average score 4.88), closely followed by the balance sheet (average score
4.82) and the notes to the financial statements (average score of 4.56). For all other
elements the scores were lower but even for elements found least important (the
historical overview) the average score was still as high as 3.6. These results (see table
5.8) again stress the importance of the financial statements as a source of accounting
information to loan officers.
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Significance levels are indicated as:
* significant with a=0.10;** significant with a=0.05; ' significant with a=0.01.
One other important element in this context is the perceived quality of the information
provided in the annual accounts of medium-sized firms. In this respect the outcomes are
much less extreme and there is also much less consensus among the respondents. For
the balance sheet and the profit and loss account the results are rather positive and none
of the respondent found the quality of these elements to be low or very low (see table
5.9). However, most other elements receive less positive qualifications and particularly
the director's report is disqualified by a considerable number of respondents. Also the
notes to the financial statements seem to leave room for improvement.
Consensus among respondents on the quality of the annual report is not very high.
Although the standard deviations indicate considerable agreement on the quality of each
separate element, the ranking of elements per respondent, measured by the Kendall's
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Significance levels are indicated as:
* significant with a=0.10;** significant with a=0.05; ••* significant with a=0.01.
Respondents put great emphasis on the presence of an audit when dealing with medium-
sized firms*. Over 80% of the respondents think the auditor's report is important or very
important. Such high emphasis was placed on an audit particularly to ensure the quality
of the information provided in the annual report (see table 5.11). Respondents were less
convinced that an audit can effectively protect external users of the annual reports.
Several other studies have looked at the importance of the auditor's report to loan
officers when dealing with firms of smaller size. Falk et al. [1976] find that US loan
officers frequently encourage small closely held companies to have audited financial
statements. Baker [1990] presented to US loan officers one of the following financial
statements: (1) a GAAP-based statement that had been audited, (2) a GAAP-based
statement that had been reviewed, (3) an income based statement that had been audited
and (4) an income based statement that had been reviewed. Respondents were asked to
decide on the approval of a loan, to indicate the interest premium that should be charged
and to indicate the understandability, usefulness and reliability of the information
provided in the financial statements presented to them. The results show that the
presence of an audit instead of a review did not affect the perceived understandability,
reliability or usefulness of the financial statements, nor did it change the decisions on
the approval of the loan. Respondents on average did charge a higher risk premium
(0.3% interest) when they received a reviewed annual report. Also, respondents were
' As mentioned before, the study was conducted in 1990. At that time, medium-sized
companies were mandated to have their annual reports audited. Before 1989, such an obligation
was part of the company law for all medium-sized and large companies but an exemption had
been made for medium-sized firms with issued capital under/ 500,000.-, or total assets under
/ 8,000,000.- or fewer than 100 employees, stalling the compulsory audit for these firms till
1989 [Beckman, 1988, p. 165].much less confident with audited income tax based financial statements, since they had
never seen an audited tax-based financial report.
Table 5.11 The audit of medium-sized firm annual reports
Question:
The audit of the annual
report of a medium-sized
company is important:
to protect external parties
to guarantee the quality of
the information provided
as a source of information
to company management
in relation to the fiscal
procedures
to prevent fraud


























































5.4.4 Information needs of loan officers and firm size
A final essential question is whether the information needs of loan officers vary when
dealing with firms of different sizes. Although the questionnaire did not contain detailed
questions to analyze this particular problem, respondents were asked whether they felt
they would require different information when dealing with small or medium-sized firms
than when dealing with large firms. The answers to this questions were rather mixed,
as 63 % indicated that the size of the firm they were dealing with would not influence
the need of accounting information, while 37% indicated that firm size was significant
for information needs. These results are in line with the Abdel-Khalik study, where it
was found that although half the responding loan officers would expect different
disclosures from small private firms, only 20% indicated that they would evaluate loan
applications from these firms differently, although there seems to be less reliance on the
financial statements on small firms and more use of information obtained through other
sources than the financial statements. The responses strongly indicate loan officers
would tolerate less extensive disclosures from small firms but that these firms should
follow the same accounting principles (measurement rules) as large firms [Abdel Khalik,
1983, p. 81].
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More detailed research into this topic has been conducted by Stanga and Tiller [1983].
In their study they confronted commercial bank loan officers with a list of 40
information items. In one version of the questionnaire a large public company context
was established and in the other a small private company context. The former
questionnaire was sent to loan officers of a large bank and the latter to loan officers of
smaller banks. Based on the perceived importance of the information items in the
questionnaire, it was found that there were few differences between respondents
confronted with the 'large firm' questionnaire and those confronted with the 'small firm'
questionnaire. Of the 40 items included in the survey, only 10 yielded significant
differences in perceived importance. Also, it was found that there was considerable
agreement between both groups in the ordering of items. Thus, the findings did not
provide much evidence for differences in information needs of loan officers when
dealing with firms of different sizes. Berry et al. [1987] did find differences between
information needs of loan officers dealing with small versus large firms but the annual
report was considered to be the most important source of information, irrespective of
firm size. Morris and Omrod [1990, p. 20] tried to establish the reaction of loan officers
to the filing of modified accounts of small and medium-sized firms. Respondents to their
study indicated they could recover about half of the loss of information resulting from
the filing of abridged accounts through other sources, but only at considerable costs. As
to the perceived consequences of reduced disclosures by small and medium-sized
companies, the respondents tended to disagree considerably.
5.4.5 Analysis of results
In this section, the results presented in the previous section will be analyzed by relating
the responses provided by respondents to characteristics of the respondents. The tests
performed were used to test the effect of age, experience as a loan officer and the effect
of a respondent having had training in business economics, on the responses given.
Thus, Spearman rank correlations were calculated for all responses and respondents'
characteristics mentioned.
The results of these tests indicate that there is little influence of any of the characteristics
tested on the responses given. There are however a few exceptions (see table 5.12).
Older and more experienced respondents find the imporfanc« of the director's report and
the auditor's report to be higher. Also the tf/ua/zry of the balance sheet, the profit and
loss account and again the auditor's report are perceived to be higher by older and more
experienced respondents. The effect of a respondent's training in business administration
is almost completely absent. It seems, nevertheless, that respondents who have had
training in business administration find the financial statements to be less important
compared to other information sources, that they find the financial statements to be less
timely and less reliable than other respondents and that they are less positive about the
importance and quality of most elements of the annual report compared to other
respondents. None of these findings, however, are statistically significant.
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Table 5.12 Significant effect of respondents'
Spearman rank correlations
Importance of the director's report
Importance of the auditor's report
Quality of the balance sheet -
Quality of the profit & loss account

























5.5 Concluding remarks ••! -
In this chapter, evidence has been provided on the perceived usefulness to loan officers
of financial reports disclosed by medium-sized companies. The views of respondents
were elicited on (1) the importance of the annual report of medium-sized firms in
relation to other sources of accounting information available, (2) the characteristics of
various accounting information sources in terms of reliability, relevance,
understandability, comparability and timeliness, (3) the importance and quality of
separate elements of the annual reports provided by medium-sized firms and (4)
differences in information needs when dealing with firms of different sizes.
The results strongly suggest that the annual report is perceived to be a primary source
of information to loan officers when dealing with medium-sized firms. Although other
sources of accounting information are available, and are used, loan officers seem to
depend heavily on financial statements when making credit decisions. Financial reports
are ranked first in terms of reliability, relevance, understandability and comparability.
Only in terms of timeliness are other sources of accounting information perceived to be
more adequate. „ .,_.,. ... . ^ .... .
Among the elements within an annual report, the profit and loss account, balance sheet
and accompanying notes are perceived to be the most important. Also the quality of the
information provided in these items is generally considered to be adequate, although the
notes to the financial statements are ranked somewhat lower. The director's report seems
to be particularly open for improvement as it is ranked significantly lower in terms of
quality than all other annual report elements.
The issue of differential information needs of loan officers when dealing with firms of
different sizes remains largely unclear. Respondents strongly disagree on this point. In
the case of the filing of abridged accounts by smaller firms, research has indicated that
loan officers are able to compensate the loss of information only partly through other
sources and at a substantial costs [Morris and Embrued, 1990, p. 20]. However, on this
point respondents also tend to disagree substantially.
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The research presented in this chapter was directed towards /n«flMm-räerf private firms
and therefore deviates from the focus on s/na// private firms in the previous empirical
chapters. Nevertheless, the results found do have implications for the small firm context.
The high emphasis placed on the profit and loss account would indicate that the
exemptions on the disclosure regarding this account provided to small firms, would not
be appreciated by loan officers. Also, the absence of a mandatory auditor's report would
seem to hamper the use of the annual report information of small firms, as loan officers
seem to strongly value the presence of an auditor's report to ensure the quality of the
information provided in the annual report. Only the lack of timeliness is indicated as a
serious drawback of using the information from annual reports.
The findings presented in this chapter would suggest that in the current situation, where
small firms are partially exempted from accounting disclosure regulations, users (i.e.
loan officers) still have to rely heavily on alternative sources of accounting information,
since the information disclosed by small firms is both short of essential elements (i.e.
the profit and loss statement) and may not be sufficiently reliable to be used as a
primary source of information to loan officers. Thus, it seems that current differential
disclosure regulations provides an inadequate solution to the issue of financial reporting
of small private firms. It would seem that either small firm accounting information is
useful and used by external parties in which case small firms should be obliged to
prepare and disclose full accounts without any exemptions provided to them. Or else the
disclosure of annual reports by small private firms has limited use and usefulness in
which case these firms should be exempted from all disclosure requirements and the
provision of accounting information of these firms should be left to private arrangements
between the firm and users depending on this information.
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Summary and Discussion
6.1 Introduction ; .=
This chapter will summarize and discuss the research presented in this dissertation,
and will provide some suggestions for further research in the area of financial
reporting by small or privately held firms, and the regulation thereof. Section 6.2
summarizes the results of the dissertation and discusses some general conclusions,
and section 6.3 discusses the limitations of the studies presented. Finally, section 6.4
will provide some suggestions for further research.
6.2 Summary
The objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the literature on the economic
effects of financial reporting regulation with a special focus on the economic effects
of such regulations for small and medium-sized private companies. The empirical
chapters of the dissertation deal with the compliance of small private companies in
the Netherlands with financial reporting regulations, the perceptions of small private
firm managers on current financial reporting regulations in the Netherlands, the cost
effects for Dutch small firms of the 1984 Dutch company law, and the perceptions of
loan officers dealing with smaller companies.
Chapter 2 discusses theories of financial reporting regulations, that attempt to explain
the existence of such regulations. Arguments from both public interest theory as well
as private interest explanations are discussed and are focused on the financial
reporting environment of small private companies. In both areas the arguments are
mostly oriented to the experience of large public companies. Whether these
arguments apply to the small private firm setting depends heavily on empirical
evidence. Although there is a large body of literature in this area, most of this
research has focused on large public companies. Though these studies do have
implications for research on the economic effects of financial reporting regulation for
smaller private companies, there seems to be a general lack of studies that have
focused directly on the small private firm situation.
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Most theoretical and empirical studies on financial reporting regulation are oriented
towards the US or UK regulatory system. In the US, financial reporting regulation is
primarily focused on publicly listed firms. But in Europe most firms affected by
company law are relatively small and mostly private firms that are unlisted.
Therefore, the costs that accounting and disclosure standards impose on small private
firms should be of much more concern in the European context than in the US. Also,
since there is no rigid enforcement of the company law requirements, the level of
compliance with financial reporting regulations in Europe may be much more of a
problem than it seems to be in the US.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 empirically investigate the financial reporting environment of
small and medium-sized firms in the Netherlands. Firstly, an investigation of the
level of compliance with company law requirements for small Dutch firms suggests
that in 1990, six years after tie introduction of these regulations, 15% of all firms
concerned violate these requirements by not disclosing any financial statements.
Equally striking is the fact that a significant number of firms that eventually do file
their financial statements fails to file their annual report with the Chambers of
Commerce within the time span allowed by the company law. As a result, the
financial statements of small private firm generally become available to the public
only with great delay, which raises doubts about the usefulness of such disclosures to
any interested party.
A detailed investigation of financial statements disclosed by small private companies,
as presented in chapter 3, indicated that compliance with formal company law
requirements, mostly facilitating the comparability of the information disclosed over
time and over firms, does not seem to be an area of great concern. A common
strategy followed by small firms is to take an exact copy of a standard model and
leaving the items that are not applicable to the firm's situation open. Most
compliance problems pertain to the notes to the balance sheet, and the amount of
information disclosed in these notes is rather limited. It is, however, not always clear
whether omissions are cases of non-compliance or just a result of the item not being
applicable to the firm's situation.
From the study on the perceptions of small firm managers presented in chapter 4 it is
clear that financial reporting and its regulation are not major issues for small firm
managers. Also it is evident that small companies do not expect to gain much by
disclosing financial accounting information or appreciate the usefulness of the
financial statements to third parties. As far as the costs of complying with company
law requirements are concerned, a significant effect of the change in company law in
1984 can be found. Accounting costs, however, only make up a small fraction of the
total company costs. Nevertheless, it can be shown that smaller firms bear
proportionately higher accounting costs compared to larger firms and that the
exemptions provided by company law do not fully compensate for the higher costs
imposed by financial reporting regulations on smaller firms.
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it is clear that current medium-sized company annual reports are generally perceived
to be important and adequate sources of accounting information. Only the timeliness
of such reports seems to be inadequate. Whether loan officers require different
accounting information from firms of different sizes remains unclear as respondents
tend to disagree on this point. .
From the theoretical discussion on financial reporting regulations for smaller or
private firms and the results of existing empirical literature, the following
observations can be made:
Criteria for differential financial reporting regulations.
The choice of firm size as a cornerstone of the differential financial reporting
regulations introduced by the Fourth EC Directive may not be a very fortunate one.
Firm size is a relative factor and whether a firm with a particular number of
personnel, a particular amount of total assets or annual sales is to be called small or
medium-sized heavily depends on other factors such as industry. Also, the cut off
point between a small and a medium-sized firm and between a medium-sized and a
large firm is inevitably subjective and hard to defend. From a private interest point
of view firm size seems to be a weak indicator of the role of financial accounting
information and consequently the costs and benefits of financial reporting activities.
The degree of separation between ownership and control seems to be a more
dominant factor and criteria based on the degree of separation between the ownership
and the management of a firm may therefore provide a much more articulate basis
for differential financial reporting regulations. Such criteria relate to the difference
between private and public companies and may be indicated by the number of
stockholders, the free transfer of stock or the degree of owners' equity held by the
management.
The effectiveness of financial reporting regulations.
The enforcement of financial reporting regulations seems to be hampered
considerably, given the large number of firms affected by such regulations. In the
Netherlands there is no systematic check of firms' compliance with financial
reporting regulations. The enforcement of compliance relies more on the initiative of
interested parties who for example may complain about the contents of a firms'
annual report to the Enterprise Chamber. In the small firm setting, however, the role
of the Enterprise Chamber seems limited. Also the absence of a mandatory audit
limits the reliability of the information disclosed by smaller firms. Although the level
of non-disclosure is not dramatically high (15% in 1990), the quality of the
information disclosed and especially the timeliness of the disclosures of small firm
seriously reduce the usefulness of such information to any user group.
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The role of an audit for small firms is currently being heavily discussed in the
Netherlands. At present there is no mandatory audit for small firms in the
Netherlands. Due to a change in Dutch audit-regulations in 1993, accountants-
administratieconsulenten, which are particularly active in the small and medium-sized
firm market, are legally authorized to perform an audit. As a result, the issue of a
small firm audit has gained much in importance in the Netherlands. The discussion
generally concentrates on the lack of internal control in smaller firms which may
result in a large number of qualified opinions for such firms. The 'Nederlandse Orde
van Accountants-Administratieconsulenten' (NOVAA) therefore has initiated a
research project to come to a small firm audit program. To overcome the lack of
internal control in small firms a small firm audit program might focus on more
elaborate substantive testing, the involvement of the auditor in the preparation of the
accounts, reliance on executive controls or the introduction of a separate small firm
audit qualification [Meuwissen and Maijoor, 1994].
The costs of financial reporting regulations for smaller firms.
The basic argument for differential financial reporting regulations for small firms
stems from the alleged costs effects of such regulations on smaller firms. However,
the cost-reducing effect of current differential reporting regulations in the
Netherlands seems to be limited as small firms still seem to bear proportionately
higher costs of financial reporting despite all exemptions provided. Whether these
cost effects are compensated by the benefit of the provision of more adequate
financial information is doubtful, given the results of the compliance study indicating
that, at-the-least, most information disclosed by small firms is strongly outdated and
in many ways incomplete.
Although in 1985 a test for new legislation was introduced in the Netherlands
(wetgevingstoets), according to which the costs related to proposed changes in
regulations have to be evaluated as well as the effect on businesses, this test did not
have much impact. Also, even if compliance costs of proposed regulations are
assessed, these assessments usually are qualitative in nature and quantitative estimates
of compliance costs are not presented. It seems that, so far, the Government has put
great trust in technological innovations such as increased automation which are
supposed to reduce compliance costs for businesses. As a result, the costs effects of
current as well as new legislations still receive only marginal attention by Dutch
politicians. . --••; -"- '••*>' -'-• ./•<•-••• *.»'-i.*- ;; ••:; • v • .-.- .-
6.3 Limitations of the study. ,!&:
This dissertation has investigated the economic effects of financial reporting
regulations. As such it suffers from the inevitable flaw of all research in this area in
172that it can not include all costs and benefits related to the financial reporting
regulation under investigation. . .-.-;•> .•?:,.•;• :., * -•....•.•••-,... .-,••--. -.-,••..
The study on the level of compliance with financial reporting regulations suffers
from the difficulty to establish whether information that is not disclosed in annual
accounts, although required by company law, relates to non-compliance with the
regulations or relates to the fact that information is not relevant or not material for
that particular firm. Therefore the level of non-compliance can only be established
from a conservative point of view, assuming that any mandatory information that is
not disclosed in the annual report of a firm is excluded because the item is not
relevant for that particular firm, unless the non-compliance can be established
positively for example from other information provided in the financial statements.
The use of questionnaires and the focus on perceptions of managers of small firms
the loan officers dealing with medium-sized firms introduces a number of limitations
inherent to this research method. The most important difficulty is dealing with
strategic behaviour by respondents in filling out the questionnaire. Company
managers may be inclined to exaggerate the effects of financial reporting regulations
on their firms, especially when they are asked to provide an indication of the costs of
complying with such regulations. Similarly, users of accounting information may
overstate the importance of information that is of potential use to them because there
is no charge for requiring more information than they actually need. Also,
questionnaire studies typically have to deal with non-response problems that are hard
to overcome. The generalisability of the results of such studies therefore often is
hard to defend.
However, given the fact that there are few studies on the economic effects of
financial reporting regulations present in the Netherlands and that practically no
research is available on the economic effects of such regulations on small or private
firms, a first study in this area is inevitably of a rather exploratory nature. Also, as
far as the investigation of accounting costs is concerned, there seem to be few
alternatives as such information is not available from any public source of
information in the Netherlands.
6.4 Suggestions for further research
As mentioned before, Dutch research into the economic effects of financial reporting
regulation and especially research on small and medium-sized firms is still in its
infancy. It is therefore evident that there are numerous ways for future research in
the area of financial accounting for smaller or privately held companies. Some
proposals for such future research will be presented in this final section.
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The role of financial accounting information within small firms.
Current differential financial reporting regulations in the EC are primarily based on
size criteria. However, the costs and benefits of financial reporting may depend more
heavily on the degree separation of ownership and control. Therefore the impact of
variables indicating the firm's degree of ownership and control on the costs and
benefits of financial disclosures deserves further attention. In this context, the
relationship between the number of shareholders or the proportion of capital held by
management and the economic effects of accounting regulations should be further
investigated.
Empirical research on current small firm audit practice.
At present there is virtually no empirical evidence on voluntary audits among small
firms. From the compliance study in chapter 4 it is clear that some small firms do
have their financial statements audited and even file the auditor's reports with the
financial statements at the Chamber of Commerce, although this is not required by
company law. Little is known, however, about why these firms voluntarily have their
financial statements audited and to what extent qualified and unqualified opinions are
expressed by auditors dealing with smaller firms.
In more general terms, little is known about the opportunities for good small firms to
distinguish themselves from bad small firms. Just following the regulatory
requirements for financial reporting seems to provide few possibilities for small firms
to show good faith. Therefore, these firms may be looking for alternative or
additional mechanisms such as a voluntary audit or the disclosure of additional
accounting information not specifically required by company law, e.g. by ignoring
the disclosure exemptions and disclosing the full financial statements instead of the
abridged ones.
The role of the external accountant in small firms
Although it is clear from existing empirical evidence that, even in the absence of a
mandatory audit, the external accountant very often is involved in small businesses,
little is yet known about the characteristics of such external accountants or their
impact on the quality of the information provided by small firms. If it can be shown
that small firms' financial statements that are prepared by an external accountant
have better characteristics in terms of timeliness and quality, the mandatory
preparation of the small firm financial statements by an external auditor may provide
a way to ensure the quality of the information disclosed as a substitute for a
mandatory audit. • -.V.J-Ä:-' ••"-• -.- -*-•••: -^— •-.-tv.-- •:- ..--•, ;•::.„•>; •:-$«• rv; ••'••••?•:-.-
Determinants of compliance with financial reporting regulation.
Various studies from different countries have shown apparent non-compliance with
financial reporting regulations among small firms, thus lowering the quality of the
financial statements disclosed. Little research, however, has been spent on studying
the determinants of non-compliance. Also, determinants of the timeliness of small
firm financial statement disclosures are of interest here as many small Dutch
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companies fail to file their financial statements on time. Although some initial work
on the relationship between compliance and timeliness versus firm characteristics has
been presented in chapter 3, further research should focus on explaining why some
firms do comply with financial reporting regulations while others do not. Such
explanations may be based on research on differences in agency costs between
complying and non-complying firms (see for example Buijink, 1992, pp. 41-42 and
Maijoor, 1991, p. 155).
Determinants of accounting costs
Additional research into differences in accounting costs between firms of different
sizes could shed further light on the determinants of proportionally higher accounting
costs for firms of smaller sizes. Especially the increasing use of computerised
financial information systems within small firms and the involvement of an external
accountant in preparing the financial statements may have considerable effects on
accounting costs for firms. In this context also the financial statements prepared for
fiscal purposes may prove worthwhile. If firms were allowed to use the fiscal
financial statements as a basis for the financial statements required by company law,
the additional costs of the company law requirements may be reduced considerably.
Little is known, however, about the differences between the fiscal financial
statements of small firms and the financial statements that are filed at the Chambers
of Commerce by these firms.
The usefulness of small firm financial accounting disclosures
This study has focused on the usefulness of financial statements for credit analysts
dealing with medium-sized companies. Further research should focus on the
usefulness of financial statements of smaller firms to banks and also to other potential
user groups.
Also, further research into the role of financial accounting disclosures in actual
decision processes may define more accurately the benefits to users from such
disclosures. Studies by Keasey and Watson [1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1988] have focused
on the potential of failure prediction for small firms using a set of financial ratios.
To our knowledge, such research into the use of small firm financial accounting
information in particular decision processes at present is non-existent in the
Netherlands.
The small firm and the regulatory process
In the area of the role of smaller firms in the regulatory process, the lobbying of
such firms may be investigated. At present it is largely unknown whether any
lobbying activities are undertaken either by small firms individually or by bodies
representing small and medium-sized firms and to what extent their lobbying
activities are successful. In the Netherlands, however, such research is seriously
hampered by the fact that there is no formalised procedure for submissions of
interested parties to regulators and there is no systematic publication of such
submissions [Maijoor, 1991, p. 161].
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Regulatory bodies in various countries in the past have shown a growing interest in,
and concern for the impact that regulations might have on small firms. These
concerns have led to the existence of legislation that either exempts smaller
businesses from financial reporting regulations or imposes fewer requirements on
smaller firms. This appendix delineates differential reporting regulations that exist in
the European Community, the US and Australia. This description is intended to
demonstrate that regulators have followed varying approaches in providing
exemptions for small firms. In the European Community, with the introduction of the
Fourth Directive there has been an articulate approach in exempting firms from part
of the financial reporting requirements based primarily on firm size. In the US, the
FASB generally rejected the idea of differential reporting regulations for small firms,
but nevertheless has implemented various exemptions for these firms. Also, the
federal financial reporting regulations in the US apply only to public companies. In
Australia there is a movement towards full exemptions for certain classes of firms,
particularly small private ones.
Defining a relative term like 'small' or 'large' evidently poses a problem that is in
essence impossible to solve. In a daily routine it is often superfluous to have an exact
definition and terms like 'small and medium-sized firms' are widely referred to
without ever giving any precise definition. As a result, most definitions of small and
medium-sized companies tend to be very broadly stated, often incorporating many
different elements that are believed to be characteristic for these firms.
In their book on 77ic Economic? 0/ 5/na// Bwine»^, Brock and Evans also point out
the futility of defining a small business
"Such definitions are arbitrary and not particularly helpful. Whether a
business is small depends upon the particular industry in which it operates.
[..] Whether a business is small also depends upon our reasons for talking
about small versus large. [..]" [Brock and Evans, 1986, p. 4].
However, if differential regulation for small firms is to be implemented, a policy
maker can not avoid defining the set of firms to which the various rules and
regulations should apply. Obviously any solution which a policy maker might come
177up with is open to discussion and criticism, since there is always a certain degree of
arbitrariness involved. Whether a business is small depends on the particular
circumstances like the country or industry it operates within, and also on the policy
area under consideration. As a result, different countries, and different agencies
within these countries, and different departments within these agencies, define the
small business sector in substantially different ways. Although it will not result in a
single generally acceptable definition, it is interesting to discover how policy makers
have dealt with the problem, how they have been criticized and what suggestions
have been made to come to other criteria.
Two basic questions can be distinguished regarding the definition of small
companies:
/. What criteria should be used to define a small firm? Most propositions come down
to the choice of a combination of size criteria, like total assets, total sales and
number of employees.
2. What cut-off point for each of the variables used should be established?
• "• Vs. •'
The size of a firm can be defined by using several variables like total sales, total
assets, number of employees or total stock market value, or by using combinations of
more than one variable. Currently, most definitions seem to include one or more of
three variables:
• total assets
• total annual sales
• number of employees
Not only the definition of a small firm poses an evident problem for policy makers,
also the control of a correct classification of firms is difficult. In a situation where all
firms have their accounts audited, this task could be assigned to the external auditor
by having him issue a statement that the company complies with the specified criteria
to take advantage of the exemptions being used in preparing and filing the accounts.
Without the obligation of an audit for all firms, an adequate control of the correct
use of exemptions by firms seems to be very difficult to ensure.
A. The European Community ' .--
In the European Community, financial reporting regulation in the last few decades
has been dominated by several EC Directives that have been implemented in the
national legislations of its member-countries, mostly in the early 1980's'. Before
' The most important Company Law Directives issued by the EC are:
• the First Company Directive, issued in 1968, stating that all limited companies and
partnerships limited by shares must publish an annual balance sheet and profit and loss
account;
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that, the situation in the European countries differed considerably. Financial
disclosure regulations for small and medium-sized firms have been laid down in the
Fourth Directive.
In the first draft for a proposal for the Fourth Directive, issued in 1968 by the study
group 'Company Law' initiated by the European Commission, only public limited
liability companies were subject to the disclosure requirements. In addition, section 2
of article 1 of the proposal provided the option to exempt small public limited
liability companies or family owned companies up to a particular size, from some of
the provisions of the proposed Directive. During the first discussions of the proposal
in 1968 the provision to exempt small companies was deleted and replaced by the
option to exempt banks and other financial institutions as well as insurance
companies from the Directive.
Further discussions in 1969 concerned the extension of the scope of the Directive
towards private limited liability companies. Until then the intention had been to issue
a separate proposal for a Directive for private limited liability companies. This plan
was now abandoned on the premise that there was no fundamental difference between
public and private limited liability companies. As a result, in a draft proposal issued
• the Second Directive, issued in 1976, that lays down rules concerning the formation of
public limited companies;
• the Third Directive, issued in 1978, dealing with mergers of public limited liability
companies;
• the Fourth Directive, issued in 1978, governing detailed rules on annual accounts of
limited liability companies;
• the Sixth Directive, issued in 1982, on the divisions of public limited liability companies;
• the Directive on the information to be published on a regular basis by companies the
shares of which have been admitted to official exchange listing, issued in 1982;
• the Seventh Directive, issued in 1983, dealing with consolidated accounts;
• the Eight Directive, issued in 1984, concerning the rights and duties of auditors;
• the Directive on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other
financial institutions, issued in 1986;
• the Eleventh Directive, issued in 1989, concerning disclosure requirements in respect of
branches opened in a member state by certain types of companies governed by the law of
another state;
• the Twelfth Directive, issued in 1989, on single member private limited liability
companies;
• the Directive on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance companies,
issued in 1991.
Financial disclosure regulations for small firms are dominated by the Fourth Directive. The
thresholds used in the Directive to define small and medium-sized companies have been
amended in 1984, 1990 and 1994. Also, the scope of the Fourth Directive has been
extended in 1990.
179in 1970 the scope of the Directive was extended accordingly. It was recognised,
however, that for private firms the requirements for the disclosure of the annual
report could be relaxed, since within these firms shareholders are known and
therefore can be sent the annual report by personal mail. Exempting private firms
from the mandatory disclosure of the annual report could, however, harm creditors.
Given the limited liability nature of private firms it was therefore felt that such an
exemption could not be provided. However, for firms that have little economic
impact (i.e. small firms) it was felt that disclosure of the annual report would not be
essential. Based on these arguments a distinction was made between three different
size-categories^ of private limited liability companies. For small and medium-sized
private limited liability companies partial exemptions* were foreseen (though neither
the size-criteria to be used nor the exemptions to be provided were specified).
In its discussion of the proposal for the Fourth Directive that was issued in 1971, the
European Parliament fully supported the scope of the Directive, although it requested
to examine the possibility to extend the scope to all firms that exceeded a certain
size, irrespective of their legal form. The Economic and Social Committee in 1973
also approved the scope of the proposed Fourth Directive. The Committee proposed
to require Member States to provide the exemptions mentioned in the Directive, but
this proposal was not followed and in the final text the provision of exemptions
remained optional. In an amended version of the proposed Directive issued in 1977*
the size-categories not only applied to private companies but also were applicable to
public companies, since it was felt that is was preferable to treat equally all
companies of comparable size regardless of their legal structure'.
* In the final version of the Fourth Directive (issued in 1978), the size-criteria were based
on total assets, total sales and number of employees. These criteria were regarded to take
into account the different characteristics of industrial companies, trading companies and
companies providing services.
' In the original version of this amendment formulated by the study group, small companies
were fully exempted from all disclosure requirements. In the final text of the proposal this
suggestion, however, was not followed by the European Commission.
* There had been a revision of the proposal in 1974, as a result of the entry into the EC of
Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland. This amendment, however, had no effect on the
exemptions provided to small and medium-sized firms. * ! i
' In the Netherlands the Institute of Registered Accountants (NTVRA) criticized the
proposed Directive with regard to private firms, as it felt that all private firms should be
exempted from disclosing a profit and loss account. Also it felt that the size limits defining
small and medium-sized companies mentioned in the proposal were far too low. The latter
point was also made in a reaction of a European study group of accountants (Groupe
d'Etudes des Experts Comptables de la EEC). As a result of these and other similar critics
the size limits were raised considerably in the final version of the Fourth Directive.
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The impact of the Fourth Directive on small and medium-sized firms received great
attention, especially in Germany where some 300,000 small and medium-sized
private firms would be affected [Hagenau and Häuser, 1989]. At the time of the
adaptation of the German law to the Fourth Directive, a number of authors suggested
that small firms could easily escape the disclosure requirements since a sanction
could only be evoked by interested parties (e.g. Autenrieth [1989, pp. 2581-2582],
Hagenau and Häuser [1989, pp. 180-182] and Weilbach, 1990, pp. 1095-1097]). So
for all firms where such interested parties did not exist (which was assumed to apply
to most small firms), non compliance with the disclosure regulations would not have
any implications. Later research has indicated that non compliance in Germany is
extremely high (Weilbach, [1991, p. 800]). Also, a large number of limited liability
companies changed their legal structure to avoid the financial reporting regulations.
Over 60,000 GmbH's' (a limited liability company) changed their legal structure into
a GmbH & Co KG, which is an unlimited liability firms (kommanditgesellschaft
(KG)) where all unlimited partners are limited liability companies (GmbH). All firm
activities would be placed in the KG to which the financial reporting regulations did
not apply. The GmbH that acted as partner of the KG, would still have to apply to
the financial reporting regulations but it would have no activities and mostly would
be a small company.
As a result, in 1986 a proposal was issued by the European Commission to extend
the scope of the Fourth Directive to unlimited companies and partnerships of which
the unlimited partners are all established as a limited liability company. In these
firms, in spite of their unlimited nature, liability in effect was restricted to the net
assets of the limited liability companies that acted as owner or partner. Such limited
liability was regarded to be one of the essential reasons for issuing the Fourth
Directive. Failure to subject the companies mentioned to the same accounting
requirements as public and private limited liability companies was felt to be contrary
to the spirit of the Fourth and Seventh Directive. The Economic and Social
Committee supported the proposal although a minority of the members was against it
for a number of reasons, one of which related to the large number of small and
medium-sized companies that would be affected by the proposal'. In 1987 the
proposal also was accepted by the European Parliament.
However, in 1988 the introduction of the proposed amendment of the Fourth and
Seventh Directive was delayed because Germany, the Member State most affected by
the amendment, requested that in return for the extension of the scope of the
Directives, the exemptions for small and medium-sized firms should also be
• Gesellschaft mit Beschränkter Haftung
' Other reasons mentioned were that the proposal created a precedent to extend the scope of
other Directives, and the fact that the problems dealt with by the proposal were already
known when the Fourth and Seventh Directive were adopted and that at that time these
problems were deliberately left to the Member States.
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extended. In Germany, the impact on the GmbH & Co. KG of the proposed
amendment of the Fourth Directive received great attention (see f.e. Hahn [1981,
p. 2461], Das Betrieb [1986, p. 1416], Barth [1986, p. 2236], Meillicke [1986,
pp. 2445-2450], Weilbach, 1992, pp. 955-957]) and there was strong opposition to
any further extensions of the scope of the Fourth Directive where it was felt that
lessening the requirements for small and medium-sized firms would be far more
appropriate.
As a result of the German opposition, in 1988 a second amendment of the Fourth
and Seventh Directive was proposed, extending the exemptions for small and
medium-sized companies. The proposal entailed the complete exclusion of small
closely held companies* from the Fourth and Seventh Directive'. It was argued that
for these companies the protection of members and other parties is not such an issue
since there are no minority shareholders and the interest of creditors can be
safeguarded by appropriate penalties for firms in case of a failure to keep proper
accounts. Also these firms are not very likely to engage in intra-Community trade, so
that the proposal would have little effect on the establishment of a common European
market. •• •.- •:. :••••••--.-.•< •• „ , .
The proposal included:
• the creation of a new category of 'closely held companies' that would be
completely exempted from all requirements of the Fourth Directive. Each member
state would be free to set their own regime for this category of firms provided that it
does not exceed the requirements of the Fourth Directive as applied to small
companies;
• a mandatory exemption allowing small companies to disclose their accounts at the
company's registered office instead of filing them at a central registry. Member
states would be free to set the same exemption for medium-sized firms;
• more flexibility for member states to vary the existing financial thresholds defining
small and medium-sized firms. Thresholds could be set by minus or plus 50% of the
current maximum and to reduce the employment threshold by 50%;
• A closely held company was defined as a company:
• not affiliated with other undertakings; " '
• not linked to another undertaking by virtue of a participating interest; —
• where the members or shareholders are natural persons and the same as the members of
the administrative or management body;
• where the shares are registered and may not be transferred without the company's
consent.
' During the preparation of the proposal it was also suggested to exempt all small and
medium-sized companies from the Fourth Directive. This suggestion was not followed
because it was felt that there was a danger that this would undermine the whole concept of
harmonising accounting standards. Furthermore it would nullify the considerable effort
Member States had invested in getting all companies to accept the new accounting rules.
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• an exemption for all small companies for preparing a directors' report under
certain conditions;
• an option for member states to exempt all single director companies from
disclosing information on loans to directors and directors' remuneration;
• a mandatory exemption for small companies from having their accounts audited.
The proposal, however, was not endorsed by the European Parliament'". A number
of revised proposals to exclude "very small" companies or "very small closely held"
companies were not accepted either. The final version of the Directive was adopted
in 1990, together with a revised version of the 1986 proposal to extend the scope of
the Directive. Although some additional exemptions were provided to small and
medium-sized companies, no category of companies was excluded entirely from the
scope of the Fourth and Seventh Directive. The incorporation of these amendments
in the Dutch legislation therefore has not resulted in major changes for small firms.
The thresholds have been raised slightly and small firms are no longer required to
prepare a directors' report unless the company has a workers' council. More
importantly, the scope of the company law has been extended so that general
partnerships (Vennootschap onder Firma, VOF) and limited partnerships
(Commanditaire Vennootschap, CV) also fall under the legal financial reporting
requirements.
With the adaptation of the national company laws to the Fourth Directive, all EC
countries will have some form of tiering regulation in which three groups of firms
are distinguished based on three size criteria: total annual sales, total assets and
number of employees. The difficulty for a policy-maker in setting cut-off points can
be demonstrated by the wide range of size-criteria implemented by the member-
countries". As can be concluded from table 1, the introduction of the Fourth
Directive still left some substantial differences between thresholds in national
legislations. Also, the thresholds have been reset on several occasions. The reason
for these adaptations is to compensate for economic or monetary developments.
'° Initially it seemed the European parliament supported the complete exemption of small
closely held firms but later this support vanished, supposedly as a result of the dramatic
changes taking place in Eastern Europe at that time [Weilbach, 1992, p. 955].
" The size criteria implemented in the national legislation of Member States may deviate no
more than 10% from the criteria mentioned in the Fourth Directive.
183Table 1 Upper boundaries defining a small firm as incorporated in national legislation's of member
states (adapted from Beckman, 1988]






























































































































NI = The Fourth Directive has not yet been implemented in the national legislation at that time (1989].
NA= Threshold is not incorporated in the national legislation.
• the boundary for personnel included in the Fourth Directive is 50.
•* in Belgium these boundaries do not apply if a firm has over 100 employees , " •
•** in France there is a further separation within the category of small firms : -•-,- •*--..,•_
In 1994, a commission of independent experts was established to examine the impact
of the EC and national legislation on employment and competitiveness with a view to
finding ways of reducing and simplifying such legislations. In a report, issued in
1995, this committee devoted considerable attention to the matter of small and
medium-sized companies (SMEs). With respect to company law, the commission
notices that [CEC, 1995, p. 79]:
• The transposition of EU legislation has frequently added significantly to costs and
rigidities (for example in implementing company law); enforcement can be
insensitive to the particular needs of SMEs and is uneven across the Community and
in national legislation has added significantly to the cumulative burden faced by
SMEs.
• Company law [...] has frequently been driven by the needs of the larger company.
For SMEs company law needs to achieve a better balance between cost and creating
a secure framework for SME access to capital and credit.
The most important suggestions made by the Commission with respect to SMEs, are
to substantially increase (by 50-100%) the thresholds used in the Fourth Directive to
define small and medium-sized companies, and to keep general disclosure
requirements under close review to ensure that they provide an appropriate balance
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between costs and benefits. For new legislation the impact on SMEs and a cost
benefit analysis should be published as a matter of routine.
The Commission recognizes that although previous attempts have been made to
simplify financial reporting regulations for SMEs, these have met major political
obstacles. In the near future it will become clear whether the recommendations of the
Commission itself will be able to by-pass such obstacles. • —
B. The US v - •• •: •••-••• :-,... ' --vt.; ^
In the US, the discussion on differential disclosure regulation emerged in the 1970s,
especially after a report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) showed that the costs for certain
disclosures were almost 200 times as high per dollar of sales for companies with
assets of less than $ 100 million than for large companies with assets of over $ 1
billion. Furthermore the report showed that there was very little interest from
sophisticated institutional investors in companies with a capitalization of less than
$ 50-100 million [Horwitz en Kolodny, 1982, p. 31 and SEC, 1977, Chapter XVÜ
and pp. 514-515]. Since then the SEC has introduced several exemptions for smaller
firms and has even considered creating a small business class whose reporting burden
would be significantly reduced [Horwitz and Kolodny, 1982, p. 33].
In the US the regulation implemented by the SEC, the Securities Act 1934 relieves
all companies whose assets fall below $ 5,000,000 and whose number of
shareholders falls below 500 at the end of any year, and all corporations whose
number of shareholders falls below 300 from the obligation to file quarterly and
annual financial statements in prescribed form and content, with independent
accountant certification of the annual statement [Landau, 1988, p. 65]. Also, shelf
registration is limited to companies with (a) aggregate market value of at least $ 150
million or (b) aggregate market value of at least $ 100 million and annual trading
volume of at least three million shares [Atiase et al., 1988, p. 26].
Accountants' organisations seem to be quite positive about differential reporting
regulation. The AICPA in 1983 recommended to the FASB it should provide
"...within the framework of generally accepted accounting principles,
differential disclosure alternatives [..] as well as differential measurement
alternatives for such [small non-public] entities." [AICPA, 1983, pp. 3-4].
However, until now the FASB has rejected the argument for differential recognition,
measurement, and disclosure rules and has reaffirmed the need for one basic set of
accounting standards for all firms [Wölk et al., 1992, p. 94, FASB, 1983].
The FASB has nevertheless initiated a research project into financial reporting by
private and small public companies. When the FASB started its project, the problem
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of defining the firms under research was discussed in the invitation to comment in
the issue in 1981. In the discussion of the topic of the invitation, it is noted that
"authoritative accounting literature [..] has not defined small business" in the
discussion on the characteristics of private firms, and also that "authoritative
accounting literature does not distinguish [..] between small public companies and
large ones". As a tentative guideline for classification the definition of the Small
Business Administration (SBA), which is mainly based on sales-figures that are
differentiated for several industries, is presented for private firms and with respect to
small public firms, the numbers of public firms with total assets less than $ 5 million
and less than $ 10 million are presented [FASB, 1981, pp. 32-35]. In the SFASs
where differential standards are introduced, the FASB, instead of attempting to
develop a single definition of what a small firm is, focuses on how specific
accounting issues affect different businesses. This has lead to different criteria for
small firms in different SFASs. . . ••;.,.
Differential reporting based on company size is very uncommon in SFASs but it was
a theme in the exposure draft on SFAS 87 'Employer's accounting for pensions'
although the final statement did not include any exemptions because disclosure
requirements for all firms were reduced. SFAS 33 'Financial Reporting and
Changing Prices' included exemptions for firms if inventories exceed $ 125 million
and total assets are less than $ 1 billion. With the introduction of SFAS 89, however,
the requirements of SFAS 33 were dropped [Atiase et al., 1988, p. 26]. The FASB
has implemented some exemptions for non-public and small public firms in several
standards (e.g. SFAS 14, 69 and 79)'*.
" Based on studies by the AICPA of the application of generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) to smaller and closely held enterprises, the FASB announced in SFAS
21 (April 1978) that non-public enterprises were relieved of the disclosure requirements of
SFAS 14 regarding the reporting of earnings per share and the disclosure of segment
information. But also, in section 8 of SFAS 21 it is clearly stated that "those suspensions,
however, should not be construed as an indication that the Board has decided that the
information requirements for those [non-public] enterprises are significantly different from
those for an enterprise whose debt of equity securities are publicly traded".
In Appendix B to SFAS 69 (November 1982), it is mentioned mat, based on responses
received to the invitation to comment on the exposure draft, non-public firms are exempted
from major parts of this standard. It is stated that "the informational needs of the users of
financial reports are the same for enterprises that are publicly traded and enterprises that
are not publicly traded. However, creditors and investors in enterprises that are not publicly
traded, if they do not already have the information they require, usually are able to obtain
it". The fact that this may not always be the case is acknowledged by the Board but is not
seen as a widespread problem. In a final comment it is stated that "The Board may need to
reassess a possible requirement for enterprises that are not publicly traded to provide the
information [they are exempted from now] after completion of the Board's project on
financial reporting by private and small public companies".
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Federal Securities Law, however, only applies to public companies, active on a
national securities exchange. Accordingly, most small companies are predominantly
affected by State Corporate laws. Although many State corporation laws have
provisions requiring that some financial statements be made available or sent to
shareholders, the form, contents and principles of preparation are not prescribed and
independent certification is not required [Landau, 1988, p. 65]. Nevertheless, despite
the absence of formal requirements to do so, many small companies have audited
financial statements prepared at the request of banks or other financial credit sources,
the company management, or the company board of directors [Choi and Mueller,
1984, p. 96]
C.Australia .-.-.... .;•
While in the US the FASB has chosen a standard-to-standard approach, evaluating
the effect of each individual standard on certain groups of firms instead of defining a
general classification of firms, in Australia the concept chosen has been quite
differently on an entity-to-entity basis, referred to as the 'reporting entity concept'.
In Australia, the fundamental approach concerning accounting standards remains that
members of the accounting profession prepare all financial reports in accordance with
all accounting standards and all standards apply to all entities except for a very few"
[McCahey, 1989].
The Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) issued two proposals for
Statements of Accounting Concepts involving the differential reporting problem.
Statement ED46A 'Definitions of the Reporting Entity' (April 1988) and Statement
ED48 'Proposed statement of policy on Differential Reporting' (January 1989)
introduced a solution for the standards overload problem based on a conceptual
framework for financial reporting that, regarding the standards overload problem,
consisted of (1) a distinction between general purpose and specific purpose
SFAS 79 (February 1984) directly resulted from the research project initiated by the FASB
regarding the financial reporting by private and small public companies. The standard
restricted the application of Paragraph 96 of ABP Opinion 16 on the disclosure of pro
forma results of operations to public enterprises only. In the appendix to SFAS 79 it is
explicitly stated that the Board's decision to eliminate the requirements mentioned for non-
public firms were based on the assessment that the costs to provide those disclosures
generally exceeded the benefits to the users of non-public company financial statements
[SFAS 79, Paragraph 14].
" Exemptions are included in ASRB 1105, Financial Reporting by Segments and ASRB
1007, Financial Statement of Sources and Applications of Funds. Although these
exemptions are not based on firm size, it would be no exaggeration to suggest that the
majority of companies exempted would fall within some definition of a small company
[Ramsay and Sutcliffe, 1986, p. 49].
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information and (2) a distinction between reporting entities and non-reporting
entities. Reporting entities are defined as entities "in respect of which it is reasonable
to expect the existence of users dependent on general purpose financial reports for
information which will be useful to them for making and evaluating decisions on the
allocation of scarce resources" (Par. 37, ED46A). Reporting entities would be
compelled to provide general purpose reports in full compliance with all accounting
standards. Non-reporting entities would «or be determined by size or ownership
structure but by (1) the separation of management from economic interests, (2)
economical or political importance and (3) financial characteristics'''. The proposed
statements include no exact definition of a non-reporting entity. In fact, the choice of
whether a company is a reporting or a non-reporting entity is left to the preparer of
the financial statements. If a company would inappropriately define itself as a non-
reporting entity. Its choice to define itself as a non-reporting entity, however, would
be limited as a result of economical consequences (credit refusal, higher costs
imposed, tighter financing restrictions) or disciplinary actions against its accountant
[Goodwin and Newitt, 1990, p. 49, McCahey 1989, McCahey and Ramsay, 1989].
Company law in Australia is directed primarily towards public companies. Public
firms can be incorporated as 'proprietary' companies if they fulfil certain restrictions
regarding (1) the right to transfer its shares, (2) the number of members, (3) the
placing of share capital among the public and (4) the deposit of money with or by the
public. Furthermore, a distinction is drawn between proprietary companies which are
really incorporated family businesses, described as 'exempt proprietary companies'
and those which are completely or partly owned by a public company. All
proprietary companies have certain administrative advantages but, in addition,
exempt proprietary companies do not have to confonn to the rigid rules of disclosure
of information and audit which other types of company have to obey [Clift, 1989,
pp. 10-11].
'* It seems, however, that, although it is explicitly stated that non-reporting entities are not
determined by size or ownership (Par. 33 ED46A), the criteria given are not that much
different. It is mentioned however that the three criteria mentioned "are not the only factors
that will be relevant in determining whether, in a particular circumstance, an entity is a






Various solutions to lighten the burden that financial reporting regulation imposes on
small firms have been proposed and discussed. In general terms, five different
solutions to the differential financial reporting problem have been suggested:
A. Differential disclosure; •
fi. Differential recognition; *
C Differential measurement; • '
D. Full exemption;
Z?. Overall simplified reporting;
In this appendix, these various solutions to implementing differential financial
reporting regulations that have been proposed will be discussed. At various points in
the following discussion there will be references to various instances of
implementation of differential reporting regulations in a number of western countries.
A more detailed description of existing differential reporting systems in the EC, US
and Australia has been presented in Appendix I.
A. Differential disclosure
With this option small firms would be permitted to disclose less information about
their affairs than large public firms while still having the obligation to prepare full
accounts for the shareholders. This was the option presented primarily by the AICPA
in 1976 [AICPA, 1976].
Differential disclosure will hardly have a reducing effect on the accounting costs of
small firms. The major burden of accounting standards is in measurement, what goes
into the financial statement totals, rather than what goes into the footnotes [Mosso,
1983, p. 128]. Since full accounts, in accordance with all the measurement standards
still have to be prepared, the production of an extra set of abbreviated accounts for
disclosure will only enlarge costs for these firms. A positive effect would be that a
small firm could be prevented from having to disclose information that is very
sensitive for privacy or competitive reasons.
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Another cost-increasing effect could emerge because preparing two sets of accounts
would give rise to problems if the accounts had to be audited. The auditor's opinion
for the full accounts could hardly be applicable to the abbreviated accounts since, as
a result of the loss of detail, these would barely give an identical view of the
financial position of the firm. Instead of including the auditor's opinion of the full
accounts with the disclosed financial report, it could be argued a new auditor's
opinion should be set up specifically concerning the abbreviated disclosed accounts.
In the UK, auditors have to add a special auditor's report to the abbreviated accounts
to be disclosed, stating that (1) the directors are entitled to deliver modified accounts
in respect of the financial year and (2) any accounts comprised in the documents
delivered as modified accounts are properly prepared as such in accordance with the
Companies Act. Similar arrangements can be found in other EC-states like Denmark,
Germany and Ireland'. In contrast, in the Netherlands the auditor's report on the full
accounts has to be disclosed as a part of the accounts disclosed even if these are
abbreviated. No accessory auditor's statement is legally required, although some
authors pleaded in favour of it [e.g. Beckman, 1986, Van der Tas, 1989]. The
problems mentioned here, only apply to a relatively small number of medium-sized
companies in the Netherlands since small companies are fully exempted from the
audit requirements.
B. Differential recognition
Differential recognition deals with the decision to formally incorporate an item into
the basic financial statements [Larson and Kelly, 1984, p. 79]. This option is seldom
mentioned separately but mostly combined with the option of differential
measurement (see below): ..-,.,.....,..., < .
"Many who suggest that small business problems should be addressed
through differential standards or measurement, are not talking about the
measure of assets and liabilities. Rather, they are often asserting that an asset
or a liability should be excluded from the statements of smaller companies"
[Upton and Ostergaard, 1986, p. 98].
The purpose of differential recognition is not only to prevent certain items from
being disclosed to external parties, but also to prevent certain items from being
presented in the financial statements for the shareholders.
The concept of differential recognition avoids the audit difficulties introduced by
differential disclosure, since the financial accounts prepared and disclosed would be
' In France and Belgium there is no distinction between the prepared and disclosed accounts
and Greece has no exemptions for small or medium-sized companies. In the Netherlands the
problem only applies to the relatively small number of medium-sized companies since small
companies are exempted from the audit requirements.
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identical. Also, it would avoid the problems of differential measurement resulting
from the introduction of multiple sets of accounting rules, since the underlying
principles for the preparation of the accounts would still come from one set of
principles. As a result the loss of uniformity and comparability in financial
statements would be minimal since only the amount of information disclosed differs
among firms but not the underlying accounting principles. >•. ^ .•_..-.,,....•.....
The problem, however, is to decide what information could be left out without
harming the credibility of the financial statements. A distinction has to be made
between what information to require in the statements of all entities and additional
information [AICPA, 1976].
C. Differential measurement - . . :- ?
Small firms could be excluded from measurement requirements that are particularly
burdensome to them. This would result in small firms using a different set of
accounting principles than large public firms. The idea of differential measurement
has lead to a body of literature discussing the pros and cons of having two different
sets of 'Generally Accepted Accounting Principles" (GAAP), one for large public
firms (referred to as B/G-GA4P) and one for small firms (named L/77LE-G/L4F).
The distinction between both could go as far as the creation of a totally separate set
of accounting rules for small firms or the continuing use of one set of GAAP based
on a single set of concepts but with differential application of these unified concepts
to different situations.
The idea of differential measurement as a general solution to the standards overload
problem was firmly rejected by the FASB [Status Report FASB, 1983]. Firstly,
having two sets of GAAP ultimately makes nonsense of the idea of "generally
accepted accounting principles". Comparing firms of different sizes would be
complicated because the concept of uniform requirements would be abandoned.
Furthermore, as a firm grows it would at some point have to change from one set of
rules to the other, with time leading to confusion and loss of consistency. It could
also lead to the idea that the LITTLE-GAAP would be of lower quality and thus a
second-class alternative for small firms. Nevertheless, the FASB did not entirely rule
out the possibility of differential measurement but stated that it would be acceptable
in cases "... supported by persuasive evidence that needs of external users of the
financial statements of certain entities are different, or that the costs outweigh the
benefits of the information" [Status Report FASB, 1983]. ^ u
To escape the dilemma of a double GAAP-approach the use of a non-GAAP basis
for small firms has been suggested [AICPA, 1980, AICPA, 1983]. The FASB also
considered the use of a non-GAAP basis for small firms' financial statements but
found that although accountants working for smaller firms indicated a higher use of
income tax or cash based financial statements, even in this group the use of those
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bases was infrequent. Accountants indicated that tax-based financial statements lack
credibility with lenders. Also, other users besides lenders prefer GAAP financial
statements [Abdel-Khalik, 1983, p. 32]. Yet, for private firms, if the financial
statements were prepared for use by the owners only, the application of the income
tax basis in preparing financial statements was favoured by accountants [Abdel-
Khalik, 1983, p. 92]. Baker [1990] studied the response of commercial loan officers
to income tax based financial statements and found that loan officers find GAAP-
reports to be more complete and more useful in making loan approval decisions than
tax- based reports.
One other alternative would be to let the auditor decide to omit GAAP requirements
not considered to be cost-beneficial and state this in the auditor's report [Mosso,
1983, p. 128]. There has been, however, opposition to the introduction of negative
connotations in the auditor's report and a more positive form of reporting has been
asked for. Furthermore, there is concern that "leaving an accountant free to omit a
required disclosure on the ground that, in his view, it does not serve the information
needs of users would pose upon him an awesome responsibility as a well as
increasing the risk that his judgement will be challenged in the courts" [Armstrong,
1977, p. 89].
As mentioned before, research among users of financial statements indicates that they
strongly oppose the idea of having two sets of GAAP because it would considerably
reduce the credibility and usefulness of general purpose external financial reporting.
Larson and Kelly [1984] dispute these results, based on the belief that the user
groups mistakenly confuse conformity with GAAP as a basis for getting relevant
information, with a belief that information is more reliable in an auditing sense. They
see differential measurement only as an opportunity for firms to withhold
information. The authors refer to several studies to support their views and conclude
that user-groups, most importantly bankers, "overemphasize the importance of
uniformity in the application of complex GAAP standards" [Larson and Kelly, 1984,
p. 82].
D. Full exemption. •
A complete exemption from all financial reporting regulation for small closely held
firms would avoid the introduction of two sets of accounting principles. If a firm has
no external use for financial statements and general purpose financial statements are
not well designed for internal management purposes, it could well do without them
[Solomons, 1986, p. 194]. General accounting principles would only be applied in
special circumstances, such as an application to a bank for a loan, but they could be
abandoned for routine accounting purposes and the preparation of statements
designed for the use by management.
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A very similar approach has been introduced by the Australian Accounting profession
in the proposed introduction of the term reporring en/ift'e?, defined as entities of
which it is reasonable to expect that there will be users who are dependent on the
entities' financial reports for decision-making purposes, which are required to
prepare general purpose financial reports, prepared in accordance with all accounting
standards [McCahey, 1989. p. 60]. Entities that are not reporting entities are not
obliged to prepare general purpose financial reports. The auditor and the
management of the firm jointly decide whether the firm is a reporting entity
depending on whether it is reasonable to expect that there will be users who are
dependent on the entities' financial reports for decision making purposes^. Managers
and auditors are motivated to make a proper choice through adverse economic
consequences for the firm (e.g. financial restrictions or credit refusal) and
disciplinary proceedings for the auditor [Goodwin and Newitt, 1990, p. 50]. Such an
approach evidently avoids the difficulty of defining to which firms the exemptions
should apply. For discriminating between non-reporting and reporting entities and to
control the disclosure of accounting information by non-reporting entities, reliance is
placed on market forces.
E. Overall simplified reporting.
The case for simplified financial reporting regulations for all firms has evolved from
the concern that users of financial information are hardly able to use current financial
reports, for a number of reasons (Hammill [1979, p. 7], Bird [1984]):
1. Users do not understand the accounting principles and methods used in financial
accounts (e.g. Lee and Tweedie [1977, 1981]).
2. Users do not understand many of the technical terms in the accounts.
3. The excessive amount of information in the accounts is hard to absorb (e.g.
Newell and Simon [1972], Tversky and Kahneman [1974] and Libby [1981]).
It is argued that the usefulness of financial information is not determined by the
quantity of information but by a clear presentation of essential elements. Company
financial reports should not be over-burdened with unnecessary details so the costs of
collecting and publishing the information are kept within reasonable bounds. This has
led to suggestions for allowing companies to issue a streamlined form of financial
* The 'reporting entity concept' introduced in ED 46A and ED 48 by the AARF, is not
accompanied by strict criteria defining such an entity, although some suggestions are made.
In ED 46 Paragraph 24 it is concluded, however, that all public companies and listed
investment trusts would be regarded as reporting entities [Goodwin and Newitt, 1990,
p. 49]. Paragraph 12 of ED 48 delineates those entities that will normally not have to
prepare general purpose accounts and includes close companies, exempt proprietary
companies (as defined in the Companies Code), privately-owned trusts, sole traders and
wholly owned subsidiaries of Australian reporting entities [Holmes et al., 1991, p. 127].
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statements, usually referred to as Su/wnary AccoM/tf/ng /teportt (SARs) or simplified
accounts, for users who wish them, instead of sending the full accounts to all
shareholders*. Users would still receive the full financial statements in addition to the
summary annual report, or would at least be able to obtain full financial statements
on request. SARs would typically include a more verbal presentation of the firm's
financial situation and place greater emphasis on charts and graphs to present
numerical data [Lee and Morse, 1990, p. 39]*.
Allowing the simplification of financial reports, however, also holds the inevitable
risk that such reports will be lacking in completeness, comparability and
understandability (Tweedie [1981, p. 141], Nair and Rittenberg [1990, p. 38]). The
use of simplified reports and the obvious risk of simplifying the complex financial
reality of a firm to the extent that the model of this reality - the financial statements -
gets so simple that it gives a false impression and does not present a true and fair
view would also introduce difficulties with the audit of such a report. Given the
nature of a summary annual report, there is a problem whether the auditor would be
responsible for the quality of disclosures in the summary annual report and its
adequacy in presenting a true and fair view [Nair and Rittenberg, 1990, p. 25].
SARs' primary function is to improve the quality and effectiveness of financial
communication with users, but also to reduce disclosure costs [Rezaee and Porter,
1988]. Yet treating simplified reports only as a supplement to the full financial
accounts would leave the reporting firms not only with the costs of collecting detailed
information for the preparation of the full accounts but might even increase those
costs if an additional simplified report would have to be prepared and printed. The
net effect on publication costs depends on the portion of shareholders still requesting
full accounts. As more shareholders request full accounts, publication costs will
' Cowan [1968, p. 99] has argued that the financial accounts should be aimed at the average
shareholder with limited skills. Such an approach would reduce the need for a separate set
of simplified accounts. Others, however, have argued that the target of financial accounts
should be a reader with more than limited skills who is reasonably well informed about the
accounting models and terminology [Bevis, 1962, p. 33 and FASB, 1978, p. viii] and that
even average readers would be served best by the more and better information is available
for the professional analyst [Buzby, 1974a, p. 46]. Indeed, it seems hard to defend that
more sophisticated readers of financial statements should have to suffer to enable the less
informed groups to receive simpler reports [Tweedie, 1981, p. 128].
* Other ways of presenting the information in accounts are already incorporated in financial
accounts by using charts and graphics. Also m«/ri.srage repomng is used, starting with
general information found in the balance sheet and profit and loss account, followed by
more detailed information in the supporting notes. Also the use of the directors' report,
summary tables, and a page with 'financial highlights' are ways to assist the reader in
finding his way through the overwhelming amount of information in the financial accounts.
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increase as simplified accounts would be prepared and published in addition to the
full accounts and not as substitutes for the full accounts'.
In the US the idea of summary annual accounts really got of the ground with a
research project that was initiated by the Financial Executives Institute (FEI), and
sponsored by the Financial Executives Research Foundation (FERF) [Nair and
Rittenberg, 1990, p. 25]. When General Motors filed a request to the SEC to be
permitted to issue a summary annual report in 1987, the SEC endorsed it. GM did
not ask for a change in the disclosure requirements, but merely suggested that the
disclosures be shifted to the proxy statement rather than run in the annual report
[Rezaee and Porter, 1988, p. 44]. Specific guidelines for the form, content and
methods of disseminating a summary annual report have not been established by the
FASB. The SEC issued a guidance on preparing annual reports using the summary
format, allowing SARs only as long as all disclosure regulations were met in other
reports (e.g. 10K forms) [Schroeder and Gibson, 1992, p. 28]. ..••••
In the UK the ICAEW issued a research study to consider the implications of
simplified financial reporting as a reaction to a memorandum of the Consultative
Committee of Accountancy Bodies [CCAB, 1977], where it was stated that:
"we believe there may be some merit in examining whether companies might
be permitted, in place of the present requirement to send the full accounts to
all shareholders, to issue to those who wish it, a simplified form of annual
statement" [CCAB, 1977, p. 4].
The Companies Act 1989 includes a section (251) allowing listed public companies to
issue a summary financial statement to shareholders as a substitute for the full
statutory accounts. The Act, however, allows the sending of simplified accounts
unless the shareholder explicitly requires full accounts, contradictory to the view of
the ICAEW that the shareholder should take positive action to choose simplified
accounts.
The reaction of reporting firms towards SARs in the US and UK seems to be
characterised by a "wait and see" attitude [Nair and Rittenberg, 1990, p. 37, Hussey,
1991, p.6]. As to the reasons why firms are so cautious in preparing SARs, one can
only speculate. Large firms could hold on to full financial statements because the
most important users would be sophisticated investors who have little interest in
* Calculations by Hammill indicate that a company issuing 20,000 reports would have no
increase in total publication costs if no more than 50% of the shareholders requested full
accounts. This 'break-even-percentage' drops if the total number of annual accounts
published decreases [Hammill, 1979, pp. 87-90]. McKesson, which was the first major US
corporation to issue a summary accounting report after the SEC consented to it, saved about
$ 60,000 net as a result of switching to the summary format [Rezaee and Porter, 1988,
p. 46].
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simplified fmancial Statements. Small firms could be ignoring SARs because there
are insufficient cost savings or they might even result in an increase in costs.
However, very little is known about the incentives of management to issue (or not
issue) SARs and also the use of SARs and satisfaction of users with SARs are largely
unknown [Nair and Rittenberg, 1990, Lee and Morse, 1990, Schroeder and Gibson,
1992].
The idea of simplifying financial reporting requirements for all firms, at the least
provides a consistent solution to the standards overload problem. This option would
avoid many of the problems involved with most of the other options presented
before. Basically, the idea of SARs is not a differential reporting solution, thus
avoiding the problem of discriminating between which firms the simplifications
should or should not apply to.
Whether overall simplified reporting will provide an adequate solution to the
standards overload problem of small private firms remains open. Simplifying
financial statements hardly seems a solution to the problem of users who do not
understand accounting basics such as accounting principles and valuation methods.
The accounting language used would still be the same while the use of non-technical
terms may lead to the loss of precision and brevity and would only increase the
problem of the excessive volume of the accounts. Also, the impact on accounting
costs for firms seems limited since summary accounting reports can never fully
replace the full financial statements. But most importantly, the idea of using SARs
ignores all arguments that support the idea that financial reporting is different in the
context of small private firms and that financial reporting requirement for these firms
thus should be different from the requirements of large public firms.





In this appendix the exemptions for small firms provided in the Dutch company law are
discussed. A description of these requirements is essential, as they provide the basis for
determining the level of compliance with statutory requirements. For example, the
standard balance sheet model provided in the company law was used in the compliance
study to determine the correct naming of balance sheet items in financial statements
disclosed. Also, these models provide a point of reference for the volume of information
to be disclosed in the balance sheet. The exemptions provided for small firms are
defined in section 396 of Title 9 of the second book of the Civil Code and involve the
preparation, the audit and the disclosure of the financial statements.
A. The small firm regime
Dutch company law distinguishes between three categories of firms based on firm size,
by using three variables: total assets, total annual sales and number of employees (see
table 1). The cut-off points incorporated in the Dutch company law to define small and
medium-sized firms have since their introduction in 1983 been reset as early as 1985 as
well as in 1991 and 1995. Small and medium-sized companies are defined as any
company meeting at least two of the these criteria''*. The criteria are specified in such
a way that all exemptions for medium-sized firms also apply to small firms, since small
firms automatically meet the criteria for medium-sized firms. The exemptions included
' Evaluation of the size criteria is based on the accumulated numbers of all firms that would
be consolidated if consolidated accounts were required. The number of employees has to be
fully cumulated regardless the portion of share capital of a subsidiary owned by the parent
company. If a firm, based on the consolidated figures, meets the size criteria for a small or
medium-sized firm then the same regime applies to the consolidated accounts (that is, if
preparation of the consolidated accounts is required for the firm).
* The size criteria do not apply to banks and insurance companies.
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medium-sized or large firms if so desired*. , x.
Table 1. Size criteria for small and medium-sized firms
^ 1983 1985 1991 1995
5/notf
Jotal assets /3,000,000 /4,000,000 /5,000,000 /6,000,000
Net turnover /6,000,000 /8,000,000 /10,000,000 /12,000,000
Number of personnel < 50 < 50 < 50 < 50
Total assets /12,000,000 /17,000,000 /20,000,000 /24.000.000
Net turnover /24,000,000 /35,OOO,OOO /40,000,000 /48,000,000
Number of personnel < 250 < 250 < 250 < 250
To avoid firms that are near the upper limits for small or medium-sized company
changing regime every year as a result of small changes in firm size, rules have been
introduced that specify when a firm can or should change from one set of rules to
another. Three basic rules can be distinguished:
1. A starting firm, in its first two financial years, has to follow the regime conforming
to the size-criteria that are applicable at the end of the first financial year (section 398,
Title 9, Book 2, Civil Code).
2. A firm using the regime for a small or medium-sized firm should change regime only
if it has not met the criteria for the regime it is currently using for two consecutive
years (section 396 and 397, Title 9, Book 2, Civil Code).
3. A firm should apply the regime for a small or medium-sized firm only if it has met
the size criteria for that regime for two consecutive years (section 396 and 397, Title
9, Book 2, Civil Code).
If, for example, a starting firm meets the size criteria for a small firm it should follow
the regime for a small firm in the first two years (rule 1). In year three, it should still
apply the small regime even if it meets the size criteria for a medium-sized firm (rule
2)*. In year 4 it has to comply with the regulation for medium-sized firms (rule 3) and
remain doing so in year 5 (rule 2). Finally, in year 6, rule 2 prohibits the firm from
using any of the exemptions for small and medium-sized firms (see table below).
' The shareholders' meeting has to take a decision on following a different regime within six
months after the start of the financial year (section 398, clause 2, Title 9, Book 2, Civil Code)
* If in year 3 or year 4 the firm should not meet the size criteria for a small or medium-sized
firm, it would have to change from the small regime in year 3 to the requirements for large
firms in year 4 (rule 2 demands a change of regime in year 4 but rule 3 prohibits the use of
the medium regime in either year).






















B. Requirements for the preparation of small company accounts .
Preparation requirements for small firms concern (1) the director's report, (2) the
financial statements (balance sheet, profit and loss account and notes to the financial
statements) and (3) complementary information. Requirements regarding the contents
of the directors report are equal for small, medium-sized and large firms'. Also,
regarding the contents of the complementary information there are no exemptions for
small firms'.
For the balance-sheet and profit and loss account there are separate models to be used
by small firms (see tables 2 and 3). These models contain less information compared to
those of large firms, in the balance sheet mostly because detail-accounts are omitted and
in the profit and loss account because some accounts can be combined'. The profit and
loss account does not provide information on the net sales of the company but only on
the gross-margin (net sales less cost of sales). Instead, a small firm has to provide the
change in net sales in relation to the previous financial year. If consolidated accounts
are available, the company profit and loss account should only provide information on
the share in profit of subsidiaries.
' The director's report should give information about expectations on future developments
concerning investments, company-financing, personnel, research and development and
circumstances that might have an impact on the company sales or profitability (section 391,
Title 9, Book 2, Civil Code).
It should be noted here that a recent change in the Dutch company law has resulted in the
cancelling of the requirement for small companies to prepare the director's report unless the
company has a works council (section 396, clause 6, Title 9, Book 2, Civil Code).
' Complementary information includes information on profit distribution, profit-sharing bonds,
statutory rights of control and financial information on subsidiaries not part of the group.
' Models for the financial statements are included in the 'General Administrative Order on
Models' of December 23, 1983, amended March 19, 1985. This Order includes two balance-
sheet models for large and medium-sized firms and two balance sheet models for small firms
(in both cases a columnar and an account form model). For the profit and loss account there
are four models for large and medium-sized firms and two models for small firms. The Order
further entails a number of articles including detailed instructions as to when the name of an
item may be changed, when items may be combined, added or left out and what changes in the
sequence of items are allowed.
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The exemptions provided for small (and also medium-sized) firms all concern
differential recognition, i.e. the incorporation of items in the financial statements. Dutch
company law does not provide any differential measurement rules. So, as far as
valuation methods and income measurement is concerned, no exemptions for small or
medium-sized firms are provided. . r , ,.,..,.
The most extensive exemptions concern the notes on the financial statements. Detailed
information on convertible loans, long-term loans, net sales, payment of directors and
commissioners, provisions and fixed assets do not have to be provided by small firms.
However, even with these exemptions the number of items to be included in the notes
is still quite extensive (see table 4). Any exemption permitted by company law can be
dismissed by the shareholders' meeting within six months after the ending of the
financial year. The shareholders of a small firm can also, within the same period, decide
to follow the regime of medium-sized or large firms. ......
Regarding the time table for the completion of the financial statements there are no
exemptions for small firms, which means that the preparation of the accounts has to be
completed within five months after the ending of the financial year. Within six month
after the end of the financial year the financial statements have to be ready for approval
by the shareholders' meeting*. If the accounts are not approved by the shareholders'
meeting within seven months, the financial statements have to be disclosed anyway,
including a deposition that the financial statements have not yet been approved. In the
case of special circumstances, the shareholders' meeting can increase the period for
' In between, the shareholders' meeting has to convene and the accounts have to be kept at the
head office of the firm for inspection by the shareholders. Often, however, the financial
statements are sent to all shareholders. For large firms, a period of 1 month may be rather
short to realise all this, but in small firms with a relatively small number of shareholders it
should cause few problems. ... -...•>•
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preparation by a maximum of six months. In that case, the financial statements have to
be presented to the shareholders' meeting for approval within two months after the
preparation is completed. So, the financial statements would have to be ready for
approval by the shareholders' meeting no longer than thirteen months after the ending
of the financial year (section 394). If the accounts have not been approved within this
period, they have to be filed anyway to prevent firms from delaying the filing of the
accounts infinitely.
Table 3. Standard abridged profit and loss account. >..•<,- ,••, <•••.•"•




Profit on fixed asset investments
Other interest receivable
Revaluation of fixed asset investments
Interest payable







Taxes on extraordinary items
Net profit
Small firms are exempted from the obligation to prepare consolidated accounts (section
407). If consolidated accounts are prepared anyway, the exemptions provided by the
regime for small companies apply equally. Finally, firms can be exempted from
preparing financial statements if they are part of a group and the financial statements are
incorporated in the consolidated accounts of the parent company'. In that case, the
content of the balance sheet is limited to five items (fixed assets, current assets,
shareholders' equity, provisions and debts) and the profit and loss accounts consists of
only two items (results of ordinary activities after tax and extraordinary results after
tax). All other requirements for preparation of the financial statements do not apply.
i
' There are some additional requirements that are laid down in section 403 of title 9 of the
second book of the Dutch Civil Code.
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* valuation methods
* depreciation methods
* valuation of foreign currencies
* methods used for calculating taxes and provisions
* changes in policies including the impact of such changes on the equity and result of the company
* amortisation period for goodwill (if not 5 years) and mentioning of the reason
* debtors falling due within a year
* detailed information about issued and paid up capital, including the allotted share capital (in case
the share capital has not been fully paid up) and the number of allotted shares and their nominal
value by class.
* information about changes in share capital, including the number and nominal value of the
company's shares allotted during the financial year, and the method of payment for shares and the
nature of contracts relating to shares issued otherwise than for cash
* summary of changes in the revaluation reserve
* information about statutory reserves
* information about self owned share-capital, including the number and nominal value and the name
of the reserves from which the value of such shares has been deduced.
* information about transactions in self owned share-capital (public companies only)
* reason for any difference between parent company capital and reserves and consolidated capital and
reserves (consolidated accounts only)
* interest of outside shareholders of consolidated group companies (consolidated accounts only)
* liabilities due within a year
* liabilities not due within 5 years
* interest rate for long term liabilities
* amount of secured long term and current liabilities
* collateral provided for debts
* amount of long term and current liabilities for which the company has undertaken to charge or not
to charge assets as security
* guarantees given in behalf of third parties, separate mentioning of guarantees for the benefit of
group companies and for the benefit of affiliated non-group companies and a classification of
guarantees to their legal nature.
* long term financial obligations not appearing on the balance sheet
* loans to directors, former directors, commissioners and former commissioners, including the
outstanding amounts, rate of interest, important conditions and repayments.
* list of subsidiaries and participations, including the name and address and the percentage of capital
held.
* name and address of the ultimate holding company.
* name, office address and place where the published consolidated accounts of each upstream
consolidating company may be obtained
* list of consolidated company's and of participations held by them (consolidated accounts only)
* change in net sales compared with the previous year (in percentages)
* salaries, wages and social security premiums, separately stating pension costs
* number of employees, in total and analyzed by business
* notes on extraordinary items
* devaluation of fixed assets
* exceptional adjustments to value of current assets
* amount released from revaluation reserve
* retained profits
* impact of changes in revaluation reserves on profits
* details about any difference between parent company profit or loss and the consolidated profit or
loss (consolidated accounts only)
202rä/ Äepo/Ti/ig /toyH/remenw/or SHUJ// Ditfc/i F/rrar
C. Requirements for the audit of small company accounts
Small firms do not have to have their accounts audited unless the shareholders meeting,
within six months after the ending of the financial year decides otherwise. The
obligation of an audit can also be part of the company's statutes.
D. Requirements for the disclosure of small company accounts
The disclosure requirements for small firms only apply to the balance sheet and the
notes to the balance sheet. The director's report, the profit and loss account including
the notes thereto, and the complementary information do not have to be filed with the
Chamber of Commerce. The balance sheet has to be disclosed as prepared but several
items in the notes to the financial statements are excluded from disclosure'". The profit
and loss account, the directors report as well as the complementary information of a
small firm is not disclosed, leaving information on the firm's profits and the proposal
for the distribution of the profits unrevealed.
The information required has to be filed with the Commercial Register of the Chamber ™
of Commerce in the district in which the legal entity has its registered office within eight
working days after the approval of the financial statements by the shareholders' meeting.
If the period for approval of the accounts has expired, the non-approved accounts have
to be filed within two months after the date of expiration. This means that if the period
for the completion of the accounts has been extended by the maximum of six months,
the accounts would be disclosed at least thirteen months after the ending of the financial
year.
Small firms are exempted from all disclosure requirements if the firm:
7. is a non-profit organisation, and
2. sends the balance sheet and the accompanying notes to the debtholders and
shareholders at their request and free of charge, and
3. files a statement with the Commercial Register by a public accountant stating that (1)
the firm was not involved in any activities beyond the firm's objectives and (2) the
relevant section in the company law applies (section 3%, Par. 8, Title 9, Book 2 of the
Dutch Civil Code).
Apart from the exemptions mentioned above based on the size of a firm, there are
exemptions based on other than size-criteria". Regarding small firms, the most
'° The exemption applies to the information on movements in allotted share capital and self
owned shares held as mentioned in section 378, clause 3.
" These exemptions based on criteria of various natures can be found in section 12, Title 9,
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code and concern special requirements for insurance companies,
banks and group-companies
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important one is that a group-firm, of which the financial data are being consolidated
in the financial statements of the parent-firm, can be exempted from the disclosure of
the complete financial statements if the parent company declares itself to be liable for
all debts of the subsidiary. In that case, the accounts of the parent company have to be
filed together with the statement of liability. Also, the preparation requirements for the
accounts for these firms are restricted to an extremely small balance-sheet and profit and
loss account, jointly containing only seven items'*.
" The items are (1) fixed assets, (2) current assets, (3) equity, (4) provisions and (5) liabilities
for the balance sheet (6) results from normal company activities after taxes and (7) other results
after taxes on the profit and loss account. Public companies have to disclose this summary
balance sheet together with the accounts of the parent company and the statement of liability.
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217218Samenvatting
Het doel van deze dissertatie is bij te dragen aan de literatuur op het gebied van de
economische effecten van regelgeving van externe financiele verslaggeving door
ondernemingen. Daarbij rieht deze Studie zieh in het bijzonder op de economische
gevolgen voor kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen. In het bijzonder worden de
volgende vragen empirisch onderzocht:
• in hoeverre voldoen kleine ondernemingen aan de wettelijke verplichtingen die er in
Nederland bestaan rond de externe financiele verslaggeving van ondernemingen?
• wat zijn de opvattingen van managers van kleine ondernemingen ten aanzien van het
bestaan en de gevolgen van deze Nederlandse wet- en regelgeving?
• wat zijn de kosten voor kleine ondernemingen die zijn verbonden aan de samenstelling
en publikatie van het financiele jaarverslag en in hoeverre zijn deze kosten bei'nvloed
door de bestaande wet- en regelgeving op dit gebied?
• wat zijn de opvattingen van gebruikers, met name bankmedewerkers, ten aanzien van
het belang van het financiele jaarverslag van kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen?
Binnen het vakgebied van de financiele berichtgeving door ondernemingen (financial
accounting) bestaat er een uitgebreide discussie omtrent het nut van en de noodzaak voor
regelgeving van de financiele verslaggeving door ondernemingen. Deze discussie heeft
zieh met name toegespitst op de situatie rond grote (beurs-) ondernemingen. Een
belangrijke reden hiervoor is dat in de VS, de federate regelgeving op dit gebied
uitsluitend van toepassing is op beursondernemingen. Daardoor bestaat er binnen de VS
relatief weinig aandacht voor de gevolgen van regelgeving voor kleine ondernemingen
of voor ondernemingen die niet op een aandelenbeurs worden verhandeld.
Recente ontwikkelingen binnen de Europese Unie (EU) met betrekking tot de wetgeving
voor de financiele jaarverslaggeving van ondernemingen, hebben er toe geleid dat in de
EU-lidstaten deze wetgeving niet is beperkt tot grote ondernemingen maar ook van
toepassing is op kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen. Daarmee ontstaat de vraag of de
argumenten die in de discussie rond regelgeving van financiele verslaggeving door grote
open ondernemingen worden gebruikt, op dezelfde wijze van toepassing zijn op kleine
en middelgrote besloten ondernemingen.
Daarnaast doet het feit dat er binnen de EU wetgeving voor de financiele verslaggeving
voor kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen bestaat, de vraag reizen wat de gevolgen van
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de naleving van de bestaande wettelijke regels lijkt in het kader van klein en middelgrote
ondernemingen van bijzonder belang. Immers, gezien het grote aantal ondernemingen
lijkt het, mede gezien het ontbreken van een verplichte accountantscontrole voor kleine
ondernemingen, moeilijk een adequate controle op de naleving van de wettelijke
vereisten uit te voeren.
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de economische theorieen met betrekking tot de wenselijkheid
van wetgeving van financiele verslaggeving besproken. De argumenten die worden
gebruikt binnen de public interest benadering en de private interest benadering worden
hier behandeld. Tevens wordt een overzicht gegeven van de relevante empirische
literatuur die op dit gebied is versehenen. Het hoofdstuk gaat in op de vraag of de
argumenten die in beide theorieen worden gehanteerd in gelijke mate van toepassing zijn
op kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen. Een belangrijk aspect hierbij is dat
regelgeving niet alleen afhangt van de omvang van de betrokken onderneming maar ook
van andere factoren, met name de ondernemingsvorm.
In het tweede deel van dit hoofdstuk wordt ingegaan op de vraag waarom regelgeving
voor kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen anders zou moeten zijn dan regelgeving voor
grote ondernemingen.
Daarnaast wordt uitgebreid aandacht geschonken aan de vraag of verschillen in
ondernemingsvorm aanleiding geven om verschillen in regelgeving te beargumenteren.
Hierbij wordt met name ingegaan op de verschillende rol die het fmanciele jaarverslag
speelt bij naamloze vennootschappen en besloten vennootschappen.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een gedetailleerde analyse uitgevoerd met betrekking tot de
fmanciele jaarverslagen die door kleine ondernemingen in Nederland worden
gedeponeerd bij het handelsregister van de diverse Kamers van Koophandel. Daarbij is
aandacht geschonken aan de tijdigheid van deponering en zijn een aantal
kwaliteitsaspecten van de gepubliceerde jaarstukken onderzocht. In het onderzoek is
gebruik gemaakt van jaarverslagen met betrekking tot het boekjaar 1984 en met
betrekking tot het boekjaar 1991. Het boekjaar 1984 is het eerste boekjaar waarop de
Nederlandse regelgeving rond de fmanciele verslaggeving van kleine ondernemingen van
toepassing is. Jaarverslagen uit 1991 zijn aan het onderzoek toegevoegd om te
onderzoeken of de verschillende kwaliteitsaspecten van de gepubliceerde jaarstukken in
de loop der tijd zijn veranderd.
Uit gegevens omtrent het aantal bij het handelsregister gedeponeerde jaarstukken kan
worden afgeleid dat hoewel een belangrijk deel (±50%) van de kleine vennootschappen
geen jaarstukken over het boekjaar 1984 heeft gedeponeerd, de naleving van de
deponeringsplicht in latere jaren sterk is verbeterd en dat met betrekking tot het boekjaar
1991 zo'n 85% van alle betrokken kleine ondernemingen aan de deponeringsplicht heeft
voldaan. Daarbij dient te worden aangetekend dat ook in latere jaren het overgrote deel
van de gedeponeerde jaarstukken (91 % met betrekking tot 1984 en 81 % met betrekking
tot 1991) later dan 13 maanden na het einde van het betreffende boekjaar wordt
gedeponeerd.
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standaardmodellen voor de balans is de vergelijkbaarheid van de gedeponeerde
jaarstukken van kleine onderaemingen toegenomen in de loop der tijd. Met betrekking
tot de hoeveelheid en de gedetailleerdheid van de informatie in de gedeponeerde
jaarstukken blijkt echter dat ook in 1991 veel jaarstukken een beperkte hoeveelheid
informatie bevatten. Het is echter moeilijk om vast te stellen of het ontbreken van
informatie-items die op basis van de wetgeving dienen te worden gepubliceerd door
kleine onderaeming een gevolg is van het niet naleven van de wettelijke regels door de
betrokken ondememingen of dat de betreffende gegevens niet van toepassing zijn op de
betrokken onderaemingen.
Hoofdstuk 4 bevat de resultaten van een enquete onderzoek onder zo'n 560 managers
en eigenaars van kleine Nederlandse onderaemingen. De enquete heeft enerzijds
betrekking op de opvattingen van de respondenten omtrent de externe financiele
verslaggeving in het algemeen en omtrent de gevolgen van de in 1983 geintroduceerde
wetgeving op dit gebied in het bijzonder. Uit de resultaten van deze Studie blijkt de
financiele verslaggeving binnen kleine ondememingen geen belangrijk probleemgebied
vormt. Hoewel het duidelijk is dat managers van kleine ondememingen weinig nut zien
in het publiceren van nun financiele jaarverslag, blijken de bestaande wettelijke regels
geen systematisch negatieve reactie bij de respondenten op te roepen.
In het tweede deel van dit hoofdstuk wordt aandacht geschonken aan de kosten voor
kleine onderaemingen die samenhangen met de samenstelling en publikatie van de
financiele jaarstukken. Tevens is daarbij aandacht geschonken aan de vraag of de in
1983 geintroduceerde wettelijke regels hebben geleid tot een significante verhoging van
de verslaggevingskosten voor kleine onderaemingen. Hoewel kan worden aangetoond
dat de aanpassing van de Nederlandse wetgeving heeft geleid tot een kostenverhoging
voor kleine ondememingen, dient hierbij te worden aangemerkt dat voor alle betrokken
ondememingen de verslaggevingskosten slechts een zeer beperkt deel van de totale
kosten van de onderneming uitmaken. Wei kan worden aangetoond dat de relatieve
verlaggevingskosten hoger zijn naarmate de omvang van de onderneming afneemt. In
combinatie met ander bestaand onderzoek kan worden gedemonstreerd dat een dergelijk
verband zieh tevens uitstrekt over middelgrote en grote onderaemingen. Het feit dat de
relatieve kosten voor kleine onderaemingen hoger zijn dan de relatieve kosten voor grote
ondememingen geeft een indicatie dat de bestaande vrijstellingen binnen de Nederlandse
wetgeving geen volledige compensatie voor kleine ondememingen inhouden.
Hoofdstuk 5 bevat een Studie onder een belangrijke gebruikersgroep van financiele
jaarverslagen: banken. In dit onderzoek zijn 200 medewerkers van banken die zijn
betrokken bij het verstrekken van kredieten aan kleine en middelgrote ondememingen
door middel van een schriftelijke enquete benaderd. Doel van dit onderzoek is na te
gaan in hoeverre de respondenten belang hechten aan de jaarlijkse publikatie van het
financiele jaarverslag door kleine en middelgrote ondememingen. De resultaten geven
aan dat bij kredietaanvragen van middelgrote ondememingen de jaarstukken een
belangrijke bron van informatie voor de bank is maar dat daarnaast ook niet financiele
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bedrijfsbezoeken een veel gevallen een grote rol spelen.
In combinatie met bestaand onderzoek op dit gebied kan tevens worden aangegeven dat
naarmate de omvang van de onderneming afneemt, het belang van de financiele
jaarstukken in het kredietverstrekkingsproces afneemt en er meer belang wordt gehecht
aan andere bronnen van informatie. Hierbij dient echter te worden aangemerkt dat zowel
in dit onderzoek als in ander vergelijkbaar onderzoek er met betrekking tot de vraag of
de informatiebehoeften van banken afhangen van de omvang van de onderneming een
grote mate van onenigheid onder respondenten bestaat.
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